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Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-94-165
Thursday
25 August 1994

Daily Report

East Europe

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NOTICE TO READERS: All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.
An Ω indicates a Foreign Media Note.

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Public Order Ministry on Deportations by Greece

AU2408110294 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Announcement issued by the Public Order Ministry; place and date not given]

[Text] The Public Order Ministry reports that since 15 August 1994, when the trial of five ethnic Greek Albanian citizens began, the Greek authorities have deported 12,830 persons altogether via three border-crossing points.

Up to now, 8,348 people have been deported via the Kapshtice crossing, where the flow of refugees was the greatest; 4,249 people have been deported via the Kakavije border crossing point; and 233 persons via Sarande.

Besides the large number of those maltreated and the deportation of more than 180 people supplied with regular documents, the Greek authorities have handed over the bodies of several dead Albanian citizens.

On 19 August 1994, the Greek authorities returned the body of Ermin Hysen Gjoka, 23, resident of Turhan in Tepelene, who was gunned down by the Greek police.

On the same day, the Greek authorities returned Ali Reci, 24, resident of Brezhan in Peshkopi, with a broken spine resulting from mistreatment by the Greek police.

On 20 August 1994, the Greek police returned the body of Xhuma Fatmir Taho, 32, resident of Vranisht in Devoll.

On 22 August 1994, the Greek authorities returned the body of Dritan Elez Muca, 19, resident of Orzhanov in Bulqize.

On 23 August 1994, another body was returned, that of Renato Selaudin Muca, 19, from Lac and resident in Tirana. A hard blow to the back of the head was noticed.

Meanwhile, the Greek authorities continue to deport Albanian refugees, although a part of them were supplied with regular documents and employed there.

Berisha, CSCE Envoy View Greek Minority Issues

AU2408112894 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] Shortly after arriving in Tirana, CSCE High Commissioner Van der Stoel was received by Albanian President Sali Berisha.

President Berisha welcomed the CSCE high commissioner for minorities, saying he was very pleased to meet him again. Since our first meeting, he said, I can tell you that your assessments have been very important and objective and the problems you raised have been fully accomplished.

He informed Van der Stoel that an office close to the prime minister is now functioning, dealing with minority problems. We have fully resolved the education problem in conformity with the Copenhagen Charter, he said, according to which a minority should have the right to be taught or learn its mother tongue. That is why the government's decision issued yesterday completely settled this problem.

Of course, he continued, Greek nationalist circles who are fighting to Hellenize southern Albania will never be pleased, but it is very important for us to apply the Copenhagen and Helsinki standards to the treatment of minorities. This also does not please Greek nationalists who eliminated the official language of the Albanian State, i.e. Albanian, from many minority schools by paying bribes, thus creating an unprecedented case in Europe and the world.

He said that he wanted to tell the high commissioner and the CSCE that hidden behind the hullabaloo for treating the Greek minority in Albania lies Greece's sole aim to camouflage problems that Greece itself has with its minorities. For this reason, he invites Greece to apply to its minorities the same standards that Albania applies to the Greek minority in Albania.

Regarding the trial of six Albanian citizens of Greek origin, President Berisha stressed that the trial is open and independent, while their claims of being mistreated during the investigation do not stand. You met them personally while they were in jail, he said, and they did not tell you such a thing. The Albanian Prosecutor's Office possesses sufficient evidence to confirm the untruthfulness of these statements.

President Berisha added that Albania had signed the agreement on not using torture, and assured Mr. Van der Stoel that it rigorously applies it and will do so in the future.

Regarding relations with Greece, the president stressed that these are very tense. The latest acts, the sweeping operation, the purge of Albanian refugees, the killing and raids in the streets of Greece, the violation of Albanian air space, and the distribution of leaflets calling for the overthrow of order in Albania constitute, he declared, a serious provocation that cannot be explained as the action of a solitary cavalier or adventurous colonel. He noted that these have naturally aggravated relations between both countries and increased tension.

If this man faces trial and all organizers and collaborators are identified and punished, he remarked, this will mean that the Greek Government is taking a more principled stance. Regarding relations with Greece, President Berisha stressed that we continue to believe that there is room for dialogue between the two countries. However, our repeated invitation has met with a categorical refusal from the Greek side, which seems not to be ready for the bilateral contacts that we consider possible. If these are impossible for Greece, he went on, we invite Greece for talks in the presence of a third party, which could be the CSCE, the European Union Presidency, the United States, or any other state or international institution that both sides would agree upon.

For his part, Mr. Van der Stoel highly praised the efforts of the Albanian Government in implementing minority rights and assessed the Albanian Government stance as open, helpful, and ready to cooperate in this direction.

Prosecutor's Office Rejects Prisoners' Claims

AU2408151294 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Statement issued by the Tirana Prosecutor's Office; place and date not given]

[Text] Regarding the irresponsible claims by defendants Bezhani, Sirmo, Qirjako, Marto, and Papakristo that they were arrested unlawfully, mistreated at the Investigation Office, were not offered or allowed defense counsel, were not acquainted with or did not have time to get acquainted with the indictment, were not told the names of the interrogators, and that an investigation has been initiated into Omonoia, the Tirana Prosecutor's Office declares the following:

1. The process of detention and arrest was carried out in strict accordance with the Penal Procedure Code and the Penal Code of Albania. Their arrest was made by the Tirana Prosecutor's Office on the basis of the decision of 21 April 1994, which is contained in the file. The defendants and their counsels have so far not submitted any request to change the state of arrest in accordance with the right provided them by law. The examination of their houses and the confiscation of compromising documents was carried out in accordance with the law.

2. The interrogation of the defendants began on 21 April 1994 and was completed on 30 June 1994. It was carried out in two- to three-hour sessions and a written report was prepared for each session. In each case, the defendants were permitted to freely express their claims and demands regarding the indictment. During the investigation, no kind of violence was done to the defendants as they claim. To substantiate this the Prosecutor's Office possesses a complete file of evidence that will be presented to the court. In all reports of the interrogation sessions it is recorded whether the defendant wanted a counsel or not or whether he wanted to confess in the absence of a counsel.

3. First, defendant Kosta Qirjako asked for Counsel Hanxhari from Gjirokaster, who refused to defend him, and later for Counsel Ngjela, who refused to take part in the defense. Finally, the defendant's family appointed Counsel Kico Ngjela, who was accepted by the defendant himself. This counsel attended the last sessions when the defendant was interrogated.

4. All written reports about the investigation process are signed by the defendants and bear the name of the interrogator. In the majority of them, the defendants themselves acknowledged in their own hand the truthfulness of the testimonies and the regularity of the way in which the report was compiled.

5. The investigation file was completed on 30 June 1994 and the indictment handed over to the defendants against their signature on 20 July 1994. According to the available documentation, every defendant had the investigation file and counsels at his disposal for more than sufficient time.

6. The counsels for the defendants have not filed any complaint to the court about being unable to become acquainted with the file and have not requested the postponement of the trial as defined by law.

7. It is not true that investigations have been initiated against the Omonoia organization. In the case in point, the object of the investigation was the criminal acts committed by the five defendants, for which they are being tried.

Socialist Party Chairman on Relations With Greece

AU2408184394 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 21 Aug 94 p 1

[Report on interview with Luan Hajdaraga, chairman of the Albanian Socialist Party, by Ardian Myslimi; place and date not given: "We Emphasize Once Again the Urgent Need for Dialogue Between Albania and Greece"]

[Text] In the last few days, RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE and the Albanian Radio-Television [RTSh] have been "picking up" declarations made by the PS [Socialist Party] leaders for the foreign press, describing them as antinational. Referring to these misinterpretations and insinuations, the journalist Ardian Myslimi addressed PS Vice Chairman Luan Hajdaraga, who stated as follows:

We have made known to the media the PS stands on the recent developments of the political situation in Albania. Thus, with regard to the trial of the five Albanian citizens of Greek origin, last Sunday, on 14 August 1994, I personally declared to the newspaper ZERI I POPULLIT that our diplomacy cannot exhaust its means of action through court trials, and that the problems existing between our two countries must be solved by our two diplomacies through good faith, dialogue, and tolerance. I have also underlined that the trial of the five citizens of the Greek minority is proceeding in a charged atmosphere of relationships between Greece and Albania, and it is for this reason that we are of the opinion that it creating great undesirable political effects that will only exacerbate the already highly charged atmosphere between our two countries.

This is the logic that leads to a just solution of the problems, building bridges of communication and dialogue between our two neighboring countries and peoples. We have always complied with this logic and attitude. Notwithstanding the recent tensions, we have urged the respective governments to stand above the incidents and see the relationships between Albania and Greece on a longer- term basis. We therefore once again stress the urgent need for dialogue between Albania and Greece.

Strangely enough, the RTSh and some government newspapers do not pay any attention to our straightforward and public stands, which are in full conformity with our national interests, peace, and stability in the Balkans. On the contrary, on recent RTSh news bulletins and on the pages of RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE, accusations and innuendoes have been reiterated in a banal way, flagrantly distorting for political purposes the stands and declarations of the PS and its leaders by doctoring the statements by patching together separate pieces of the declarations they have made for foreign media.

Even in this difficult situation, the PS expresses its already known attitude toward the existing difficulties between Greece and Albania, which must be resolved through dialogue and good understanding, considering the relationships of good neighborliness between our two peoples as a factor for peace and stability in the Balkans.

We have already underscored that the Greek minority in Albania should be a factor of friendship and harmony with neighboring Greece. They are Albanian citizens and must abide by the laws of the Albanian State, and at the same time, as an ethnic minority, they must enjoy all the freedoms and rights they are entitled to under the fundamental legal documents such as the Law on Human Rights and Freedoms.

Thus, if the five minority defendants who are being tried by the Tirana Court will be punished for their political beliefs, then we, the socialists, will demand their release, something that we do for all other political prisoners. This a clear cut stand and does not leave any room for ambiguity. In a democratic state, nobody—not politicians, members of a minority, or former political prisoners can be denied their inalienable right to hold their own political convictions.

We see with regret how the open stands of the PS, which are in full harmony with our national interests, are being distorted in a flagrant way for propaganda purposes, something that can by no means serve the appeasement of the political situation, but tends to strain it further.

Berisha Says Woerner's Death 'Great Loss'

AU2408154994 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] Today, Albanian President Sali Berisha expressed his condolences to the FRG Embassy in Tirana over the death of Mr. Manfred Woerner. Over to Bujar Muharremi:

[Muharremi] President Sali Berisha paid a courtesy visit to the FRG Embassy today to express his condolences over the death of Mr. Manfred Woerner, former NATO secretary general. On this occasion, President Berisha highly praised Manfred Woerner as a celebrated politician while member of the German parliament and German defense minister. He stated that Woerner made a great contribution particularly in NATO's framework.

President Berisha left the following note in the condolences book: With the death of Manfred Woerner, Germany lost a distinguished statesman, while the Atlantic Alliance lost one of its more outstanding leaders since its foundation. Albanians lost one of their most precious friends. Mr. Woerner's death is a great loss for your country and the Atlantic Alliance.

He gave a great contribution to the restructuring of the Atlantic Alliance, President Berisha stressed during a conversation with Mr. Otto Graff.

Representatives of the diplomatic corps accredited in Tirana also paid homages today.

Rights Group on 'Political' Use of Security Files

AU2408184494 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 20 Aug 94 p 1

[Declaration issued by the "Albanian Helsinki Committee;" place and date not given]

[Text] The Albanian Helsinki Committee reminds both the public opinion and the national authorities that last June this committee hosted a symposium dedicated to the problems of former state security secret files. The symposium was attended by a considerable number of participants, representing various Albanian and foreign political bodies.

One of the main conclusions reached through the debates was that this issue should be separately dealt with, so as to give it a thorough and final solution in the form of a law approved by the parliament. Among other things, it was demanded that the files should by no means be prematurely used for political needs of the moment. Cases of using the files against a number of persons were denounced.

We observe with regret that this practice is still going on with impunity. In a communique by the Ministry of Public Order on the hunger strike of the former political detainees, certain assertions with regard to several strikers were made, describing them as "incrimated" and "former security agents." Such a method is incompatible with the norms of a constructive debate in the conditions of a democratic order. It is the exclusive competence of the judicial authorities to declare defendants guilty or not guilty.

Starting from this particular case, the Albanian Helsinki Committee once again calls for due attention to the problem of security files, urging its serious treatment and demanding that any attempt to use the files as a means of political struggle be thwarted.

[Signed] The Albanian Helsinki Committee

Article Views Turkey's Bulgarian Minority Policy

AU2408182794 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 19 Aug 94 p 1

[Report by Radka Petrova: "Turkey Does Not Recognize Any Bulgarians on Its Territory"]

[Text] According to the official Turkish authorities, no Bulgarians whatsoever are living in Turkey. Bulgarians are not listed among the 28 officially recognized ethnic groups. As is known, the Turkish Constitution does not admit the existence of minorities within the limits of its country, but allows the existence of ethnic groups. Armenians, Jews, Gypsies, Walachians, Albanians, Russians, and a number of other ethnic groups are living in Turkey according to the latest official census; only the Bulgarians are missing.

Only 600 people have remained from the large Bulgarian community in Istanbul and Edirne of the past, historians recall. Constantinople Bulgarians are registered in their Turkish passports under their first names, which are Bulgarian, but their family names are spelled and pronounced in the Turkish manner, according to rules. Well-informed sources claim that the Bulgarians in Turkey have two names each, a Bulgarian name and a Turkish name. Dozens of families that have refused over several years to obey the request to become Turkish subjects are provided only with documents of temporary residence, although being born in Turkey. They are not entitled to work in the Civil Service, to have bank accounts, or to enjoy full civil rights as long as their names are not listed with a Turkish ending in their passports.

Along with the Turkification of Bulgarians in our southern neighboring country, a secret process of Hellenization is going on, conducted with Byzantine refinement and cunning. Elderly Bulgarians living in Istanbul who have no pensions because they have not worked for the Civil Service are offered financial assistance from the Greek side. A well-known source, who prefers to remain anonymous, reports that Greek parliamentarians proposed a pension amounting to 18 million Turkish liras to the Bulgarian priest, Reverend Kostadin Kostov, if he would pledge allegiance to the Greek community. Father Kostadin refused to do so, while some other individuals from the Bulgarian community accepted.

The neglect of the Holy Synod regarding the Bulgarian community in Turkey is a cause of concern for our compatriots. The recent scandal that erupted on the occasion of the Orthodox Church Patriarchate in Istanbul forcing Bulgarians to have their baptism certificates written in the Greek language is under control, however, our fellow countrymen are still waiting for the Holy Synod to send them Bulgarian language forms for such certificates.

While the existence of Bulgarians in Turkey is at stake, corrupt individuals, mainly from the Greek clergy, are purchasing real estate in the center of the Istanbul "Fener" district, where the Central Orthodox Patriarchate has its residence. They bequeath their property to the Greek Orthodox Church, thus increasing its influence in Istanbul. Well-informed circles claim that the Greeks are granted the funds for purchasing real estate in Istanbul from U.S. banks.

Regardless of the fact that no Bulgarians exist in Turkey, according to the official authorities, the life of our community in Istanbul is carefully watched by the "Ethnic Minorities" Department of the Turkish Police. The life of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in Istanbul is also observed vigilantly by the same authorities.

Socialist Party Leader on Post-Election Coalition

AU2408182894 Sofia NOVINI 5 in Bulgarian 19 Aug 94 p 9

[Interview with Zhan Videnov, leader of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP, by Rozalina Evdokimova; place and date not given: "Modern Left-Wing Party of Democratic Socialism—This Is the BSP!"]

[Excerpts] [Evdokimova] In setting the date for the referendum on the program of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], were you influenced by the opinion of certain members of the Supreme Council who think that September is the most suitable month for holding the referendum?

[Videnov] First of all we took into account the necessity of providing as many BSP members as possible with the opportunity to express their opinion on the final version of the draft party program. They need time to study the draft program and therefore we hastened to publish it. Thus we will utilize the one-month period allocated for this purpose by the 41st BSP Congress and will prompt the BSP members to take part in the referendum. The period from mid-September to mid-October will be used for holding meetings in the primary party organizations at which the draft program will be discussed, clarified, and adopted through an open or secret vote by the BSP members. Those who cannot take part in the meeting and are prevented from establishing contact with the primary party organizations could nevertheless vote afterward in the referendum for or against the draft program. Actually, September is not the most convenient month, but the congress decision on holding the referendum is not a formal one. It is related to our comprehensive concept regarding the political calendar until the end of the year, and naturally, with the necessity of holding early parliamentary elections somewhere in November-December, something the BSP considers absolutely necessary. [passage omitted]

[Evdokimova] As a BSP leader, how do you think the party should be described best? What adjective do you prefer—modern, left-wing or modern?

[Videnov] I do not think that these concept should be turned into a fetish. We must be extremely precise in this respect in order to cope in the most efficient manner with their formalistic side, while seeking their best common denominator. Without rejecting the new party, modern party, and party of renewing socialism concepts, I think that the shortest and clearest description, which appears repeatedly in the party manifest, platform, and now—the party program—entitled "New Times, New Bulgaria, New BSP" is a modern left-wing party of democratic socialism. This is the shortest possible, and simultaneously, the fullest description of the party, which by no means negates the other descriptions. [passage omitted]

[Evdokimova] The last question. What is the basic obstacle that still prevents the implementation of a coalition between the BSP and the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party?

[Videnov] I think that there is almost no obstacle to creating a post-election left-wing-center coalition, which would form the next Bulgarian Government. The only difficulty is outside the parties themselves and it is related to the lack of clarity regarding their success in attracting the voters and winning society's confidence. The prospects of the various formations differ in this respect. Moreover, the prospects of certain formations are not especially rosy. We greet the maximum unity and concentration of the left-wing-center forces and wish them success in the upcoming political tests. We will facilitate this as much as possible through the means of legislation. [passage omitted]

Commentary: Politicians Lack 'Patriotism'

AU2408201794 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 22 Aug 94 p 4

[Commentary by Konstantin Subchev: "Selfish Patriotism"]

[Text] This year thousands of Bulgarians again rallied on the historical site of Petrova Niva to pay tribute to the memory of the heroes who perished in the Transfiguration Day [Preobrazhensko Vuzstanie] uprising, as they have been doing for several decades.

This time, the ceremony could really be called a people's celebration, because none of our statesmen made the effort to pay their respects to our heroes who sacrificed their lives for our national liberation by attending the event. Only the presence of Bishop Yoanakiy added some official character to the commemoration. Evidently the temptation of vacationing on the Black Sea coast prevailed over the last shreds of the politicians' historical consciousness and sense of responsibility. Even President Zhelev who in the previous years never failed to attend such ceremonies preferred not to be present on the recent occasion. Perhaps he does not wish to be insulted by a bunch of hooligans, and this might justify his absence to some extent.

The patriotism of the Bulgarian politicians has always been determined by their selfish interests. What profit could you gain from the dead, even if they are national heroes? The dead can neither vote nor pay taxes.

The national nihilism of the "ruling classes" is gradually becoming a model of behavior for the whole nation. Should we be surprised, in such a case, that two thirds of the Bulgarian population do not know anything about the date 19 August 1903?

Poll Shows Workers' Support for Rightist Parties

AU2408182694 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 17 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by Jaroslav Fiala: "Half of the Workers Support the Right Wing; The Left Is Gradually Losing Its Traditional Voters' Base"]

[Text] If elections were held in the Czech Republic today, more than 40 percent of workers would give their votes to the parties of the present government coalition. Together with the preferences for smaller nongovernmental right-wing parties, this is almost one-half of the 2 million Czech workers. This ensues from data provided to [DENNI] TELEGRAF by the Center for Empirical Research (STEM).

According to the 1992 census, 2,340,000 people declare themselves to be workers, which is about 40 percent of the economically productive population of the Czech Republic. According to an estimate by sociologists, this number has declined slightly in the past two years in conjunction with the continuing process of economic reform. According to the STEM poll, however, more than half of the workers (53 percent) support the current development in society and do not want the communist regime to return. A mere 10 percent of workers would welcome the return of that regime. The remainder would prefer a middle way or do not have an opinion on that matter. The ongoing economic reform is supported by 48 percent of the workers, and the evolution toward capitalism is considered inevitable by 47 percent, despite the fact that this group is characterized by greater fears of bankruptcies, unemployment, and overall social insecurity. Sociologists contend that the overwhelming majority of the workers do not intend to react by strikes to a less favorable situation because they do not consider them reasonable.

Support for constitutional officials is also relatively strong among workers. Vaclav Havel is trusted by 65 percent of them and the architect of Czech economic reform, Vaclav Klaus, by a full 60 percent. On the other hand, leaders of the leftist parties have the support of fewer than 25 percent of the workers.

Foreign Trade Statistics for First Half 1994

AU2508090394 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 18 Aug 94 p 7

[Report by the Price Statistics and Foreign Trade Section of the Czech Statistical Office: "Foreign Trade Turnover Rose in the First Half"]

[Text] The development in foreign trade of the Czech Republic in the first half of 1994 can be characterized by more dynamic activity in imports rather than in exports, the creation of a trade surplus, continuing changes in the territorial structure of foreign trade, and changes in the structure of imports and exports according to the individual categories of goods. The reciprocal exchange of goods in trade with the Slovak Republic declined. In imports, the share of imported chemicals and related goods increased, while the share of machine and vehicle imports continued to decline. In exports, the share of exports of various finished products increased, while the share of machine and vehicle exports declined. While import prices declined, export prices rose, and, therefore, the real terms of trade developed favorably.

The overall foreign trade turnover in the first half of 1994 increased by 5.8 percent in comparison with the same period of last year—imports by 10.3 percent and exports by 1.9 percent. The value of imports reached 189.4 billion korunas (Kc) and was Kc17.7 billion higher than in the first half of 1993, while the value of exports amounted to Kc195.1 billion, which is Kc.3.6 billion more. There was a surplus of Kc5.7 billion. Surveyed on a monthly basis, there was a surplus of Kc2.2 billion in January, Kc0.5 billion in March, Kc3.1 billion in April, and Kc2.1 billion in June, while, in February, there was a deficit of Kc0.9 billion and in May of Kc1.3 billion.

Imports rose from all states except Slovakia, while imports from the former Soviet Union remained approximately at last year's level. Most dynamic was the growth in imports from the states with a state-controlled trade system, from developing countries, and the states allied in the European Free Trade Association [EFTA].

The greatest increase in activity was shown in exports directed to the EFTA and EU countries. On the other hand, exports to countries with a state-controlled trade system significantly declined, but its share in the Czech Republic's foreign trade is very low. Exports to Slovakia, the states of the former Soviet Union, and developing countries also declined.

From the territorial point of view, the distribution of the total foreign trade turnover was as follows: states with an advanced market economy 62.1 percent (EU states 45.5 percent and EFTA-member countries 11.5 percent), the Slovak Republic 16.1 percent, countries of the former Soviet Union 8.2 percent, developing countries 6.5 percent, European states with a transition economy (excluding the countries of the former USSR) 6.5 percent, and states with a state-controlled trade system 0.8 percent.

Considering individual countries, in comparison with the same period last year, imports from Brazil rose the fastest (0.3 percent of total imports), followed by Belgium (2.0 percent), Canada (0.5 percent), South Korea (0.6 percent), Finland (0.9 percent), France (3.6 percent), China (0.6 percent), and Japan (1.9 percent). On the other hand, imports declined from Egypt, Bulgaria, Romania, and Malaysia.

In comparison with the first half of 1993, exports to South Korea grew the fastest (0.1 percent of total exports), followed by exports to Japan (0.8 percent), France (3.2 percent), Austria (7.9 percent), Finland (0.5 percent), Hong Kong (1.2 percent), and Switzerland (1.3 percent). Exports to China, Egypt, and Turkey markedly declined.

According to preliminary calculations, in the period January-May 1994, import prices declined by 0.4 percent in comparison with the same period of last year, and the index of physical volume of imports increased by more than 12 percent. Export prices rose 3.5 percent, and the physical volume of exports declined by 3 percent. The real terms of trade reached the value of 103.9 points.

In trade with the Slovak Republic, in the first half of 1994, the value of imports reached Kc30.9 billion or Kc1.7 billion less than in the same period last year, and the value of exports reached the same amount—that is, trade was balanced. In comparison with the first half of last year, the volume of exports to Slovakia declined by Kc11.2 billion. Imports declined to 94.7 percent of the level of the first half of 1993, and exports dropped to 73.4 percent. The delivery-reception relations formed at the time of the united state are still reflected in the exchange. However, these links are weakening as time goes by. In the exchange of raw material, material, and goods, industrial goods dominated, with 38 percent of the total imports and 29 percent of the total exports, and machines and vehicles followed, with 20 percent of imports and 26 percent of exports.

Imports from states with an advanced market economy increased in the first half of 1994 by 16.3 percent in comparison with the preceding year, and export to these states by 19.1 percent. The increase in the value of imports in comparison with the same period last year translates to Kc16.3 billion and the increase in exports to Kc19.7 billion. The balance of trade showed a surplus of Kc6.2 billion. The surplus of trade with the EU countries was Kc12.1 billion, while trade with the EFTA countries resulted in a deficit of Kc2.6 billion. The most important partner among these countries was the Federal Republic of Germany, with a share of 26.4 percent in the total foreign trade of the Czech Republic, followed by Austria (7.7 percent) and Italy (5.6 percent). The dominant item in imports from the states with an advanced market economy was machines and vehicles, which accounted for 44 percent of all imported goods and material. In exports, it was industrial goods, representing more than 31 percent of all exports. The share of exports of machines and vehicles amounted to less than 25 percent. Reciprocal exchange with the OECD countries developed, imports from these countries reached Kc116.2 billion in the first half of 1994 (in comparison with the same period last year, it increased by 16.1 percent), and exports reached Kc122.7 billion (a rise of 17.7 percent). There was a trade surplus of Kc6.5 billion.

Imports from developing countries increased by 21 percent, while exports to this region declined by 4.7 percent in comparison with the first six months of 1993. The balance of trade here showed a surplus of Kc5.2 billion. Imports consisted of 36 percent machines and vehicles and 30 percent food and livestock. Exports comprised 44 percent industrial goods and 41 percent machines and vehicles. The share of the states of Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia in the total turnover of the foreign trade of the Czech Republic reached only 3.6 percent, but imports from there rose 30.5 percent, while exports grew by 8.9 percent.

Imports from the European states with a transition economy excluding the former Soviet Union increased by 16.2 percent and exports by 8.7 percent. The trade surplus reached Kc4.8 billion. The largest trade partner from this group was Poland, with a 2.9-percent share in the total foreign trade turnover, followed by Hungary with 1.7 percent. Almost 21 percent of the imports was made up of industrial goods, approximately 20 percent of chemicals and related goods, 17 percent machines and vehicles, and 14 percent mineral fuels, lubricants, and related material. Exports from the Czech Republic to these countries consisted mostly of industrial goods—29 percent of total exports, and 22 percent of machines and vehicles.

Imports from the countries of the former Soviet Union remained approximately at the level of last year, but exports dropped to 86.9 percent of the level of the first half of 1993. The trade deficit amounted to Kc11.3 billion. The largest trade partner from the group was Russia, with a 9.8-percent share in total imports but only a 3.2-percent share in total exports. In the structure of imports according to the categories of goods, imports of mineral fuels, lubricants, and related material dominated because this classification includes crude oil and natural gas. The share of this category of goods in total imports was almost 72 percent. The largest group of exported goods was machines and vehicles, with 38 percent of total exports. Industrial goods had a 22-percent share, while food and livestock had a 13-percent share in total exports.

The surplus achieved in trade with the states with a state-controlled trade system—that is, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Laos, China, Cuba, Vietnam, Mongolia—amounted to Kc0.8 billion. The volume of imports from these states was 30.5 percent higher in comparison with the first half of 1993, but exports declined to just one-third of the level in the same period of last year. This development was a result of an even greater drop in the value of exports to China. The dominant item in total imports was various finished products, with a share of more than 50 percent of the total imports, followed by food and livestock, with almost 16 percent, while exports were dominated by machines and vehicles, with 82 percent of total exports.

In the structure of imports according to the categories of goods, the share of imports of chemicals and related goods increased by 1.4 points in comparison with the same period of last year, to 13.5 percent of total imports. Over the first six months of 1994, 3.2 million metric tons of crude oil was imported (3 million metric tons in the same period of the preceding year) and 3.8 billion cubic meters (3.5 billion cubic meters) of natural gas. The share of imports of various finished products increased by 0.7 points, to 11.5 percent. The share of imports of machines and vehicles declined by 2 points, to 33 percent; the share of mineral fuels, lubricants, and related material declined by 1.2 points, to 10.9 percent, and food and livestock by 0.7 points, to 7 percent. In the first half of 1994, in comparison with the same period of last year, imports increased in all groups except for the category of mineral fuels, lubricants, and related material.

The structure of exports according to the categories of goods in the first six months of 1994 was characterized by an increase, in comparison with the same period last year, in the share of exports of various finished products by 2.1 points, to 13.8 percent of total exports, and raw materials other than fuels and material for the food industry by 1.1 points, to 5.5 percent. On the other hand, the share of exports of machines and vehicles declined by 1.1 points, to 27.1 percent. The share of the most important goods item among exports, which was industrial goods, with almost 31 percent of total exports, marginally declined. In comparison with the first half of 1993, exports declined in the categories of food and livestock; beverages and tobacco; mineral fuels, lubricants, and related material; and machines and vehicles.

Schmoegnerova Receives Vietnamese Counterpart

LD2408192094 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Excerpts] The first basic agreement between Slovakia and Vietnam on trade and payments was signed in July of this year by representatives of the two countries during the July visit of Slovak Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik to Southeast Asia. [passage omitted] Agata Stanekova reports:

Following yesterday's informal talks between Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Tran Duc Luong and Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Brigita Schmoegnerova, the bilateral talks continued this morning. After that, the Vietnamese delegation was received by Slovak Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik. [passage omitted] Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Brigita Schmoegnerova, at whose invitation the visit is taking place, assessed the talks as follows:

[Begin Schmoegnerova recording] We made a step forward in the talks today, when we agreed on the program of concluding some further important agreements, which should represent a prerequisite for further economic cooperation. We made a preliminary agreement that, by the end of September or the beginning of October, at the latest, the agreement on the prevention of double taxation would be ready for signing. We assume that, at approximately the same time, we will be able to prepare another significant agreement on the support of foreign investment between Vietnam and Slovakia. In connection with the agreement on trade and payments, which was signed during the visit of our government delegation to Vietnam, we started talking in detail today about the fulfillment of one point of the agenda: setting up an intergovernmental committee for economic cooperation. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Preliminary talks also concerned concrete possibilities for the development of cooperation, such as the Komarno shipyard [south Slovakia] and the project of establishing a joint venture. The Vietnamese side, among other things, expresses interest in the import of Slovak hops.

Kanis Conducts Defense Talks

LD2508130794 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 25 Aug 94

[Text] In Bratislava today, Defense Minister Pavol Kanis met with Vietnam's deputy prime minister, Tran Duc Luong, who was interested in cooperating in the construction of medium-size coastal defense ships.

The two representatives also discussed other opportunities for cooperation in the defense industry.

The discussions followed Premier Moravcik's July visit to Vietnam.

Foreign Ministry 'Purge' of Diplomats Viewed

AU2408201594 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 23 Aug 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Jozef Janto: "A Purge in the Diplomatic Corps a Few Weeks Before the Election"]

[Excerpts] Bratislava—We have learned from well-informed sources that, before the parliamentary election, Jozef Moravcik's provisional government wants to recall six ambassadors of the Slovak Republic and fill the vacated places with its own people. We have therefore turned to the Secretariat of Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Kukan to obtain more specific information. Milan Cigan, entrusted with the management of the minister's Secretariat, told us that the appointment and recall of ambassadors was a "normal process"—that is, a routine affair.

"When Minister Kukan assumed office, one of his priorities was to complete the building of our diplomatic network. It is not customary to give any reasons when appointing and recalling ambassadors, which is why I would treat these matters not as tragedies but as routine occurrences," Milan Cigan told us. At the same time, he stressed that not six but only two ambassadors were involved. He refused to give any reasons for their dismissal on the grounds that certain rules exist and so "there would not be any problems, should the recalled be entrusted with other posts."

One of the ambassadors recalled is Jan Szelepcsenyi, ambassador of the Slovak Republic in Ankara. While the minister's Secretariat refused to explain why he was recalled, Jaroslav Chlebo, director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Press Department, answered our question about the reasons, which we faxed to the Ministry on 19 August, saying that "the recalling of two ambassadors is being dealt with at present because of dissatisfaction with their work results." [passage omitted]

Jan Szelepcsenyi informed us that he learned about his recall on 16 August. Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Kukan informed him in a letter that he had canceled his accreditation with effect from 12 August 1994 and recalled him from the post of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Slovak Republic to the Republic of Turkey. In a fax addressed to our editorial office, the recalled ambassador writes that, throughout his work in the ambassadorial post, no one ever dealt with the issue of to what extent he was fulfilling or not fulfilling the political aims laid down in the concept approved on 13 January 1993. [passage omitted] "I regard the premature termination of my diplomatic mission in Turkey not only as a personal loss, but also as damage to the interests of the Slovak Republic on the international scale," Jan Szelepcsenyi writes in the conclusion of this statement. [passage omitted]

Despite Milan Cigan's assurance that "only" two Slovak ambassadors have been recalled, we inquired whether further purges were planned for the following weeks (before the election). Cigan ruled this out but noted that no head of mission has been appointed, to date, for approximately 13 of the Slovak Republic's 54 representative missions abroad. The provisional government wants "to fill the most important posts," he said, adding that the candidates have already been selected and the appropriate governments asked for their agrement [French word used] with these people. [passage omitted]

Hence, a number of people (six, 10?) are about to be dispatched abroad to take up ambassadorial posts, most of whom have (or still are) working at "cushy" places, mostly at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They got there, for the most part, because they were in opposition to Meciar's government or, in other words, because they opposed Slovakia's sovereignty and independence. How will these people represent our statehood and defend our interests abroad?

It is customary for a new government to appoint its own people to positions of importance. Moravcik's government is doing this at the eleventh hour. It is only natural that the new government that will emerge from the elections will want to have people who will be willing and able to implement its program at important posts abroad. Some of the present appointees will therefore have to be recalled. The Moravcikites are, in fact, trying to lay a time bomb of no confidence in the new government, which is unethical, to say the least. (Editor's note: The second recalled ambassador is Ivan Spiska, ambassador of the Slovak Republic to Algeria. We have prepared an interview with him, which we will publish in one of our next issues).

Minister Kukan Declares Independence From DU

AU2408155394 Bratislava SME in Slovak 23 Aug 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "E. Kukan Is Independent"]

[Text] Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Kukan informed the Slovak Electoral Commission that he will run in the election on the slate of candidates of the Democratic Union of Slovakia [DU] as an independent candidate. The slates of candidates of political parties and movements published in the daily press listed Eduard Kukan on the slate in the West Slovak constituency, without the designation "independent candidate" after his name. This was announced by the Press Department of the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

HZDS Leader Assesses Postelectoral Cooperation

AU2408173994 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 23 Aug 94 pp 1, 9

[Interview with Sergej Kozlik, deputy chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, by Julius Gembicky; place and date not given: "Privatization? Inevitability and Curse of Our Economy"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Gembicky] There are reports from the political lobbies about the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] holding talks with the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] or even with the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] about postelectoral cooperation. Is this reality, speculation, or outright bluff?

[Kozlik] We have been declaring for months that we do not intend to seal ourselves off after the election. The essential prerequisite, however, is the compatibility of programs regarding, at the very least, the basic plans and methods of bringing them about. We are very close to the SDL in this respect. There are not only signals, but it is also the reality that a part of the SDL leadership has thrown itself head over heels at privatization, which weakens the prospects for postelectoral cooperation with a certain group of representatives of this party. When one considers the fact that this party favors a rapid privatization of banks, while we categorically oppose it, what hopes would there be for a postelectoral coalition?

The probings [sondaze] heretofore have been very discreet, at the level of informal conversations and exchanges of views. Such exploratory talks have also been held with the KDH, with which we agreed that the privatization of banks is premature as long as a competitive environment does not exist. I assume, however, that those indications of an agreement are not a result of the KDH's principles but, rather, a result of the fact that, so far, this movement has not had a chance to become involved in the privatization game.

[Gembicky] Do you think that the effort to find pragmatic solutions to problems could eliminate personal animosity among the leaders of political entities? The majority of Slovakia's citizens would surely welcome that.

[Kozlik] I cannot reply with either a yes or a no. This animosity is a product of something; it is necessary to return to the pragmatic level. Claiming that the animosity is caused only by personal antipathy would be a simplification. It has its roots, above all, in the attitude of top representatives toward privatization and other practical economic issues.

[Gembicky] You emphasize the fact that the views of a certain part of the SDL leadership differ from yours. Does that mean that another part is closer to your mode of thinking?

[Kozlik] Our idea is to strengthen the Slovak factor in privatization and to diversify economic power so that no narrow group of billionaires will come into being and then seize political power or dictate to the political power the defense of its interests. This is what complete liberalization would lead to. I am sure that we will find understanding for this position not only in the SDL, but also in other parties.

[Gembicky] Does this include the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS]?

[Kozlik] For the time being, the ZRS is not viable for us. I regard [ZRS Chairman] Janko Luptak as a personally honest man with a rather weak professional and political background, but we do not know anything about the people behind him. They refused to participate in the work of the electoral commission on the grounds of their inexperience. If they are incapable of co-organizing the electoral commission, how do they want to organize the state?!

[Gembicky] On the one hand, you declare that you are open to postelectoral cooperation, and, on the other, SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA has published the photographs of members of the SDL Executive Committee, which will be perceived by the voter as an expression of the HZDS's decidedly anticommunist orientation. The SDL would be ready to support the HZDS deputies' proposal to abolish the screening law. How can one find a common denominator for all those incongruities?

[Kozlik] Each party's preelection activities are diverse. Moreover, the HZDS is facing the pressure of a great many political entities. It is like in karate, where you must parry attacks from, and strike in, seven directions. Only after the election will the precise course of action be laid down.

[Gembicky] Your direct rival in east Slovakia is SDL Chairman Peter Weiss. What will you come up with in the election campaign to win this duel?

[Kozlik] East Slovakia is an ethnically and religiously diverse region that is politically liberal. Our main weapon will be a businesslike approach. Our leaders are able to comprehensibly and clearly explain the HZDS's ideas about economic recovery on the basis of the promotion of investment.

[Gembicky] Do you expect a sharply confrontational or a nonconfrontational election campaign?

[Kozlik] We do not want a confrontational campaign, but, on some issues, we must set clear limits beyond which not a single step must be taken, even at the cost of a referendum or at the price of having to amend some laws, whose application is damaging to Slovakia's interests.

Knowledge of Privatization 'Strike Alerts' Denied

AU2408203394 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 23 Aug 94 p 4

[Article by "mv": "Nothing Is Known at Martin and Ladce About Strike Alerts"]

[Text] Ladce/Martin—Yesterday, we verified reports about the work force of the Ladce cement works and the ZTS [Heavy Engineering Works] Martin state enterprise rebelling against privatization and intending to call strike alerts as a sign of their protest. At the Ladce cement works, we were given a lecture about theirs being a stabilized firm in which people are working properly, and we were told not to pay any heed to such reports.

The reaction at Martin was similar. Anything of that sort is out of the question at the ZTS shareholding company. It is a private firm in which everyone must work and where one can engage in politics only after work. An incensed reaction also awaited us at the ZTS state enterprise. There, too, they had not heard anything until yesterday about an intention to strike.

Expert Committee: Privatization To End By 1997

AU2408202794 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 24 Aug 94 p 12

[Report by Zsuzsa Gal: "Privatization Must End by 1997—New Strategy: Cash Investors Have Priority"]

[Text] The committee of experts whose views were used in formulating the bill and the future privatization strategy to be submitted to the government and the Parliament held its second and last meeting on 22 August. Government Commissioner Ferenc Bartha and Lajos Csepi, general director of the State Property Management Corporation, viewed the major concepts of this bill on 23 August.

The expert advisory body came to the unanimous conclusion that privatization should be accelerated and, if possible, it should end within three or four years. All the more so because a loss of assets worth about 600-800 billion forints has already emerged, and the acceleration of the process is the only way of avoiding further losses. The experts agreed that improving the state firms with budget allocations can no longer continue; thus, the future owners will be in charge of improving these firms.

It became obvious in the course of the consultations that two basic and contradictory interests must be coordinated. One is a short-term interest, namely that the budget should have as much income as possible and as soon as possible from privatization (so far, privatization has contributed only 50-53 billion forints to the state budget). The other interest is the national economy interest according to which we need viable enterprises and good owners with adequate capital at their disposal. We can only solve the contradiction inherent in these two different interests by determining the conditions of privatization for every firm individually by thoroughly reviewing the economic, market, employment-policy, and other considerations involved.

At the same time, the society wants to know what circle and strata we want to connect to privatization, and this is some kind of criticism of the former practice, Ferenc Bartha pointed out, and added that they worked out some new methods and means to facilitate the purchases carried out by the management and the employees.

Ferenc Bartha pointed out that some 800-900 firms are waiting to be privatized, and this number is divided into three major groups. Some 30-40 firms of strategic importance with a considerable capital requirement are still under state ownership. The state will either continue to finance these firms, or new groups of owners will have to finance them. No employee or management buyout is allowed during their privatization.

The next group is made up of medium-size and relatively successful firms that are destined for two different portfolios: a so-called national fund and the compensation fund. The national fund—which would strengthen the role of money and capital markets—would be offered to institutional investors, and the compensation fund would be offered to owners of compensation bills. The third group is made up of enterprises in difficult situations; their privatization is to be carried out in a decentralized way, and every preference would be given to their purchase.

Lajos Csepi pointed out that privatization will continue to be market-oriented and will continue to be based on competition. Among the new features, he mentioned the fact that they will decide on the fate of each and every firm individually after a thorough analysis, and they will firmly determine the available preferences, including the circle of possible investors. Therefore, they will not offer a tender that can be equally contended with existence loans, compensation bills, installments, or cash. They will also discontinue the changing of compensation bills into bonds.

It is also a new feature that the employees' trade unions will be able to voice their opinions better than before, although they will not have a veto right this time either.

Ferenc Bartha pointed out that an investigation is currently under way to find out whether there were any hasty decisions in the months of the government change. In addition, the experts have already prepared the privatization balance of the past four years.

They will submit an alternative proposal to the government on the type of organization they will make out of the fusion of the State Property Agency and the State Property Management Corporation. The combined organization can be either an economic corporation or a budget institution; the experts prefer a corporation. They also worked out which parliamentary bodies will supervise the privatization process.

Opposition Party Officials View Draft Media Bill

AU2408201494 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 24 Aug 94 p 6

[Report by Jozsef Szabo Bartha: "Opposition Views Draft Media Bill"]

[Excerpts] We asked the opposition parties about the government coalition concept regarding the draft bill on free radio and television broadcasts in Hungary.

Attila Zalan Csenger, deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP]: It transpires from the first reading of the draft that this is not what we expected. We expected a bill that, with a few questions still pending, has already been almost accepted by a six-party consensus. The latest bill, however, is a totally new formulation that disregards the former agreements. For example, this draft proposes a simple 50 percent majority in nominating bodies, chairmen, and deputy chairmen, and this is not only far from the principle of parity, but also from the possibility of a consensus. [passage omitted]

Earlier, the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] stressed the importance of a six-party consensus. This disappeared completely now that they have gained power. However, the KDNP continues to regard the consensus as important and firmly demands such a consensus. Therefore, in its current form, this draft bill is unacceptable for us.

Jozsef Torgyan, chairman of the Independent Smallholders' Party: The obvious mistake of the government media draft bill is that is lacks a system of sanctions that would force the implementation of the future law. It lacks a system of labor-law, penal-code, and civil-code consequences that would regard a possible distortion of news or the suppression of important facts as a crime against the freedom of the press. [passage omitted]

Tamas Deutsch, deputy chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats: The opinions voiced at the party coordination meeting in August have generally been included in the draft bill. However, numerous parts of this draft bill need additions and more precise formulations, like the issue of financing the Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television. [passage omitted]

Janos Weber, media expert of the Hungarian Democratic Forum: This draft differs greatly from the version that once enjoyed broad public support. We should stick to the version that enjoyed a consensus at the end of 1992 and in the Autumn of 1993. Unfortunately, almost nothing remains from the former consensus. [passage omitted]

Olechowski: U.S. Not Consulted About Zacharski

LD2408120294 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1100 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski, when asked at today's news conference in Warsaw about the issue of Marian Zacharski, said that the appointment of a person to a prominent post in such a sensitive service, a person who has been sentenced to life imprisonment in a friendly country, is harmful to Poland. Minister Olechowski said that he passed on this opinion to President Lech Walesa and the Council of Ministers.

Minister Olechowski also denied that the Polish Government has approached the U.S. State Department with regard to the Zacharski issue.

Calls Reports 'Lies'

WS2508092794 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 25 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by F.N.: "Minister Olechowski on Zacharski Case—No Consultation With United States"]

[Text] *During a press conference on Wednesday, Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski denied reports that have been emerging from various sources that the Polish Government has allegedly consulted U.S. authorities concerning the case of recalling Marian Zacharski from the post of chief of intelligence at the Office of State Protection. While not abandoning his critical assessment of the Zacharski appointment, the minister described suggestions that Washington's note in the case was made radical on Olechowski's initiative as absurd.*

The minister described as lies suggestions that have been propagated by some representatives of the Clinton administration that the Polish Government has allegedly asked the Americans to deliver their opinion on the Zacharski appointment. The note from the Department of State regarding this controversial case was purely in the form of information on the legal aspects of the situation of Zacharski, who was convicted by a U.S. court. Aside from that, the note came after President Walesa's announcement that he will reject the appointment.

The Zacharski case dominated the first half of the minister's press conference, covering domestic issues. The main reason for having convened the conference, however, was to let reporters know about the withdrawal of a draft of a new Foreign Ministry [MSZ] statute that had been submitted to the Council of Ministers and the announcement of a reorganization in the MSZ within the foreign minister's range of powers. The planned changes will relate to the MSZ's internal structure, supplemental replacements among the ministry's leadership and directorial staff, and new rules on assigning officials to posts abroad. While appointing officials at the MSZ, the criterion of professional skills is to be taken into account; it will also be considered in the process of filling vacant MSZ deputy ministerial posts. According to A. Olechowski, that does not rule out the possibility that the posts could go to representatives of the ruling coalition.

Olechowski on Current Aims of Polish Diplomacy

LD2408153294 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1407 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Excerpts] Warsaw, 24 Aug—Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski said at a news conference on 24 August that there is no crisis in Polish-Russian relations. However, he admitted that contacts between both states were not excellent.

Olechowski said that Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin will visit Poland most probably in September and Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev a month later. [passage omitted]

Olechowski said that during the second half of this year the main aim of Polish diplomacy is Poland's participation in West European structures. Cooperation with the Ministry of National Defense in implementing the Partnership for Peace program and diplomatic steps accompanying the September meeting of foreign ministers from the Weimar Triangle states [Germany, France, and Poland] and President Walesa's visit to Canada and the Netherlands are among the activities that are to help in the process of joining NATO.

The minister of foreign affairs stressed that one of the main aims of Polish diplomacy is the improvement of relations, particularly economic, with east Asian states. He expressed hope that a strong impulse to improve mutual relations will be provided by this year's visits by Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak to China and President Lech Walesa to Japan and South Korea.

Sejm Commissions Want Abortion Veto Rejected

LD2408152494 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1200 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Three Sejm commissions—justice, health, and legislative—are to recommend that the Sejm reject President Lech Walesa's veto concerning an amendment to the penal code liberalizing the antiabortion regulations. It was stated at a meeting today that rejection of the veto means that a recommendation would be made to the Sejm to pass the amendment to the penal code again. The amendment allows abortion in case of difficult living conditions or difficult personal circumstances for the woman.

ZChN Official Said Candidate for Walesa Aide

WS2508101194 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 25 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by Agnieszka Kublik and Dominika Wielowieyska: "The President and the Right Wing; Time To Court the ZChN?"]

[Text] *Apart from Tomasz Wolek and Andrzej Urbanski, Ryszard Czarnecki, deputy chairman of the Christian-National Union [ZChN], is reported to be another candidate to become Lech Walesa's press spokesman.*

There is unofficial talk in the Sejm that the president is getting ready to rebuild the Solidarity camp under his leadership. "Replacing officials in the President's Office and removing Mieczyslaw Wachowski from power could serve that goal," politicians speculate.

The vision of changes in presidential offices could be very attractive for those politicians who have found themselves outside of parliament.

The president could begin with the ZChN, which has usually distanced itself from measures that were hostile to Walesa. Through the ZChN, he could reach out to other right-wing parties, those that are in the Alliance for Poland bloc along with the ZChN, such as Center Accord.

Ryszard Czarnecki says he has not been made an offer to replace Drzycimski. However, when asked whether the ZChN would be willing to cooperate with Walesa, Czarnecki replied: "As Jozef Pilsudski used to say, you should take but not sign."

"We are not among the president's enemies. Still, the ZChN is not interested in personal games and maneuvers, but, rather, in political concepts and programs," Czarnecki says.

The President's Office refused to confirm rumors about Czarnecki or the remaining two candidates. Minister Andrzej Zakrzewski, who is temporarily filling in for Drzycimski, who was told to go on vacation, thinks that the president will not opt in favor of a spokesman/politician. "We are looking for an expert now," Zakrzewski says.

Still, Czarnecki's candidacy seems likely because, some time ago, the president is said to have proposed to him membership in the National Radio and Television Broadcasting Council. The ZChN politician declined, however, and that was how Ryszard Bender became a member of the council.

As ZChN Chairman Wieslaw Chrzanowski admitted in a conversation with GAZETA WYBORCZA, the appointment of Henryk Goryszewski as chief of the National Security Bureau was a message that the president is trying to win the ZChN's favors.

The president, however, probably hoped for too much. Goryszewski's rapport with the ZChN was quite sporadic at the time, and he did not occupy any post in the party's leadership.

So it is probably time for another move. It could be the offer for Czarnecki or another right-wing activist.

However, right-wing activists say that it will be very hard for the president to unite post-Solidarity parties together again. They also add, however, that Walesa could possibly be hoping to move to the second round of the presidential election on his own. If, at that stage, a postcommunist candidate is his opponent, the right wing could be forced to support Walesa anyway.

ZChN Urges Resignation of Interior Minister

WS2508092994 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 25 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by WZ: "ZChN Against Milczanowski; Observation of the Belweder"]

[Text] *It is time for Minister Milczanowski to resign, said Christian-National Union [ZChN] leaders Wieslaw Chrzanowski and Ryszard Czarnecki yesterday.*

They presented reporters with a list of accusations against the chief of the Internal Affairs Ministry [MSW], ranging from defending Marian Zacharski to tolerating police corruption to the inefficient fight against the Mafia.

According to Chrzanowski and Czarnecki, Milczanowski's activities are primarily detrimental to Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak, and much less so to the president. If, however, the MSW chief does not resign as a result of resistance from the Belweder, Lech Walesa could pay a price for that in the form of a worse outcome in next year's presidential election, Czarnecki said.

The statement encouraged reporters to ask questions concerning the ZChN's possible support for Walesa—for instance, in a situation if he were to dismiss not only his spokesman, Andrzej Drzycimski, but also presidential aide Mieczyslaw Wachowski.

Chrzanowski failed to deliver a definite response. He said that neither the ZChN nor the Alliance for Poland has made a decision yet. We will be following the direction of changes in the President's Office. It will definitely have an impact on the stand taken by voters, Chrzanowski said.

The ZChN leader also complained about the widespread decline in moral standards. He cited the examples of desecration of church buildings and cemeteries, and also the publication by WPROST of a picture of the Virgin Mary with the baby Jesus wearing gas masks on the front cover of the most recent edition of the weekly. The photograph is an attack against freedoms of believers in the country. It violates the right of Catholics to not see things that are insulting to the values they hold dear, Chrzanowski argued.

Czarnecki, in turn, was critical of Rabbi Weiss: His sharp statements do not serve the cause of Polish-Jewish dialogue. On that issue, we agree with Adam Michnik: Weiss came to Poland primarily to pick fights, Czarnecki argued. He suggested that, unless the rabbi changes his attitude, he should be removed from the country by force next time around.

Politicians Cited for Delays in Privatizing

WS2508100994 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 25 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by J.B.L.: "Mass Privatization Program; Prime Minister Blocks, Kwasniewski Calms"]

[Text] For several weeks now, the third group of enterprises that are to take part in the Mass Privatization Program [PPP] is waiting for the prime minister to sign the document, which is delaying the beginning of the program's implementation. Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko said that Waldemar Pawlak would sign the document within several days. The prime minister, however, declared that first the compensation part of the program should be implemented, and only then the rest. According to many economists, this means limiting and, in fact, destroying the entire PPP. The reasons behind Waldemar Pawlak's activities are unclear. He first spoke about the need to check the condition of the enterprises; now the issue of limiting the program has come up.

The views of the opposition, like the views of the coalition, are not all the same. The program was approved in the Sejm thanks to the votes of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], whereas the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] objected. The Union of Labor [UP], in turn, has all along been in favor of limited mass privatization.

"It is difficult to say anything about the prime minister's reasons," say Jerzy Eysymontt, of the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms, and Tadeusz Syryjczyk, of the Freedom Union. However, since the inception of the governing coalition, we have been observing an evident antiprivatization attitude in the PSL.

Tadeusz Syryjczyk, as well as some SLD leaders, says that the influence of the prime minister's advisers has played a role here.

According to Syryjczyk, limiting or abandoning the privatization program will have a negative effect on economic growth because it is the private sector that is increasing employment and production, as well as the amounts of money earmarked for investments.

Jerzy Eysymontt believes that delaying mass privatization may lead to a situation in which the law on the National Investments Fund is ready and there is no mass privatization, even in the limited option, because it is one of the phenomena that may yield results only through full-scale implementation. Something akin to a critical mass is necessary, but the program merely in the compensation option does not ensure that scale. In Jerzy Eysymontt's opinion, what is happening represents a defeat for Privatization Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek. He stresses that the stand taken by Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko is not clear to him because the formulations found in the "Strategy for Poland" may mean the desire to replace privatization with commercialization; the program shows that the government, let alone the coalition, is far from being unanimous on this issue.

"I think that the SLD is internally divided over this issue and is passive," says Syryjczyk. He claims that this is linked, among other things, to the protection of some management cadres, the poor cadres that are afraid of privatization. They are election customers of the left. He believes that, by adopting a passive attitude, the SLD loses in the confrontation with the PSL.

Aleksander Kwasniewski is convinced that the compensation stage of the implementation of the PPP is only the first step, which will be followed by another. Therefore, we cannot speak about slowing the program or liquidating it.

"This program must get off the ground," Kwasniewski says. He believes that the SLD will be very firmly in favor of this. He does not directly answer the question of whether the left will pressure the PSL as much as possible. He emphasizes, however, that the SLD has all along been involved in the preparation of mass privatization and that the National Investment Funds are a very important part of the party's program. He recalls that this is what set the SLD and UP at odds at the stage of forming the coalition. "While we understand the prime minister's caution, we will also want a clear scenario of implementing this program," says the SLD leader, "so that it will be clear that the privatization process has not been slowed but simply spread across stages and is being implemented."

* * *

Representatives of the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development told Reuter yesterday that the financial aid for the PPP (amounting to $100 million from the World Bank and $60 million from the other) was planned as aid for the program in its full version. Now the proposal to change this plan must be seriously considered.

International Arms Fair Scheduled for Kielce

94P21107A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 1 Aug 94 p 21

[Article by Ziemowit Nowak: "Kielce Arms Fair Around the Corner"]

[Excerpts] Another international arms fair will be held in Kielce this year, between 8 and 12 September. Headlined as the Second International Defense Industry Show, the event will be dedicated to saving the defense industry. The fair is organized by the Regional Development and Promotion Agency in Kielce, the Kielce Fair Center, and CENZIN, the Foreign Trade Organization. [passage omitted]

Arms production is on the decline around the world because the demand for arms is shrinking all the time. By 1997, NATO plans to reduce its armed forces by 25 percent. Some member countries will get rid of even up to 50 percent of their arsenals. [passage omitted]

Poland's munitions production has shrunk even more dramatically than that in Western Europe. For example, at the Mesko Metal Works in Skarzysko Kamienna, which makes guided missiles and ammunition in addition to civilian products like household appliances, total production fell by 65 percent between 1990 and 1993. In special [military] production, the factory was forced to reduce its output of guided missiles by as much as 90 percent. This is because these missiles were made according to former Warsaw Pact standards, and the demand for them petered out after the pact's collapse. Still, these products could remain competitive if they were adjusted to NATO standards. [passage omitted]

The 1993 show in Kielce attracted representatives from munitions firms from countries such as the United States, France, Sweden, Israel, and Germany. The main indoor exhibition last year occupied a huge area of 1.5 hectares.

This year, there will be more firms from Germany, including Eschbach and Donier, which will present radar and communications systems. For the first time, Aerospatiale of France will exhibit its equipment in Kielce. It makes military instruments and electronic bearing systems.

Exhibitors from beyond the eastern border will include Gall Expo, the largest arms trade enterprise in Ukraine, and Company Vyts, from Lithuania.

The Taas company of Israel will be another new exhibitor. It is one of the largest arms producers in Israel and one of the largest foreign partners for Polish defense-industry plants. Among other products, Taas makes the famous Uzi machine guns.

Polish exhibitors will include Gamrat of Jaslo, a leader in the production of plastic interior decoration products. The company is also involved in the use of PVC and other plastics for modern arms.

Sobieslaw Zasada Centrum SA, the Polish dealership for Mercedes, will exhibit special vehicles. Show organizers say that Mercedes, which supplies all-terrain vehicles to the Bundeswehr, among other armies, plans to produce special vehicles in Jelcz for the European market.

Bumar Labedy will bring to Kielce its PT-93 Hard tank, fitted with a new engine. Lucznik of Radom will show a new version of the Wanad and P-93 pistols and five models of the Glauberyt machine gun.

Another novelty during this year's event will be a "Dynamic Show" of Polish equipment at the Army exercise grounds in Bukowka, near Kielce. Organizers also plan to build a firing range within the Fair Center, on which small arms could be presented. [passage omitted]

A special conference will accompany the show this year. Co-organized by the Central Office of Planning (CUP), it will attract at least 12 official government delegations from countries such as Russia, the United States, and France. In all, the conference is expected to draw representatives from 27 countries in addition to NATO officials. Leading topics include international arms trade control and the role of international cooperation in the conversion of the defense sector.

One of the underlying ideas of the conference will be the prospect of cooperation between Poland and NATO.

Parties Issue Declaration on Joint Action

AU2408115294 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 19 Aug 94 p 3

["Declaration" issued by Democratic Convention of Romania, National Trade Union Bloc, and a part of National Confederation of Romanian Free Trade Unions-Fratia in Bucharest on 18 August 1994]

[Text] With regard to the deepening of the moral, social, and economic crisis in present Romania, as well as the continuous worsening of the standard of living, with an increasingly obvious loss of all hope, and observing with great concern the prospect of general disaster toward which the Romanian society is rapidly advancing out of the indifference, incompetence, and lack of political will of the current leadership, the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] together with the National Trade Union Bloc [BNS] and a section of the CNSRL [National Confederation of Romanian Free Trade Unions]-Fratia, represented by Mr. Victor Ciorbea, consider it as absolutely necessary to really start working to eliminate the factors that caused and maintain the current critical situation.

In this respect, those who sign the present declaration, that is, the CDR, BNS, and a part of the CNSRL-Fratia, although preserving complete independence, agreed to mobilize all their forces and resources, to achieve common programs and actions aimed at observing, examining, and finding solutions to concrete problems at central and local level. Thus, we decided on the following:

—to set up a permanent joint working group in charge of identifying directions and means of short, medium, and long term actions;

—to attain systematic contacts and meetings with the representatives of the Democratic Convention (parliamentarians, mayors, counselors, and other elements of the administration) and with trade union members, and thus get familiar with and find solutions to certain problems;

—to establish a rigorous schedule, with precise terms for the implementation of the intentions included in the strategy of resolute and joint actions, in line with common interests;

—to gain the CDR's support for the effective involvement of the BNS and of a part of the CNSRL-Fratia, as partners, in the given social-economic problems;

—to clearly define the responsibility and duty of each side in fulfilling the established objectives.

The present declaration will be extended and completed periodically with programs conceived and convened in the spirit of the above statement.

Within one month the signatory parties will appoint the members of the joint working teams at central and local level.

[Issued] Bucharest, 18 August 1994

[Signed] Democratic Convention of Romania—Emil Constantinescu

National Trade Union Bloc—Dumitru Costin

On behalf of a part of CNSRL-Fratia—Victor Ciorbea

Democratic Convention President Views Priorities

AU2408175894 Bucharest EXPRES MAGAZIN in Romanian 16-23 Aug 94 pp 15-16

[Interview with Emil Constantinescu, president of the Democratic Convention of Romania, by Ileana Lucaciu; place and date not given: "The Old Structures Have Not Yet Been Dismantled"]

[Excerpts] [Lucaciu] Without belonging to any party, you are the president of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR]. Therefore, you can have an objective view of the crystallization of the political doctrines in Romania. Have these doctrines acquired a well defined status or do they assert themselves in the electorate's awareness only through the personalities of certain party leaders?

[Constantinescu] [Passage omitted] There are doctrines, with a more or less clearly defined political offer. But the social and professional groups of the electorate, which are bound by specific interests, thus motivating their adherence to one or the other of these doctrines—something that leads, in the last instance, to the formation of organized, lasting, and durable political structures, namely the parties—are very poorly defined as yet. Unlike the situation in the Western democracies, the leaders and prominent figures have formed the parties in our country, not the other way round, a process that would have required a long period of selection. Therefore, quite often the migration of certain leaders leads to the emergence and disappearance of certain parties. We must accept the normalcy of this situation, since we are in a period of transition. But we must look at this process in its perspective, since things are bound to change. [passage omitted]

[Lucaciu] The CDR is an alliance, a bloc of parties with diverse doctrines ranging from Christian-democracy to liberalism and from social-democracy to ecology. To this, one should add the representatives of the civic society. Is the reason for this alliance solely the fact that we are in a period of transition and that social and professional groups are poorly defined from the viewpoint of their interests?

[Constantinescu] [Passage omitted] In the absence of a public presence for more than 40 years, the opposition parties have proved to be an easy prey for the preestablished and promptly obvious tendency of the current power to rebuild a single party, in the form of the National Salvation Front [FSN] in the first stage. [passage omitted] The CDR only came into being in the wake of the electoral failure. The CDR meets the current requirements of the establishment of democracy in our country.

[Lucaciu] Is the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] a social-democratic party?

[Constantinescu] The PDSR's evolution removes it still farther from the principles of social-democracy. The explosive way in which the PDSR has been trying of late to subordinate almost all sectors of the society—the administration, economy, finance, and culture—to turn agricultural, trade union, youth, and revolutionary organizations into conveyor belts of its policy, and to devour its former and present allies demonstrates the PDSR's ambition to completely dominate Romanian society. One can understand that up to a certain point. Each party aims at strengthening its position and force in society. However, power should not be an end in itself, but only a means to implementing one's doctrine. Only if it went into opposition would the current ruling party be able to prove that it is really a social-democratic party and that it accepts the democratic dialogue. [passage omitted]

[Lucaciu] The liberal movement is in a delicate situation. The Liberal Party-1993 [PL'93] and the National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention [PNL-CD] operate within the Convention. The National Liberal Party [PNL]-Quintus [Mircea Ionescu-Quintus, PNL president] group, which is involved in a conflict with another liberal wing, the PNL-Campeanu [Radu Campeanu, former PNL president] group, wants to join the CDR. In its turn, the Civic Alliance Party [PAC], which is a CDR member, is flirting with the liberals of the Quintus wing and has set up the Civic-Liberal Alliance. What is the CDR position toward a possible unification of the liberal movement, in the context of the existence of a Civic-Liberal Alliance, as well?

[Constantinescu] The CDR supports the unification of the liberal movement most resolutely, in the belief that the most natural place of the liberals is in the Convention. The dialogue between a Christian-democratic pole and a liberal pole would give balance and strength to the Convention. Likewise, the Civic-Liberal alliance is not only a mere name that sounds good. It should not be combated, applauded, or laughed at before it is seriously examined. [passage omitted]

[Lucaciu] How do you interpret the PAC statement of 13 August? Can it be interpreted as a personal attack against you?

[Constantinescu] I can understand the reasoning behind that statement. Maybe the PAC leaders needed it at a time when they had to make a clear-cut choice, while the party was rather divided on the issue. Unfortunately, the Romanians prefer to unite against something rather than for something. Indeed, the declaration contains many confused, inexact, and untrue statements, which the press can check for itself. It is also an unjustified personal attack, both formally and substantially. [passage omitted]

[Lucaciu] Certain political analysts consider the presence of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] in the CDR as inopportune. Such statements are usually made at times of crisis caused by certain UDMR figures, through their extremist-nationalist pronouncements.

[Constantinescu] It is good that you raised this problem, which is a long-standing one. This does not mean that we should discuss what has happened in the past, but rather what might have happened in the context of what actually took place. What would have happened in 1990 if the Targu Mures incidents had been followed by similar incidents in Covasna, Harghita, or other localities? I do not want to fall prey to the mania of certain extremist parties, which keep putting forward all sorts of scary scenarios. However, I am raising the question: Might not Transylvania have become a laboratory of the Bosnia-Herzegovina type, even before the outbreak of the conflict in Yugoslavia? Today, we are very far removed from that. All foreign politicians appreciate the stability achieved here in the matter of ethnic coexistence. If we recall the occasional violence of certain actions of the power, one can realize that the UDMR's presence in the Convention—which also implied a major electoral risk—has contributed to turning the conflicts from street violence into parliamentary disputes. They were preceded by disputes with the CDR itself. We clearly said that the divisions within the Romanian majority are also extant in the Hungarian minority, which also has a functioning extremist camp. The important thing is that these extremist groups, which exist all over the world, should be put in a situation whereby they can only talk on their own behalf, not on behalf of the entire Romanian majority or Hungarian minority. The CDR has accomplished that. Let me remind you that only 7 percent of Romania's population currently perceives the ethnic conflicts as a major risk. Indeed, 90 percent consider corruption as the major danger looming over Romanian society. The epoch of ethnic diversions has gone down for ever and the CDR has played a balancing role in this respect and was even a kind of wall between the Romanian and Hungarian extremists. [passage omitted]

[Lucaciu] The CDR Supplementary Act, Point Four stipulates that the CDR president should be designated as the sole candidate of this grouping for Romania's presidency. If you are reelected CDR president and run for the presidency, how do you view the issue of the monarchy in Romania?

[Constantinescu] The monarchy is an option of certain citizens of the country. They may amount to 15 or 20 percent of the population, but the percentage does not count. What counts is the fact that this problem exists. Therefore, it should be discussed in a democratic and serious manner. Any problem can be solved only if you admit that it exists. The current power is behaving as if the problem did not exist. It has always avoided facing it head on. My viewpoint is simple: It is not the president who decides the change of the Constitution and government form in Romania. This can only be done through two consecutive referendums, whereby Romania's citizens are explicitly questioned on these matters. I wonder: Who is afraid of the expression of the nation's will through a referendum? After a referendum on this subject, the problem can be considered closed, in an atmosphere of mutual respect and due tolerance. [passage omitted]

[Lucaciu] As can be seen, the PDSR is strengthening its ranks. Is the possibility of a resumption of the PDSR-opposition talks still topical?

[Constantinescu] The likelihood of new negotiations has receded very much following the PDSR's refusal to accept the CDR proposals last January, proposals that aimed at putting together a new parliamentary majority. Our generous offer was used by the PDSR to discipline its allies, whom it is gradually turning into decorative symbols. The problem may arise again only in a situation of serious economic and social crisis.

[Lucaciu] On several occasions, the problem of ensuring that the various CDR parliamentary groups can function as a single group, without party differences, was brought up in the Convention. Do you consider this proposal as viable, particularly now, on the eve of a new parliamentary session, and do you think that it could be implemented?

[Constantinescu] I believe that the time has come for a united CDR parliamentary group to be constituted. It would contribute very much to the efficient cohesion and coherence of the CDR initiatives. This idea will be discussed and I hope that it will be accepted. [passage omitted]

[Lucaciu] Certain analysts do not exclude early elections.

[Constantinescu] Theoretically, early legislative elections would be necessary in Romania, because there is a contrast between the parliamentary majority and the electorate's majority, which is currently leaning toward the CDR as the public opinion polls indicate. The elections would offer an opportunity for the new political realities to be better reflected at the government level. However, I doubt that the power will take the decision to hold early elections. Let us not forget that, according to the Constitution, this decision depends on the president alone.

CDR, TU Leaders Assess Cooperation Program

AU2408201894 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 19 Aug 94 p 3

[Report by Clementina Filip: "Opinions of Leaders Involved in the Program for Cooperation Between the Democratic Convention of Romania and Trade Unions"]

[Text]

Emil Constantinescu, president of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR]: "This Political-Trade Union Bloc Is Capable of Pulling Romania Out of the Current Crisis"

"The significance of the event that has taken place today can be understood only in the context of the economic, social, and political evolutions in Romania in the past four years. This event sums up a process of individual clarifications both at the level of trade unions as well as at the level of the Romanian opposition.

Not only trade union members, but also workers who represent a key component of the Romanian society have realized that the individual salary claims will not solve either their problems or the problems of their families in a situation of continuous degradation of the educational and health system and, what is even more serious, in a situation of a constant decrease in the general economic production, something that deprives the country of the resources necessary to improve people lifes. In this situation, we have reached the idea of establishing this political-trade union bloc, capable of working out a joint strategy to pull Romania out of the current crisis and ensuring appropriate ruling and capable of ensuring the implementation of this strategy, whose future goal is to assist the CDR in gaining power. Our primary goal is to cooperate in order to achieve the parliamentary representation of trade unions and also achieve cooperation at the level of local administration and at the level of civic society."

Dumitru Costin, president of the National Trade Union Bloc [BNS]: "We Are Working Out a Mechanism of Cooperation Between the Political Factor and Trade Unions"

"We have noticed that, for quite a long time, there has been discordance between the political factor, the political decision, and people's everyday life. Through the document that we signed today, we will succeed in working out, in a relatively short period of time, certain mechanisms of cooperation between the political factor and the trade unions because we are both interested in the economic and social aspects of life. We hope that through this mechanism of cooperation between trade unions and the political factor we will activate the political factor that has demonstrated a relative inertia of late."

Victor Ciorbea, CNSRL [National Confederation of Romania's Free Trade Unions]-Fratia president: "We Set the Foundation for Establishing a Current Alternative Political Ruling Force"

"By signing this declaration, we set the foundation for establishing a current alternative political ruling power or ruling force. No doubt that this will represent—I hope—only a first step on the path of cooperation between trade unions and the CDR, and that, in the near future—by which we understand a few weeks—the negotiations with the Democratic Convention will take concrete shape in an alliance, a pact, that will comprise all the details and certainly all the principles for future cooperation. Certainly, priority will be given to the principle of preserving the identity, independence, and autonomy of the signatories."

President Iliescu Views Sociopolitical Developments

AU2408133394 Bucharest DIMINEATA Supplement in Romanian 14 Aug 94 pp 3, 4

[Interview with President Ion Iliescu by Seoul MBC Television Network correspondent Dr. Il Song; place and date not given: "No Country Can View Its Own Development in an Autarkical Way Without Linking it to General Current Economic and Technological Developments"]

[Text] [Il Song] Mr. President, what were your government's major achievements following the collapse of Ceausescu's communist dictatorship?

[Iliescu] In the four and a half years that have followed the social explosion that characterized the Romanian revolution of December 1989, great and profound transformations have taken place in all areas of our society.

First of all, there has been intense activity in the political arena to change the entire totalitarian structure into one representative of a democratic society, characterized by freedom of expression, organization, and manifestation. Thus, a great number of parties have emerged; over 200 parties have been registered over the past few years. A new democratic state structure has been set up according to the principles of the rule-of-law state. Certainly, we have come along several stages in our development process.

The first stage, that is the fist six months, was devoted to the temporary organization of the state. A kind of temporary parliament called the Provisional Council of National Unity was established, followed by the first elections in May 1990 and the election of a new parliament, which was at the same time the Constituent Assembly; the country's president was elected for the first time through general elections.

In the two years that followed those elections, the new Constitution was drafted, this having been the major task of the first democratically elected parliament. The process of drafting the Constitution was very open, the public having been thoroughly informed of parliamentary debates on the draft constitution through our television network. After the Constitution had been worked out and endorsed by the parliament in December 1991, a national referendum was held for the approval of the respective constitution. On the basis of this constitution new elections were held, that is, local elections in February and general elections in September 1992. With these elections we concluded the third stage of our development and entered a normal phase with our newly elected parliament, newly elected president, and with the establishment of the government on the basis of the composition of the new parliament, all this based on the new constitution which is the fundamental law of our democratic state. From this, it is obvious that vast and profound changes in the social and political organization of our society have occurred. Certainly, there are many problems and disturbances—if we compare this period to the first months of 1990, when political confrontation was most acute and included street confrontations. We have now moved to a normal state of affairs and normal conditions for political confrontations, which take place in the parliament and in the press. This is natural in any democratic state.

Second, the most important and most difficult problem has been the reorganization of our national economy. Certainly, we have gone through the process of dismantling the former centralized state economy based on a central administration, and we have advanced toward a market economy. But I am talking here about an extremely complicated process, one that involves activities at many levels. The parliament has adopted a great number of new laws to establish this new economy's legislative framework. We have set up new institutions and new mechanisms. However, there are still problems to be solved because reorganization always begins with disorganization.

In the first stage of this process we carried out the dismantling of the former institutions of the centralized economy, without having established or put into operation the new framework, new institutions, and new mechanisms specific to a market economy. Because of that, we now face many disruptions along the way. In addition, the general international conditions—according to which we conduct our activities—also had a negative influence on our country's development. First of all, in this respect I could mention the disbandment of the CEMA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] and disappearance of traditional markets and of traditional partners, such as the former Soviet Union and other neighboring countries. Certainly, these have been reflected in the general economic activity. Apart from all this, one could mention the Gulf crisis and the Yugoslav crisis, which also directly affected our economy.

[Il Song] What economic conditions can Romania provide for Korean firms and the Korean people?

[Iliescu] First, we have followed with great interest your country's economic development, the dynamic nature of its economic and technological development. In general, we regard this region, a very dynamic region in the world economy, with great interest.

I believe our region could be of great interest for your country and the other countries in your region because all the countries in our region undergoing transition now certainly have to face very difficult times, but they all have great resources, that is, material, natural, economic, and human resources. They are not underdeveloped countries but countries that possess important economic potential and, above all, important human potential.

Looking at our country we can see that the general level of education of our people, of our youth, is similar to the level in the developed countries. Certainly, we are going through a difficult time of transition but we have what it takes to ensure our future development, our future dynamic evolution, and later, within the general process of progress, to achieve general integration and make a contribution to the common development process in Europe as a whole.

From this viewpoint, I believe that for both Korea and other countries Romania is most interesting place. And it is not only the Romania's national potential that is important, the potential of a country with a population of 23 million —which while not a big country is not small either, possessing natural resources and a remarkable economic and human potential. Also its position is important. It is located on the Black Sea and has the Danube and the prospect of trans-European connections through the Danube-Main-Rhine canal, which links the Black Sea with the North Sea. Thus, it is a sort of entryway from the Middle East to this area of Europe and to the whole of Europe. In the same way Romania is also a point of contact between Western Europe, the Russian zone, and the Middle East. So I believe that because of its geostrategic position, Romania is very interesting and could be a very good partner in terms of both its own qualities and its location in this area.

[Ill Song] What makes Romania interesting for the European Union? Mr. President, are you interested in joining the European Union in the future?

[Iliescu] Certainly. Our policy is generally oriented toward this, as is the general course of the current development.

Today we are living in a time in which civilizations are developing, a time in which countries are integrating, and economic and social integration in particular is proceeding apace. No country can look at its own development in an autarkical way, without linking it with the general process of current economic and technological development. Technological progress was the main factor that compelled countries to enter a general integration process, that is, a process of integration in the regional, continental, and world economy. Thus, we regard it as a strategic orientation for for our country to achieve economic integration in the general process of interconnection with all European countries and to join this European integration process. It is a general trend and is generally necessary for everyone.

In the same way one can talk about the integration of Europe in the world economy, because there is a general trend toward unification and integration in the world economy.

[Il Song] Why did such a huge gap develop between the former communist bloc and the Western capitalist bloc?

[Iliescu] First, for many years, the division of Europe into two parts and the emergence of certain military, political, and ideological structures widened the gap between the two parts of our continent. This created an element of permanent tension and a situation of conflict. In the past, the entire policy was dominated by this bipolar concept, namely the confrontation between the two blocs.

Some internal factors in the systems of the former Soviet bloc, in both the political and economic areas, brought about the disappearance of this reality. Technological progress created a very dynamic development in the economies of the developed countries. This process emphasized the inability of centralized systems to ensure a proper pace of technological and economic development in line with the general course and trends in the world economy. These were the major reasons for the failure of the old system, certainly combined with the populations' general discontent with the lack of positive economic results, social conditions, and standard of living. To this one could add the general feeling of being isolated from the civilized world at a time when communication was becoming the characteristic of our world.

As a result of this situation, we experienced a general economic regression, mainly in the area of industrial production; the disappearance of traditional markets also contributed to this. In its turn, agriculture went through a very difficult period of disorganization and reorganization. There have also been less than favorable weather conditions over the past three years.

Nevertheless, we can say that the most difficult times are over, after three years of a continuous drop in economic activity increase in inflation and unemployment. For the first time last year, we succeeded in halting a decline in industrial production, and some positive signs of normalization and recovery of industrial production have been noted. Last year, we realized good agricultural production; this year, I believe we will have the best results so far, even compared to last year. As I have already mentioned, there are positive signs in industrial production. Certainly, both of these economic areas will contribute to economic improvements.

However, there are scores of other problems in the field of economic reform. The most significant is the fact that last year we had the highest rate of inflation, but now, we can see a tendency toward decrease in the inflation rate. While last year the average monthly rate was 13.5 percent, in the first six months of this year we registered a rate of only 6 percent and there are signs of a continuous drop in the inflation rate. Thus, if the annual rate of inflation was 300 percent, this year it will be about 70 percent. This is also a positive sign. The national currency also visibly stabilized. For four years there has been a general decline in our national currency's rate of exchange. For the first time in April we achieved stabilization of the exchange rate and, implicitly, stabilization of the national currency. Both the decrease in inflation as well as the stabilization of the national currency are positive elements that will give new impetus to the process of recovering our economic activity. We believe that currently we are moving to a new phase of general economic improvement.

[Il Song] We have the impression that you, Mr. President, are an economist.

[Iliescu] ...Engineer.

[Il Song] I also am a specialist, however, the analysis you have made is indeed impressive. I am going to ask you a question connected to the previous one. What were the major decisive factors for your government in the period of transition toward democracy and a market economy?

[Iliescu] There are two aspects to note here. We have to take into account the fact that there is no other way. There is only the road toward democracy and a market economy. We have effected a general dismantling of a system based on a totalitarian state structure and centralized economy that prevailed in our country. All of the social, political, and economic activity demonstrated the failure of such a concept and of such a state and economic structure.

Thus, the choice of the Romanian society is clear, namely to move toward democracy through a rule-of-law state, because this is the only way to efficiently and realistically approach the issue of organizing our current society. From this viewpoint, there is no way to return to the former structures or the former mentalities. However, we have to strive to consolidate things that we have already achieved, that is, to strive to consolidate the rule-of-law state and the democratic structure of society. Later, we have to proceed to something much more difficult, namely to build the new structures and mechanisms of a market economy with its two major elements: first of all, to achieve efficiency on the basis of a coherent structure, organization, and mechanism as well as maintain a good level of economic activity both at the macro and microeconomic level. The second important thing to remember is the social aspect, the effects of economic efficiency on the population. We must take into consideration both aspects relative to our conditions.

[Il Song] What is your opinion of the recent events in the Korean peninsula, including Kim Il-song's death and developments in the wake of it?

[Iliescu] I am very much aware of the fundamental difficulties in relations between the two Korean countries but I am optimistic that a new, positive development will occur there. First of all, we have hailed the recently developed prospects for a meeting of the presidents of the two Korean states, and we believe that this is a positive step toward the beginning of a process of rapprochement between the two states. This is in the interest of both countries, in the interest of the entire region, and in the interest of peace in general throughout the world. Thus, I am hopeful that this process will continue and we must expect more favorable developments in the next period.

[Il Song] The official press in North Korea affirms that the reins of state might pass from former president Kim Il-song to his son or to another person.

[Iliescu] Society's development in general does not depend on a single person. This is connected with a much more profound process according to the fundamental principles of society and I am certain that such a development will indeed take place.

That is why in the past we witnessed this process of disintegration in the former Soviet system from the inside. I believe we are now going through a new era in which there are no longer two opposing blocs but in which the disappearance of the blocs and of political organizations is not sufficient. The most important thing is to achieve real integration and to overcome certain preconceived ideological ideas in approaching political relations and economic relations between states and national economies. I believe that this process will continue.

[Il Song] I have one more question. I would actually like to ask you several because you, Mr. President, can explain things so well. Do you have any idea how the labor force can be motivated? This is essential for the market economy but in the former communist countries the labor force was not properly trained in this regard.

[Iliescu] You are right. It is a major difficulty and barrier for us, this psychological barrier in people's mentality.

One of the consequences of a centralized system was lack of initiative. Initiative was not encouraged. On the contrary, it was discouraged, as was the spirit of enterprise. On every issue everybody waited for decisions from above because this was the way the system operated. It was a hierarchical centralized system in which all decisions on how any type of resource—financial, human, material, and so on—was to be used and distributed were taken at a central level, by a single person. All problems had to be decided at the top. This created in people an attitude of hesitation, of waiting for others to solve their problems and take decisions for them. Today it is vital that we establish a new mentality and approach problems in economic and social life and in other areas in a new way. Each person has to assume responsibility and the risks involved in the decisions they make. This is the major characteristic of the spirit of enterprise and the sense of responsibility that has to be taught. It is not an easy process but it is one of our major goals and one of the greatest difficulties we have had to face in this new process of development. You have perceived the problem correctly.

[Il Song] Mr. President, thank you very for answering my questions.

PUNR To 'Remodel' Political Behavior

AU2408180394 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] A communique received from the Press and Media Department of the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] points out that the PUNR's joining the Romanian Government is an important and decisive historical step made by a political party that embodies a Romanian national political tradition. Its ideological doctrine, the communique reads, symbolizes the pragmatic dimensions of the real national interest. Through its economic platform, the PUNR expresses its total opening toward reform, privatization, and Romania's natural and necessary integration into the European economic, political, and security structures.

Likewise, the PUNR sincerely and truly supports the efforts to normalize Romania's relations with the neighboring states, in the spirit of the CSCE commitments and the assertion of the rights of individuals belonging to the national minorities, in accordance with generally accepted European and international standards.

The communique stresses that, with the PUNR's entry into the government, the party will remodel its political behavior in accordance with the national responsibility it has assumed in accelerating the privatization process and the country's economic recovery, ensuring the people's social protection, and combating corruption and the Mafia-like structures in the national economy.

In the PUNR's vision, the bilateral political treaty between Romania and Hungary will have to include the solemn commitment to the inviolability of borders and the lack of any territorial claims—another communique released by the PUNR after yesterday's meeting between the leadership of that party and Foreign Minister Mr. Teodor Melescanu. The PUNR communique emphasizes that the bilateral political treaty between Romania and Hungary will also enable both sides to express the desire to ensure the rights of individuals belonging to the national minorities in Romania and Hungary in accordance, with generally accepted European and international standards, and with the minorities expressing unconditional loyalty toward the state whose citizens they are and on whose territory they live. The PUNR considers that the conclusion of this bilateral political treaty will contribute to creating a new climate in Romanian-Hungarian relations capable of furthering our integration in the Euro-Atlantic political, economic, and security structures.

PDSR To Discuss PRM Government Participation

AU2508102294 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0400 GMT 25 Aug 94

[Text] A meeting of the Permanent Delegation of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] took place at the party's headquarters in Bucharest, last night. The meeting examined the main problems resolved by the Permanent Delegation during the summer, when it was empowered to adopt certain measures and make decisions, which must now be submitted to the PDSR National Council for ratification. The meeting also discussed the stage of setting up the county structures of the Agriculture Forum and of the local consultative councils as well as the priority problems in Romania's agrarian policy.

Examining all aspects of the Greater Romania Party's [PRM] request for the conclusion of a political protocol and for the start of negotiations on possible PRM participation in the government, the PDSR Permanent Delegation decided to initiate, as of today, a principled, exploratory discussion with the representatives of that political party, as well as with others supporting the government—the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] and the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM]. The PDSR will be represented at the talks by Messrs. Ioan Solcanu, vice president in charge of political affairs, and Gheorghe Prisacaru, chief of the International Relations Department.

At the end of the meeting, the PDSR Permanent Delegation decided to convene the Central Executive Bureau on Thursday, 8 September, when it will also fix the date of the proceedings of the PDSR National Council meeting.

Police Arrest Caritas Founder on Fraud Charges

AU2508093594 Paris AFP in English 0911 GMT 25 Aug 94

[Text] Bucharest, Aug 25 (AFP)—The founder of Romania's hugely popular pyramid investment game, Caritas, is to answer to charges of "fraud" and "fraudulent bankruptcy" in Bucharest Thursday [25 August], Romanian police said.

Ion Stoica was Wednesday questioned by police in the Transylvanian town of Cluj before being taken to the Romanian capital. He could face five years in jail if found guilty. An arrest warrant should be issued by the public prosecutors office later Thursday.

The arrest comes less than a week after the nationalist Romanian National Unity Party (RNUP) joined the government. RNUP leader Gheorge Funar, who is also mayor of Cluj, had openly supported Caritas.

Over two million Romanians have taken part in this "game of mutual aid" since it was started up early this year. In that time the turnover of the scheme had increased from around 400 million to roughly 700 million lei ($240 to 400 million), according to press reports.

Caritas' assests, which are spread around most of Romania's main towns, have been frozen for the past two weeks. The move follows tens of thousands of complaints against Stoica by participants who lost out in the game. Around 20 unlucky gamblers in Cluj have been on hunger strike for two weeks in an effort to put pressure on Stoica and Funar.

Official Rejects Allegations of Weapons Exports

LD2408141394 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 24 Aug 94 p 18

[Letter from Gheorghe Duta, Minister-Counsellor, the Romanian Embassy in London: "Romanian Policy"]

[Text] Sir—Romania has not exported any weapons to Bosnia or any other republic of the former Yugoslavia (report, Aug 9) [The Daily Telegraph 9 Aug report "US Set to Send Bosnian Army Weapons" makes no mention of Romania].

Acting in full compliance with the provisions of the 1991 UN Security Council Resolution 713, the Romanian Government enforces a ban on all Romanian public institutions, companies, and individuals, including foreigners resident in our country, with respect to deliveries of arms and military equipment.

Furthermore, Romania is supporting sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, even though this has cost our economy $7 billion since 1992.

Bosnian Serbs Reject Contact Group Plan

LD2508125594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1231 GMT 25 Aug 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, Aug. 25 (TANJUG)—The "Contact Group" plan gives far more to the Muslim-Croat federation than the Bosnian Serb republic in terms of economic potentials, according to a statement of the Bosnian Serb information ministry.

The statement published in the Belgrade daily BORBA on Thursday listed the reasons why the plan for the territorial division of Bosnia-Herzegovina was unacceptable to the Serb side.

"The Contact Group plan envisages that the Muslim-Croat federation get 100 percent of the lead and zinc ore deposits, 62 percent of the bauxite, 88 percent of salt deposits, 73 percent of magnesite, 100 percent of asbestos, 70 percent of dolomite, 100 percent of the potential oil fields, 100 percent of brown coal deposits, 88 percent of lignite," said the statement.

After a detailed list of the mines, the statement listed the electric power potentials and facilities which the Bosnian Serb republic would have to hand over to the Muslim-Croat federation.

"The Muslim-Croat federation would get 78 percent of the existing hydro-electric power facilities, 73 percent of the hydro-electric potentials and 76 percent of the existing thermo-electric power plants," said the statement.

It gave a detailed list of the large number of the most important factories on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina which would go to the Muslim-Croat federation, including all military industry facilities.

"The Muslim-Croat federation would get 13 of the Bosnian Serb republic's cities and towns," said the statement.

It said that, under the Contact Group plan, the roads in the Bosnian Serb republic would be cut off, and the biggest railway juncture, at Doboj, would go to the Muslim-Croat federation.

The statement said the river ports would also go to the Muslims and Croats, so that "the waterways would be inaccessible" to the Bosnian Serb republic, and that the Bosnian Serbs would get to keep only one of the four airports, in Banja Luka.

The Bosnian Serbs would fare poorly also in terms of radio and TV relays, getting only four out of (?10) and be in a similar position as far as hospitals go, according to the ministry statement.

Under the Contact Group map, all river valleys would be part of the Muslim-Croat federation, said the statement.

It said that 286,000 Serbs had left the territory of the Muslim-Croat federation and about 400,000 of them had lost all of their property.

The statement said it would be difficult to find homes for 100,000 more Serbs once they are enabled to leave the Muslim-Croat federation.

The statement said that, under the Contact Group plan, the refugees who have taken shelter in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would not be able to return and, moreover, their number would further increase.

Kozic Says Stand on FRY Relations 'Secret'

AU2408165694 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Aug 94 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Srpska Republic Is Introducing New Currency?"]

[Text] Pale—Dusan Kozic, prime minister of the Srpska republic [RS], stated yesterday for SRNA in Pale that the priority tasks of his cabinet are the "drafting of measures and all possible alternatives for the conditions created by the blockade of the RS by the FRY.

"Whether the blockade lasts two or three months, we will have to prepare ourselves for all contingencies and will have to adapt the army and the economy for the possible deterioration of the situation," Kozic said.

He said that his government has done everything possible not to wreck what Dragoslav Avramovic [governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia] has achieved with his program and that it is not hindering the implementation of the Program of Economic Stabilization.

"The RS constitutes 15 to 30 percent of the market, this varies according to different sectors, and is part the program worked out by Avramovic," Kozic said, adding: "We will fight through suffering as much as we can. Regarding the introduction of a new currency and the dual currency system, this is only in the consideration stage."

"This issue," Kozic said, "should be examined by a team of experts whom we will meet in Bijeljina next week." He said that the RS stand on the issue of the monetary system will be presented at that meeting.

Speaking about the last session of the RS Assembly, at which there was some criticism of the program of the new government and its composition, Kozic said that only two deputies had criticized the program.

The head of the RS Government said that he has not had enough time to devote himself to the problem of the suspension of relations with the FRY. He said that part of the explanation as to what stand the new RS Government will take regarding the current situation falls in the "domain of a secret." "The most elementary bases of the government activities in the new conditions have been defined, and I think this is enough," Kozic said.

France Opposes Lifting Arms Embargo on Muslims

LD2408133494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1312 GMT 24 Aug 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, Aug 24 (TANJUG)—French Defense Minister Francois Leotard told a Bosnian Muslim paper he was energetically opposed to exempting the Bosnian Muslims from a United Nations arms embargo.

Speaking for the Sarajevo daily BIH EKSLUZIV on a United States proposal to lift the embargo for the Muslims, Leotard said this would be a very dangerous move. He said it would automatically mean a U.N. troop pullout from Bosnia, continuation of the war, severance of logistic and communication links, lack of information on the situation on the ground and reduced possibility of mounting air strikes.

Leotard said some U.S. senators, starved of publicity and lacking knowledge of geopolitics and strategy, were urging a unilateral lifting of the embargo for the Bosnian Muslims without thinking of the consequences such a decison would cause among the allies. "Perhaps some Americans do not have a clear conscience about Bosnia, because they talked endlessly and never actually did something. If the Security Council bows to U.S. pressure, which I doubt, we would be leaving Bosnia immediately," Leotard said.

Leotard said France had made it clear to the United States that insistence on a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo was immoral coming from a country which, save for some 30 experts, had no troops in Bosnia. Asked to explain why France stubbornly opposed the move, Leotard said this was an odd question because he was not a "U.S. congressman who can hardly differentiate between Bosnia and Botswana."

Leotard said that in case the embargo was lifted, his 3,000 troops would become sitting ducks for the Bosnian warring parties. "In this terrible and incomprehensible war, neither side is too pleased with the U.N. Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] very much, maintaining that UNPROFOR should serve the interests of that particular side alone," he said.

Leotard said he was confident if the French peacekeepers were to withdraw from Bosnia-Herzegovina, the British, Spanish, Dutch and all other U.N. troops except the Turks would follow suit. The Bosnian Serbs strongly opposed the idea of Turkish troops joining the U.N. peacekeepers, because Turkey has been sending arms, volunteers and money to tht Bosnian Muslims since the outbreak of the Bosnian civil war in 1992. Turks had occupied the Balkans, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, for five centuries converting much of the local population to Islam.

Asked what would happen if the Muslims were exempted from the embargo after all, Leotard said that if this was someone's strategy to help the Bosnian Muslims return the lost territories, it would quickly prove to be a dangerous game. He said the Bosnian Serbs would undoubtedly respond by mounting a major offensive with unpredictable results.

Leotard said he believed that France was not alone in opposing the exemption of the Bosnian Muslims from the U.N. arms embargo and that many other people felt the same way.

UNPROFOR Warns of Potential Pullout Problems

AU2408140694 Paris AFP in English 1302 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Aug 24 (AFP)—The UN Protection Force's withdrawal from Bosnia-Herzegovina could take months and run into a raft of problems, from mass protests by civilians to outbreaks of violence, UNPROFOR warned here Wednesday [24 August].

"We have at least three scenarios," said Major Eric Chaperon, spokesman for UNPROFOR in Bosnia. "It could take a couple of weeks for a normal withdrawal and if we have problems, it could take months." He declined to give details of the withdrawal, envisioned after the failure of peace efforts, saying only that UNPROFOR was "always updating plans."

UNPROFOR officers who asked not to be named said the force's leaders fear mainly that civilians could stage spontaneous demonstrations against the pullout, particularly in three enclaves in the east of the country.

Chaperon said the way the process went would depend on "the situation on the ground" and "the behavior of the three sides"—Bosnian Serbs, Moslems and Croats.

A withdrawal is seen as an inevitable consequence if the arms embargo is lifted, as the United States has indicated it could do starting in October. Washington announced the change of heart after the Serbs, who have conquered a large portion of the ex-Yugoslav republic, repeatedly rejected an internationally-mediated peace plan.

French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said last week that France planned to bring home its UN contingent in October unless the parties to the conflict accepted a peace proposal by then.

UNPROFOR has a total of 22,040 military and non-military personnel in Bosnia.

UNPROFOR Accused of Carrying Muslim Arms

LD2408151894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1446 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Zvornik, Bratunac, 24 Aug (TANJUG)—A column of trucks and armored vehicles belonging to the UN Protection Forces' [UNPROFOR] British unit was not allowed to enter Gorazde today because of an attempt to smuggle in parts for weapons and combat equipment, circles close to the military leadership of the Srpska republic army confirmed for TANJUG today.

According to the sources, during a routine check before entering the area under Muslim control around Gorazde, an illegal delivery was discovered in the British supply convoy which left Kiseljak yesterday. It is reported that Srpska republic army officers discovered a platform for Milan and Mira antitank missiles, a gun carriage for a large-caliber gun, and a night-firing system.

The Serb military sources claim that this was an obvious attempt to deliver heavy weapons and missiles, which indicates that other parts for these weapons, as well as ammunition and missiles, must be being delivered in some way, most probably by air.

The UN Security Council proclaimed the Gorazde area a protected zone, and under international law regulations the zone should have been completely demilitarized a long time ago.

Serbs Use Artillery on Doboj, Bugojno Fronts

AU2508091794

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0800 GMT on 25 August carries in its regular seven-minute newscast several reports on the fighting in the country.

Reporting from Gracanica, Izudin Durakovic says that "the enemy have continued to attack the defense lines and civilian targets over the last 24 hours in the theater of operations of the 2 Gracanica Operations Group. On the Doboj front, apart from some sporadic small arms fire along the demarcation line, the enemy also fired artillery from several directions. The chetniks used 120-mm mortars against the defense lines of (?Klin). In the afternoon the Chetniks fired 62-mm mortars, and used a rocket launcher [words indistinct]." As for the Gracanica front itself, Durakovic says that "last night the enemy put up a heavy artillery barrage, and tried simultaneously to infiltrate a strong sabotage group in [word indistinct], but this was spotted in time and destroyed. More fierce shelling of the defense lines in Vis followed."

Describing the situation in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army's 7th Corps theater of operations, Razija Mehic says that "last night the chetnik forces used artillery to attack the Mt. Vlasic, Komarska, and Bugojno fronts, with simultaneous attempts at infantry breakthroughs. One such breakthrough was reported on the Turbe front, where the chetniks inevitably failed, and then shelled civilian targets. Last night at 2140 [1940 GMT] howitzers from Mt. Vlasic started shelling the Travnik area and the citizens spent most of the night in their shelters."

The 3rd Corps Press Center reports that "yesterday the chetniks spent most of the time licking their wounds after the heavy losses that they suffered in trying to recapture lost territory. They did not have the courage to try any infantry attacks. However, their intensive reconnaissance activities indicate that they might have another go." The report says that "the units defending Zavidovici came under mortar attack overnight. Also, one terrorist group tried to penetrate the free territory, but had to pull back after being intercepted."

Reporting on the situation on the Sarajevo front, the studio announcer cites the 1st Corps Information Center that "last night the chetniks kept up provocative fire along the entire demarcation line. They fired grenades and missiles from shoulder-held launchers at Stup Hill, and also used an antiaircraft machine gun. They fired an antiaircraft gun at [word indistinct], and grenades at Zabrdje. Small arms fire was heard along the entire front line."

Further on Doboj Attacks

LD2408140594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1331 GMT 24 Aug 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Doboj, Aug. 24 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Muslim troops on Wednesday continuously attacked Bosnian Serb positions and settlements around Doboj in northern Bosnia, Bosnian Serb army sources said.

The sources said that the Serb defenders of Mt. Ozren near Doboj repelled a strong combined artillery and infantry attack aimed at penetrating the Serb defences northeast of Maglaj, pushing the Muslim troops back to their initial positions.

The Serb side has reported no casualties.

The Bosnian Serb army neutralized a Muslim commando team trying to infiltrate Serb territory in the southern section of the Vozuca front.

The Serb troops in the eastern section of the Teslic front repelled a Muslim infantry attack backed by anti-aircraft and 82-mm mortar fire.

Bosnian Serb army sources also reported flights by NATO aircraft below the permitted altitude in the Doboj area.

The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA on Wednesday reported strong Muslim artillery attacks southwest and west of the Serb town of Brcko in northern Bosnia on Tuesday night.

Brcko is situated at the neck of the vital Serb corridor linking the east and the west of the Bosnian Serb republic.

SRNA also reported continuous Muslim small arms fire on the northwestern approaches to Sarajevo on Tuesday night.

Muslims Use 'Poison Gases'

LD2508135394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1329 GMT 25 Aug 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Doboj, Aug. 25 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Muslims used poison gases in infantry attacks on Bosnian Serb positions and villages in the Doboj region in northern Bosnia on Thursduy, Bosnian Serb army said.

The Bosnian Serb communique said that Muslims had launched two strong infantry attacks within an interval of a few hours, trying to break through the Serb defense lines near Mala Lozna in the southeastern section of the Mt. Ozren front.

The statement said Serb troops had repelled both attacks without losses in human lives, but several Serb fighters had to seek medical help because the Muslims had used poison gases.

Bosnian Muslim troops opened fire from 82-mm mortars from the direction of Maglaj on Serb positions southeast of the town, and stepped up the fortification of their positions in the southern and eastern sections of the Vozuca front.

Muslims opened sniper, small-arms and mortar fire on Serb positions in the eastern section of the Teslic front.

Bosnian Serbs were forced to respond in an equal measure, destroying several Muslim trenches and inflicting significant losses in human lives on the enemy.

Operations Group Repels Assaults on Zmajevac

AU2408151994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Today again, chetniks attacked the zone covered by the 7 South Operations Group. They carried out provocations along almost all defense lines. On several occasions, (?Teslic) chetniks were shelling the [word indistinct] district of Kalosevic from their well-known stronghold of Zelena Kosa, but fortunately there were no consequences.

On several occasions, the aggressor launched combined artillery-infantry assaults, thereby trying to endanger the newly (?taken) lines on Zmajevac and (Busar). However, the joint units of the 7 South Operations Group successfully repelled all these attacks and pushed the enemy back to his previous positions.

Government Attacks on Ozren Front Continue

LD2408222894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2217 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Doboj, Aug. 24 (TANJUG)—Muslim infantry, with strong artillery support and using war gases, attempted to break through Bosnian Serb defences on the Ozren front in northern Bosnia Wednesday, the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA said.

SRNA was quoting the Bosnian Serb army's First Krajina Corps command.

The Muslims were attacking fiercely also on the Trebava front and along the Spreca River, also in the north, but the Serb military sources have not said if they had casualities.

Muslim attacks from the direction of Tuzla intensified on the Majevica front, SRNA quoted the press office of the Bosnian Serb army's Eastern Bosnia Corps as saying.

Velika Kladusa Fired on From 'Occupied' Croatia

AU2408184794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Provocative fire was opened today from the occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia on the outskirts of Velika Kladusa. In addition to a few mortars being fired, antiaircraft guns and antiaircraft machineguns also opened fire. Similar activities were registered on the lines of separation between the fighters of the 5th Corps and Karadzic's chetniks.

Abdic Urges Followers To Oppose 5th Corps

AU2508094394 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Aug 94 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Babo Will Never Betray You!"]

[Text] Zagreb—On Monday [22 August] our office received a faxed message from Fikret Abdic for the people of western Bosnia. The text, purporting to come from the so-called cabinet of the president of the autonomous province of western Bosnia and signed by Fikret Abdic, reads as follows:

"Citizens of western Bosnia, wherever you are,

"Today, although in exile we are not humiliated and we retain our dignity. We are strong and united in one demand, the demand that we return to our homes. The return is possible only if our persecutors and the butchers of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army leave our devastated and burned down homes. We will not give up on our unique demands until the last member of the 5th Corps leaves our villages and towns. We will persevere in exile with its uncertain fate, which is still safer than that offered to us by Alija Izetbegovic and the Sarajevo government. They have no mandate to decide on our return because they have driven us out. We will not go back to our butchers knives and enable them to continue the crime that they began. Velika Kladusa and western Bosnia are a strong warning because they are witness to the criminal policy of Alija Izetbegovic, who created an aggressor out of a victim by carrying out aggression against his own people.

"Citizens of western Bosnia, wherever you are, remain united and rest assured that Fikret Abdic Babo [Abdic's nickname, meaning 'Daddy'] and other leaders of the autonomous province of western Bosnia will never betray you," the message reads.

Army Spokesman Views Charges Against Abdic

AU2508104794 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 19 Aug 94 pp 2, 7

[Karlo Jeger report on interview with Emir Mesic, public relations officer of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army; place and date not given: "The Command of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Announces: We Will Enter Velika Kladusa and Put Fikret Abdic on Trial as Traitor!"]

[Excerpts] Following the latest offensive actions of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, Fikret Abdic's rebel forces are in complete chaos and are facing military defeat. [passage omitted]

Of the former six brigades of the so-called people's defense, four brigades were completely destroyed at Pecigrad, and the 6th Brigade was decimated in the fighting at Trzac and Mala Kladusa.

The weapons that Abdic's soldiers have are mainly infantry weapons, while they have the artillery support of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia. The situation with the tank crews is similar—Abdic rented them, along with the tanks, from his allies. [passage omitted]

On the other hand, the forces of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army comprise about 30,000 soldiers. Their main problem was lack of ammunition and weapons.

However, within the past month, the 5th Corps seized 1,200 automatic rifles, 200,000 rounds of ammunition, 200 Osas and Zoljas, and several metric tons of other war material during the action of deception Tigar-Sloboda 94. During the most recent battles another 1,600 "barrels" were captured, as well as a large quantity of ammunition. Therefore, since early July, the forces of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army have become more powerful by over 3,000 pieces of various weapons.

Nevertheless, the greatest strength of the Bihac corps lies in their organization and the high morale of the fighters, who were surrounded by the Serb forces for over three years, fighting against three enemies: the Chetniks from Bosnia and Croatia, and Abdic's paramilitary formations.

The Competent Commander Dudakovic

The 40-year-old Brigadier Atif Dudakovic is in command of the forces of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

Brigadier Dudakovic was born on 2 December 1954 in the village of Orahova, between Bosanska Dubica and Bosanska Gradiska. He graduated from the Ground Forces Academy at the top of his class.

He worked for the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] until 1991 at the Artillery Education Center in Zadar, from where he was removed, because of his "suspicious" political positions, by the current Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army, to the position of lecturer at the Command-Headquarters Academy in Belgrade.

Atif Dudakovic, originally from a village that the Bosnian Serbs almost completely ethnically "cleansed," arrived in Bihac in April 1992. He took over the command of the corps on 1 November 1993 from Ramiz Drekovic, after he had been in command of the 502d Mountain Brigade, undoubtedly the best formation in the corps.

He used his former formation during the secret action Tigar-Sloboda 94 along with the special troops of the Bihac Tigers and members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in order to deceive the Chetniks from Croatia and Fikret Abdic.

He is evidently a decisive and competent commander who, apart from persistence, also displayed the ability to plan complex actions. The operation of deceiving Abdic and seizing the weapons started in February 1994 and ended on 9 July 1994. The action deceived not only the Velika Kladusa military command, but also the Counterintelligence Service officers of the 15th Lika Corps and the 21st Banija Corps.

The Money With Which To Buy Peace

In liberating the occupied areas held by Abdic's forces, Dudakovic displayed great skill in conducting the operations using the so-called range maneuver: He placed such a close circle around the enemy that surrender was inevitable. Dudakovic thus also managed to avoid unnecessary casualties in the inter-Muslim conflict. However, there were 155 killed and some 500 wounded members of Abdic's "4th Brigade" until the day of surrender only. [passage omitted]

We talked about the latest situation in the Bihac region to Emir Mesic, the public relations officer for the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. [passage omitted]

"Fikret Abdic Is a Traitor!"

[Jeger] [Passage omitted] The Higher Public Prosecutor's Office from Bihac has brought charges against Fikret Abdic. Will the court proceedings be fully implemented?

[Mesic] Fikret Abdic is a traitor, and he will have to answer before the court for the crimes he perpetrated.

[Jeger] Does that mean that the amnesty proclaimed by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency does not hold for him?

[Mesic] No. The amnesty is good only for the people who are in the territory under his control, who were mobilized by force, and who have not perpetrated crimes. [passage omitted] [end Mesic]

It is not widely known that Fikret Abdic organized concentration camps for Muslims in his self-proclaimed state. Not only did he imprison the captured members of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, but he also interned the civilian population that was not loyal to him, which included Muslim priests . This is evident from the charges that the Higher Public Prosecutor brought against him in Bihac on 23 July 1994.

Inhumane Camps for Compatriots

According to the claims of the prosecutor, Abdic has been suspected of establishing concentration camps in the facilities of the Agrokomerc farm at Plazikur, where 340 civilians were imprisoned, including 40 women and about a dozen minors. Seven khojas [Muslim teachers] were also imprisoned. The prisoners were taken away to work—digging trenches, felling trees, and other hard work that the "Ministry of Defense of the Autonomous Province" needed. The regime was exceptionally strict. The prisoners slept on concrete floors. They were allowed to use the toilet only twice a day, and not at all during the night. This concentration camp was for the so-called extremists.

One thousand five hundred prisoners have been through the prison at Drmaljevo, that is, the rolling mill building. These were mostly people who refused to be illegally and forcefully mobilized, or else they were imprisoned as members of the Bihac Corps.

According to the latest information, there are about 500 more people in the prison, 300 of whom are civilians. The prison manager is an Osman Efendic. Abdic turned even the garages of the Grupex company into an improvised prison.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the UN Secretary General's special rapporteur for human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, has also confirmed in his latest report that Abdic holds his compatriots in inhumane conditions.

"The special rapporteur was deeply shocked after his visit to the detention camp in Velika Kladusa. During the visit he talked to many of the detainees. They are there without any substantiated charges.... The detainees are held in buildings not fit for human habitation—there are no basic conveniences such as sanitation, proper bedding, and other provisions for the maintenance of human dignity. Among the detainees there are injured people urgently in need of, but not receiving, medical care. Many detainees have been subjected to mistreatment by the guards. Detainees are being sent for days at a time to engage in forced labor, sometimes close to the confrontation lines."

Excellent Agrokomerc Business

According to Mazowiecki's statements, about 300 civilians and 150 military prisoners were detained in the center. The special rapporteur also unambiguously confirms that the forces loyal to Fikret Abdic have been obstructing the passage of the humanitarian convoys to Bihac and the territory controlled by government forces.

The delivery of humanitarian aid to some 300,000 people in the Bihac area has been obstructed since November 1993, and Abdic completely stopped the flow of humanitarian convoys in May this year. There is no doubt that business was booming for Agrokomerc, which had no problem in importing large quantities of food and selling it to the hungry people at much higher prices. That business was good can be seen from the statements of the latest refugees from Banja Luka, who said that Agrokomerc-labeled products were available there.

However, the worst part of the charges against the self-appointed western Bosnian leader relates to the murder of some 200 civilians during the artillery and infantry actions of the paramilitary formations of the "autonomous province of western Bosnia" and those that had been arranged with the Serb aggressor.

In the conditions in which the Bihac region was in danger of hunger, and with constant and coordinated armed attacks by Abdic's forces and the Chetniks, the military actions aimed at resolving this inter-Muslim conflict were to be expected.

196 Bosniaks Threatened, Expelled From Bijeljina

AU2408201194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Ethnic cleansing continues in Bijeljina. Karadzic's criminals, headed by Vojkan Djurkovic, have expelled another group of Bosniaks and sent them across the front lines at Majevica. Salih Brkic reports from Tuzla:

[Begin Brkic recording] After almost two and a half years of a Golgotha in Bijeljina, night hunts and raids, and after spending time in a camp [sabirni centar] in [word indistinct], 196 Bosniaks arrived in Tuzla. Most of them are old people, women, and children.

By frightening these people, the Bijeljina criminal phalanges are trying to obliterate the truth. On the eve of being sent to our fighters' lines at Majevica, war criminal Vojkan Djurkovic threatened that he would perpetrate bloody revenge on the relatives of the expelled people who remain in Bijeljina and other [words indistinct] if they say anything.

The night before, he rounded them up from their homes, robbed them in the camp, and, together with his gang, took from the expelled people the meager possessions they had in one of the buses. This is why some of this largest group of expelled people so far recently arrived in Tuzla without anything, only a small plastic bag or two.

Thus, today Tuzla received 196 more sufferers from Bijeljina. Together with several recent groups, nearly 800 expelled people have arrived in Tuzla recently.

In the heart of democratic Europe, which has been calmly watching all of this, ethnic cleansing continues. [end recording]

Trebinje Assembly Chairman on Effects of Blockade

AU2408173794 Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 22 Aug 94 pp 20-21

[Interview with Bozidar Vucurevic, chairman of the Trebinje Communal Assembly, by Velizar Brajovic; place and date not given: "We Pray to God and No One Else"—first paragraph is VREME introduction]

[Excerpts] Last week, the Vilusi border crossing was closed to Bozidar Vucurevic, chairman of the Trebinje Communal Assembly and the leader of the Herzegovina Serbs. On 2 August, as the guest of Metropolitan Amfilohije at the consecration of a church on the slopes of Komova, he was able to pass through without any problems; however, since 4 August, the day when the blockade was imposed, everything has changed.

[Brajovic] Did you expect that the Montenegrin authorities, that is, those of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], would impose such a blockade on the Srpska republic?

[Vucurevic] Since the international community has succeeded in forcing a lot out of Yugoslavia, the Serbian people, the Serbs, and Montenegro, and being aware that there is no end to their demands, more demands were to be expected, but to be honest, not this many. Not to the extent that a complete media, communications, and telecommunications blockade would be imposed. We were not prepared for campaigns and surveys aimed at slinging mud at the people in the Srpska republic. However, we have endured a lot in the course of these three years of war; there can be not doubt that we shall endure this too.

[Brajovic] Until recently, the FRY authorities kept convincing the international public that they were only dispatching humanitarian aid to the Serbs in Bosnia, yet now they claim that the Srpska republic can only receive humanitarian aid. What kind of aid was it receiving earlier?

[Vucurevic] We received a lot of aid from Serbia and Montenegro, and the greatest aid extended to the attacked and suffering people was moral support. However, we can hear what the authorities are saying, and we know what the people think.

[Brajovic] Telephone lines have been disconnected, you cannot watch the television program, you do not have enough fuel for military vehicles, and you cannot communicate with other parts of the state, not even with the leadership in Pale, because all the telecommunications centers are on FRY territory. On the other hand, trains traveling on the Belgrade-Bar route are passing unhindered. Is there a chance of reciprocal measures being introduced?

[Vucurevic] We have taken all this very much to heart, because there are enough examples of states being at war, where the telephones were still working. For every telephone conversation we had to go to Pale, Bijeljina, Banja Luka, and so on. We wanted everything that we have achieved, or wanted to achieve, to be based on Serbia and Montenegro. Everything that goes through the Serb republic and serves the Serbian and other republics will not be threatened. I admire people, who, even when they are feuding, do so in a civilized and dignified manner.

[Brajovic] Montenegro has withdrawn the equipment and experts who were supposed to reactivate the mine in Gacka. How do you assess this?

[Vucurevic] When our Serbs from Herzegovina and Montenegro colonized certain parts of Vojvodina, the first thing they did in the places they settled was to pull down all the Serbian churches. Now these same people are building churches; new, larger, more modern churches. When we split with the Russians in 1948, we stopped drinking Russian tea. As you can see, we are now again going to church, drinking Russian tea, and Herzegovina coal will again burn in the Niksic ironworks. [passage omitted]

[Brajovic] The guns above Dubrovnik were again heard. Can you tell us something about the reasons and consequences of this conflict?

[Vucurevic] The front line here has been quiet for some time. The Croatian Army has been disturbing us with gunfire lately. Just recently they killed a young man for no reason. We cannot use the Trebinje-Ljubinje route, we cannot farm Popovo Polje, yet their planes are landing unhindered at Cilipi airport and they are developing tourism, and it is common knowledge that the Republic of Croatia carried out an aggression on our territory and is now holding a third of the Trebinje territory. They have exceeded every limit and that has caused this reaction.

[Brajovic] You are not giving up on your demands for access to the sea and on the unification into a single Serbian state. What are the chances of this coming true?

[Vucurevic] It is absolutely realistic and certainly achievable. We shared a joint coast in Neum that measured 24 km. Serbian Herzegovina cannot stretch along the coast yet have no access to the sea. No way, not even according to international law. Every normal nation, even the Muslims, want to live in a single state. The Serbs will realize this either now or never—meaning now.

Official: People Returning to Velika Kladusa

AU2408173694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Here is a report on the current situation in Velika Kladusa where, correspondent Mirza Sadikovic reports, life is gradually returning to normal. We apologize to our listeners for the poor quality of the recording:

[Begin recording] [Sadikovic] Following the arrival of the units of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina

Army in Velika Kladusa, (?life) has been gradually returning to normal in this town. Deceived by Fikret Abdic's criminal policy, a number of Kladusa people crossed over to the UN Protection Areas in Croatia. It is encouraging to know that [word indistinct] citizens who fled from Kladusa have been returning to their homes. Esad Velagic, coordinator in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, is [word indistinct] visiting the liberated territory of Velika Kladusa. We'll ask Mr. Velagic to tell us about the current situation in the liberated parts of the (?district).

[Velagic] The situation in the region of Velika Kladusa today is very (?tempestuous), active, very interesting. Personally, I am delighted by what I have seen in Velika Kladusa. It looks as if no army has passed through the town at all. There are no traces of breakage and destruction. There is a feeling of delight, (?tears of joy). It is amazing how people have [word indistinct] in order to live to see this day.

You see our people have been returning from the so-called Serbian autonomous region of Krajina. [Words indistinct] late last night Radio Velkaton broadcast (?that) Abdic said that the 5th Corps has been killing, raping, persecuting. These are utter lies: People have been returning home. We assume that this process will take 10 to 15 days and that [words indistinct] and it is certain that they will not be deceived, that what the amnesty [word indistinct] to these people will be implemented. Therefore, there will be no punishing, persecuting, expelling. We are not going to continue Fikret Abdic's policy. This is what we have been fighting for over the past year. Therefore, I say to all (?Kladusa people): Come back home, help relations normalize and trust between people be restored. As for those who have caused all this, let them go away never to return from history (?of expulsion) which is certainly a stain on the Muslim people.

[Sadikovic] Legal authorities in the Velika Kladusa region (?are already being formed).

[Velagic] We have just had a meeting with the chairman of the commune of Velika Kladusa, that is, with the war presidency. We have put [word indistinct] urgent issues on the agenda, agreed on the speed with which we should solve them, [words indistinct] all (?enterprises), appointed acting directors, they have already been working. One is trying to protect all property to the maximum, [words indistinct] to serve the town, the people, and the armed forces as soon as possible. Therefore, not (?a long time will pass) before all these functions are fully operational in accordance with the precise needs of this people and the defense of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Sadikovic] Tell us, what is the state of the Agrokomerc Combine, [word indistinct], and other enterprises, as there are some arbitrary reports in other (?media) of other countries?

[Velagic] Well, there is a lot of misinformation. Commissions have been formed that will establish the situation and what has been found. Huge transportation resources have been (?taken away) from the Velika Kladusa region and as for other production capacities, we are going to determine what the situation is, and will then be able to say more specifically what has been (?misappropriated) and [word indistinct] from the Velika Kladusa region.

[Sadikovic] What should be done with a view to [words indistinct] be accelerated in this region?

[Velagic] Well, our primary task is to increase the population. We do not want a lot of people to profit and [words indistinct] on the suffering of our Bosnian people. There is no reason for that. And as for those who have been helping the autonomists the whole time, they are now happy to be able to protract these people's agony. I say again, the people of Velika Kladusa can safely return home. [end recording]

Commune Head Appeals for UNHCR, ICRC Aid

AU2408173494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] On the occasion of the critical humanitarian and health situation in Srebrenica, Selim Beslagic, head of the Tuzla Commune, has sent an appeal for help to Srebrenica people to the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] Command for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UNHCR, and the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC]:

Srebrenica, in which about 47,000 people live in a small area, has been pushed to the margins of interest of the organizations that are obliged to ensure the basic conditions for survival in this town, even more so as winter is coming, it says in the appeal.

Due to the shortage of salt and other food items, endemic diseases, such as goiters and serious anemia, have appeared in Srebrenica. The UNHCR and ICRC convoys are bringing minimal quantities of food and humanitarian needs to Srebrenica, because the Serb aggressor side has deliberately been letting through only transports that would only ensure a bare subsistence.

During past winters, refugees and locals have cut down all the woods in the protected zone.

The international organizations are asked to comply with all UN resolutions that envisage the conditions of life in Srebrenica and the behavior of the aggressor who has been violating all UN resolutions.

Banja Luka Bishop on Serb Land Union Right

94BA0366A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 1 Jul 94 p 32

[Interview with Banja Luka Bishop Jefrem Milutinovic by Nikola Arezina; place and date not given: "The Trip to the Promised State"—first paragraph is NIN introduction]

[Text] *Bishop Jefrem Milutinovic was born in 1944 in Busnovi, near Prijedor. He took orders as a monk in the Liplje Monastery in the Banja Luka Episcopate. After graduation from the Religious Academy in Moscow, he performed duties as a teacher and counselor in the Seminary of the Three Holy Bishops in the Kirki Monastery. In the Belgrade Cathedral in 1978 he was advanced to the rank of bishop of the Serbian Orthodox Church. He became archbishop of the Banja Luka Episcopate in 1980, succeeding His Holiness Bishop Andrej in that position.*

[Arezina] Your Holiness, please elucidate from your viewpoint the background of the present interethnic conflicts in Bosnia.

[Jefrem] The roots of our conflicts are historical and go very deep. It should be remembered that the Turks ruled our region for five centuries, that our present Muslims are not Turks, but Serbs who converted to Islam, and that our indigenous Serbian people nevertheless perceived that gesture as a betrayal of national interests. Unfortunately, that has been borne out, both in the degree of their exclusiveness, and also in their direct allegiance with all occupiers: Turkey, Austria, the fascists in World War II, and thus even with the most recent wreckers of Yugoslavia. As for the most recent conflicts, they have occurred because of the manifest desire of our Muslims to create an ethnic state in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina. And the immediate occasion was the firing into the Serbian wedding party, which was followed by the well-known events.

[Arezina] The Serbs in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina are at war once again. How do you interpret these tragic paradoxes in religious history?

[Jefrem] The Orthodox Church, which represents authentic Christianity, has never given occasion for aggressiveness and militancy, but on the other side we are confronted by expressedly militant Islam, which is guided by jihad, i.e., holy war against all unbelievers, that is, against all non-Muslims. Orthodoxy does allow for self-defense, for defense of an individual's life and family, defense of holy artifacts, and defense of land. If there is anything that might console us in this tragic war, then it is the fact that the Serbs did not start it, but that they had to accept the engagement, because it was imposed on them. I hope that we are not to blame because the military successes were on our side. Those who are defending what belongs to them are always more successful.

[Arezina] Even in areas where there were no military operations, a large number of shrines have been destroyed. This has certainly been a burden on interfaith relations to a great degree. What are those relations today on the territory of your episcopate?

[Jefrem] Unfortunately, this war has brought a great deal of evil to everyone. Hatred and revanchism, which by and large have sprung up on all sides in the war, have driven people even to destroy religious structures. There has been destruction in the course of military operations, because certain facilities have been turned into military fortifications, but there has also been destruction where there was no war. It began in Slavonia, and then it carried over to the regions of Bosnia. I see this current destruction of religious structures as a consequence of the grim historical legacy. For 500 years the Turks destroyed Christian shrines in our region. And in 1941 our Croats also destroyed hundreds of Orthodox churches on the territory of the NDH [Independent State of Croatia], and when this began again in Slavonia, some of the Serbs, above all those who had been atheized, manifested revanchism, and the ultimate effect is that everyone has done evil to everyone else.

[Arezina] How do you view the proclaimed idea of unification of all Serbian lands in one state?

[Jefrem] We think that it is the divine and human right of every people to live united in one state on its historical territory. That right may not be denied anyone, including the Serbs. The Serbian Orthodox Church, as the spiritual cohesive force of the Serbian people, achieved that unification long ago. Political parties cannot decide on that right individually, this is a much broader right, and it belongs to the court of the entire people. After Yugoslavia's disintegration as a multinational state, what could be more logical than creation of ethnic states? We do not deny others that right, and we are seeking it as our inalienable right and the obligation of this generation, but also of the generations to come. We cannot trade off the national interests of our people, nor do we desire to threaten the interests of others.

Croatian, Bosnian Foreign Ministers Hold Talks

LD2408121794 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] The Croatian and Bosnia-Herzegovina foreign ministers, Mate Granic and Irfan Ljubijankic, held talks in Zagreb this morning. They discussed relations between the two countries. After the talks they made the following statements for our reporter Andjelko Perincic.

[Perincic] The Bosnia-Herzegovina minister said that a meeting between the highest-ranking officials of the two countries would take place soon. He had the following to say about today's talks:

[Begin Ljubijankic recording] We discussed the current bilateral issues, primarily the possibilities of rounding up our agreement, on which the two governments are working. We also discussed visas and refugees and the possibilities which we can foresee after a possible lifting of the embargo on arms to Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would have a certain impact on both countries.

We also spoke about the problem of the refugees from Velika Kladusa. We agreed that the refugees should return to their home area and that it was very important to bring stability to the region—and not just as far as Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned; it is also in the interests of Croatia.

I will use this opportunity to call again on the refugees not to believe propaganda and return to their homes. No one in Europe wants them. It is in their best interests to go home. [end recording]

[Perincic] Croatian Foreign Minister also made a brief statement.

[Begin Granic recording] We discussed all bilateral issues: political, economic, and the overall situation in the region, with special emphasis on September and October when the UN General Assembly is due to hold its session and the UN Security Council is expected to reach a decision on UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Force] new mandate and on the possible lifting of the arms embargo on deliveries of weapons to Bosnia-Herzegovina if Bosnian Serbs do not accept the contact group's plan. We also mentioned possible UN Security resolutions about the easing or the tightening of the sanctions which depends on the behavior of the Bosnian Serbs and Belgrade.

As far as our bilateral relations are concerned, the Washington agreement is the basis for our relations and the main goal of the two governments is to implement the agreement in its entirety as soon as possible. We will offer all humanitarian aid needed by the refugees from Velika Kladusa but the main goal is to ensure that all the refugees go back safely and to provide them with necessary guarantees for their security. [end recording]

Muslim Refugees Detail Torture by 5th Corps

LD2508101794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0927 GMT 25 Aug 94

[Text] Knin, 25 Aug (TANJUG)—A delegation of the main headquarters of the Serb army of Krajina, headed by assistant commander Colonel Marinko Gajic and head of the medical service Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Pejak, have toured the Kordun region and viewed the situation created by the arrival of the Muslim refugees from the autonomous province of western Bosnia.

The information service of the Serb army of Krajina announced today that the Muslim refugees—45,152 of whom were registered by 1800 yesterday—told members of the main headquarters about the torture committed by members of the 5th Corps of the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina Army against the remaining population of western Bosnia. According to the same source, the refugees claim that several hundred people were killed in a column of refugees that was intercepted by members of the 5th Corps. The survivors are still hiding in the woods.

A statement adds that the refugees also said that members of Izetbegovic's army took the remaining civilians from Velika Kladusa to the village of Todorovo, on the road from Kladusa to Cazin, under the pretext that the Serbs were about to bomb Kladusa.

The main headquarters of the Serb Krajina army conveys the unanimous and determined stance by the Muslim refugees that they will not return unless the 5th Corps forces leave the autonomous province of western Bosnia.

Martic Urges Butrus-Ghali To Aid With Refugees

AU2408161294 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serbian Krajina, sent a letter to UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali in which he said the following, among other things:

You have been informed that the army of the Muslim-Croatian Federation between 20 and 23 August occupied the territory of the autonomous province of western Bosnia. The entire population of this region, all of them Muslims, fled from the terror of the units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps to the republic of Serbian Krajina. Currently, our data suggest that there are 60,000 refugees here.

According to eyewitnesses, soldiers of the 5th Corps loyal to Alija Izetbegovic have been opening fire indiscriminately at anyone during their advances. A great number of civilians were killed on that occasion, mostly women and children. In this way the units of the 5th Corps loyal to Izetbegovic completely cleared the territory of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of its population. All settlements, including Velika Kladusa, are mostly empty.

The republic of Serbian Krajina opened its borders and in accordance with the international humanitarian norms accepted all the Muslims who had been chased away by the Army of the Muslim-Croatian Federation. The injured who were lucky enough to pass into the republic of Serbian Krajina were admitted to St. George's Hospital in Vojnic. The remaining refugees were accommodated on the territory of municipalities Vojnic, Topusko, and Glina.

In the name of the authorities of the republic of Serbian Krajina and my own, I appeal to you to understand the gravity of the situation in which the republic of Serbian Krajina has found itself by accepting so many refugees. The republic of Serbian Krajina has already received approximately 200,000 refugee Serbs, chased by the current Croatian authorities. The humanitarian aid that the international organizations send to the refugees in Krajina has diminished considerably lately. It is evident that the additional 60,000 refugees represent an enormous burden for the republic of Serbian Krajina and without an immediate and substantial engagement of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Red Cross, and other humanitarian organizations the position of the refugee Muslims could grow unbearable.

I expect your personal engagement in taking immediate and necessary measures by which the incumbent international organizations would help the authorities of the republic of Serbian Krajina to provide for the refugees. This, among other things, is stated in a letter that Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serbian Krajina, sent to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali.

Akashi, Krajina's Martic Satisfied With Talks

LD2408212494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1955 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Plitvice, 24 Aug (TANJUG)—After five hours of talks in Plitvice today with representatives of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], Yasushi Akashi, the UN secretary general's special envoy, expressed satisfaction at the participants agreeing on the importance of progress in resolving the issue concerning the reopening of the motorway, water supplies, and humanitarian aid.

"I am very pleased that they cooperated and accepted a pilot project for resettling people in the zones of separation," said Akashi, and expressed the UN Protection Force's [UNPROFOR] readiness to help overcome the problems and reach concrete agreements on all issues.

"I am returning deeply convinced that I was met with readiness and goodwill for sincere talks with the other side," he stressed, adding that the times in which we are living are critical and should not be wasted on marginal issues.

When asked what specific agreement had been reached on water supplies, Akashi replied that they discussed water supply systems in Biograd, Drnis, and Teslingrad, as well as the Petrinja-Sisak system which is on the list of priorities.

RSK President Milan Martic told journalists that Akashi proved himself yet again to be a true and objective fighter for peace and that today's talks concerned projects that benefit both the Serbian and Croatian peoples.

Speaking about specific agreements, Martic stressed that, within the framework of the pilot project of resettling people to the zones of separation, it was proposed that Croatia should begin with resettling Skabrnja, while the RSK will begin with resettling Islam Grcki and Kasic.

As far as the reopening of the motorway is concerned, Martic said he will engage in direct talks with Croatia on condition that they are not to the detriment of the Serbian side, but are beneficial for Serbs.

"No specific agreement was reached. We have remained open to this kind of talks, i.e. to reach an agreement on all aspects of security," Martic said, adding that there will be no unilateral concessions with regard to the question of the motorway.

When asked about the extension of UNPROFOR's mandate, Martic replied that the RSK agreed to offer hospitality in its own territory if UNPROFOR continues to encounter problems in Croatia.

They also discussed Muslim refugees from the autonomous province of western Bosnia in the RSK. In Martic's words, Akashi demonstrated a high level of understanding for the fact that the RSK is not capable of accommodating 60,000 refugees out of its own pocket.

"We received firm guarantees that the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross will devote maximum attention to this problem," Martic said in conclusion, and added that Akashi promised to do everything he could to ensure that the refugees do not remain in the RSK, which is objectively not capable of looking after them.

Bosnian Ambassador Favors Defense Alliance

AU2408143894 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Aug 94 p 7

[Interview with Kasim Trnka, ambassador of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Croatia, by Visnja Gotal; place and date not given: "For a Defense Alliance of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina"]

[Text] Even though he has not officially been accredited yet, Dr. Kasim Trnka, former minister of justice and administration in the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is the new Bosnia-Herzegovina ambassador to Croatia. The appointment of Dr. Trnka to this post is the result of his diplomatic activities, especially his work in the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation within the framework of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the peace process for Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which he participated from the very beginning. Although the replacement of former Ambassador Bisera Turkovic had been expected within a matter of days for some time, the appointment of Dr. Kasim Trnka has nevertheless raised many questions about the reasons for the change of the diplomatic representative of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government in Croatia.

[Trnka] You should ask those who made the decision why the change was made. However, in my view, the main reason is the need to embark on the creation of the federation and confederation of the two states at full steam. The embassy has been neglecting diplomatic activities. Its main activities boiled down to work on humanitarian issues and the issue of refugees as the main center for transfer of people and goods was in Zagreb. In addition to my participation in the peace process and my sound knowledge of the situation, I think that the fact that I am not a member of any political party and that therefore I am acceptable to people of different political, religious, and national beliefs has nevertheless played a crucial role in my appointment. Whatever, I expect to be busy, because the embassy's work here will be to give priority to diplomatic activities, although the numerous refugees facing return from third countries will also be given consideration. If that happens, Croatia will again become the main transit center.

[Gotal] In that case, will the refugees be sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and how?

[Trnka] The Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina is working on a detailed program for the return of refugees that will take the general situation into account. We are aware of the complexity of this job, which depends primarily on the continuation of the peace process. Refugees can only return if they wish to do so and on the condition that their safety is guaranteed. Also, there must be a balanced return in terms of nationalities. In other words, we must attain the pre-war national composition of the population. After all, how can someone return if someone else is living in his house? This is why it is necessary to secure decent conditions for the people from the regions under Serbian control until they can return. However, they cannot live on humanitarian aid for long, and the best help that the world can offer is to helps us restart production, because the economic revitalization of the republic is necessary.

Serbian "Puppet Show"

[Gotal] The confederation between the two republics will play a very important role in all this. Are there any specific results?

[Trnka] I can say with pleasure that sound and qualitative cooperation between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina has been achieved, and that there are already some 10 joint accords. For instance, there are agreements on establishing economic cooperation, the protection of property, customs, rail, road, and air traffic, on abolishing visas, the opening of the Ploce port.... There are still some other areas that require further work. These areas are the education of refugees and their health care, and I hope this will be solved soon.

[Gotal] President Tudjman recently received the representatives of your country in Brijuni. What influence does Dr. Tudjman actually command in Bosnia-Herzegovina today?

[Trnka] His influence in Bosnia-Herzegovina is unquestionable. Regarding his meeting in Brijuni, the heterogeneous composition of the guests was striking. The meeting was attended by the president of the Croatian Democratic Community and the representatives of the Federation and the army. Tudjman is obviously in a position to influence the military-economic situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and his role in terms of support for the further course of developments is significant.

[Gotal] The currently most topical issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the clash between Milosevic and Karadzic. Is this a real rift between Belgrade and Pale, or just a diplomatic move?

[Trnka] I think that all this is a puppet show aimed at presenting Milosevic as a peacemaker and easing the sanctions. I believe that their ultimate goals are identical, although Milosevic might have perhaps realized that military actions should stop as the world will not accept that kind of solution. In my view this is a clash between the militants and those who want accomplish the same goal at a slower pace. Karadzic and Mladic cannot accept this because they would then lose their positions. What is important is that the ultimate aim is the same, all Serbs in one state, according the Gazimestan formula.

[Gotal] To what extent has the signing, or rather the nonsigning, of the Contact Groups' peace plan by the Serbs contributed to the improvements in the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and will this finally produce specific results?

[Trnka] The situation will improve if the Contact Group's plan is followed through, because it should reward those who have signed it and punish those have not. The only weakness of this formula is that it does not contain deadlines and that the plan has not been backed up with a serious threat. The Serbs are still being offered a kind of bonus. However, I think that what they are doing is to their own detriment, because this denouement clearly differentiates between the peace and war options. The international community continues to be indecisive, which is confirmed by the latest events around Sarajevo. Karadzic is very carefully calculating when to open fire and when to stop, and, in this way, is demonstrating that he is the master of life and death in Sarajevo. In this way he is testing the international community's patience because he has realized that members of the international community disagree on possible military action. The only constructive measure for this kind of behavior is to use force. One must say that the international community has achieved some results because the situation in Sarajevo, objectively speaking, is better than it had been before the ultimatum. Therefore, despite the inefficiency, Serbia has been grounded to some extent.

Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina—Reality

[Gotal] General Rose recently shocked the world public with his statement on the withdrawal of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] from Bosnia-Herzegovina, which he later denied. What was the reason for this statement and what would the possible withdrawal mean in the current situation?

[Trnka] I think that this is a kind of media pressure aimed at frightening the parties involved in the conflict. If these forces were, for instance, replaced by NATO, I would be more than happy. UNPROFOR is a heterogeneous organization that does not function in a unified way, while NATO is an extremely homogeneous organization. If UNPROFOR were to leave, we should at least have the arms embargo lifted. Otherwise this would be a sacrifice. I think that a defense alliance with Croatia and the lifting of the embargo would be sufficient for the protection of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since we are on the subject of a possible lifting of the embargo, I think that if the Contact Group's plan was implemented this would not be necessary. After all, the embargo was introduced unjustly, because it was adopted with the SFRY in mind. We are a separate legal entity today.

[Gotal] The new Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation is expected to achieve a lot with regard to the settlement of the conflict. What has been done so far, specifically, on the functioning of the Federation?

[Trnka] Regarding the Federation, several segments are functioning impeccably, namely the setting up of institutions at federal level, the setting up of the joint military command, the feeling of better communications with the world.... However, we cannot be satisfied with the delay in the setting up of municipal and cantonal organs as stipulated by the Federal Constitution. It is in fact these organs that could facilitate the normal functioning of everyday life, the return of the refugees, and the economic renewal of the country. I expect the Brijuni meeting to give new impulses to the realization of that, and to make the opponents of the Washington Agreement realize that they do not stand a chance.

We must also be aware of the objective circumstances, such as the recent Croatian-Muslim clash, which some people used to advance their positions. I must also say that the Croatian media sometimes disregard the position of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and only write about the Federation, despite the fact that, according to the Constitution of the Federation, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is an international legal subject with territorial integrity and will remain a constant in international relations and the final peace settlement. After all, the organs of Bosnia- Herzegovina exist, too. The Federation certainly has an important role and has great powers, but this does not mean that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina should disappear.

Zenica Prisoners

[Gotal] The Croatian media recently carried a report about Croatian Defense Council [HVO] soldiers being held captive in Zenica. Despite the agreement on the exchange of prisoners according to the all-for-all principle, they have not been released yet. What do you know about this?

[Trnka] At one time I was personally involved in that process and a complete exchange had indeed been agreed. The exchange was carried out with the exception of a few persons facing criminal charges. It was agreed that both sides' lawyers examine the files and establish the real state of affairs. If their views were to differ, it was agreed that they should invite international experts. I spoke to Mr. Zubak personally about inviting these lawyers. The report published in the media surprised me with its intonation and I will check what is going on with the Justice Ministry in Sarajevo. Mato Tadic, the new justice minister, who was charged by Mr. Zubak to check this information, should be able to provide the best information. However, if there are some murder cases, murders are murders and it is irrelevant whether it was the Mujahidin or someone else that was killed. These reports work like unnecessary insinuations that could affect good relations between the two countries.

[Gotal] Finally, who does the Bosnia-Herzegovina Embassy represent in Zagreb today?

[Trnka] The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I must stress that Bosnia-Herzegovina is now an entity with an international-legal status and that its international-legal status will continue to exist. Despite the unfortunate clashes between the HVO and the Army of the Bosnia-Herzegovina, I will do everything possible that all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina perceive this institution as their embassy, which will protect their interests.

This, of course, also refers to the loyal Serbs who have not brought their loyalty into question in any way. This is a state organ that must not discriminate against anyone, and this refers to everybody. I am indeed using this opportunity to invite all our citizens to use our embassy's service, and to announce the opening of the General Consulate in Split in order to make our operations easier.

Report Views Krajina Serb Plans for Federation

AU2408130094 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 18 Aug 94 p 4

[Report by Linda Milisa: "Dreaming of the 'Transdrina Federation'"]

[Text] Sibenik—In the remake of Milosevic's famous play "Precani [Serbs living outside the territory of Serbia on the other side of the Drina River], the Usurpers of Serbia," Martic has decided to play the role of the peacemaker between Milosevic and Karadzic, and has given his state-creation the role of "coordinator of Pan-Serbian unification."

Consequently, in a "statement from the president's office," Martic will announce that he is concentrating on calming the situation between Belgrade and Pale and that he will "hold high-level talks with the leaders of Serbia and the Srpska republic to that end." He already met with Karadzic in Zvornik in the middle of week, but the listeners to "state" radio were not given any juicy morsels about the Zvornik meeting. They were told only that a meeting was held "to discuss the overcoming of the present blockade that the FRY has imposed on the Srpska republic."

Milosevic's follower from the "westernmost Serbian land" will justify the recent decision about the unification of the "Srpska republic" and the "republic of Serbian Krajina," which Martic's "parliament" made on 4 August, as well as public support for the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs, under the motto of "sacred Serb interest." That is why he does not fear negative comments from Belgrade. Convinced that "after a time the rift will be overcome," as a result, among other things, of his role as a shock-absorber, Martic cannot understand why entire leaderships, those in new Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, which compete with each other in clearly distancing themselves from Karadzic, do not realize that the international community has played its last card, the card of a rift among the Serbs. Martic is trying to compensate for the total lack of propaganda support for Karadzic in the Serbian media by his own media, which get their sustenance from frequent press conferences of "krajina parties" and "rallies organized in support the government, army, and people of the Srpska republic," which they themselves organize.

And so in Okucani the local radicals organized a rally called "let's not let them divide us," and sent "a message to the world that the Serbs will accept only maps drawn by the blood of Serb heroes." The branch office of Jovic's SPO [Serb National Revival] stated that "the Srpska republic's political leadership is absolutely right to reject the contact group's so-called peace plan." The spokesperson of the Knin SPO, a Miss Gordana Zubic, will explain that by saying that "the situation in the Srpska republic in a way influences the situation in the republic of Serbian Krajina," for "the nonsigning of the plan will pave the way for accepting the factual situation on the ground, and when—God willing it will also happen—the Srpska republic is recognized as a Serbian country, the same principle will be applied to the republic of Serbian Krajina."

Regarding the blockade, the Knin SPO sent word to Milosevic that "since the Yugoslav, Serbian, and Montenegrin governments will not let foreign bandit so-called humanitarian organizations deliver aid to enemies of the Serbs via the territory of the FRY, nobody can stop the Serbs, their institutions, the Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbian humanitarian organizations from helping their brothers." Miss Zubic was told that the latter do not really need that help, since "the Srpska republic is capable not only of surviving and defending itself, but also of helping the republic of Serbian Krajina and Serbia."

The Knin Serbian Democratic Party and Milan Babic, who knows very well what it feels like to be abandoned by Milosevic, have recently put their heads together to concentrate on a much subtler issue—what to call the future "transdrina federation." According to Babic, the future "state of the united Srpska republic and the republic of Serbian Krajina" is supposed to be organized as a monarchy and be called the "Serbian principality." Babic's SDS accused "Prime Minister" Mikelic and a "group of his comrades" of "attempting to impose a blockade of the Srpska republic by the republic of Serbian Krajina," i.e. of attempting to introduce "yet another border separating the Serbs." He accused the "Krajina assembly" of, as it were, giving up the idea about unification of the "two Serbian republics west of the Drina."

Major General Views Operations in Slavonia

AU2508080094 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 16 Aug 94 pp 7-9

[Interview with Major General Djuro Decak, commander of the Osijek Regional Corps, by Gordan Nuhanovic; place and date not given: "I Will Not Be Replacing General Bobetko"]

[Text] Lately there has been much controversy about Major General Djuro Decak, commander of the Osijek Regional Corps—from half-founded rumors about the general's fondness for expensive cars and speculations regarding his aspiration to General Bobetko's position, to far more bold and dangerous imputations regarding mistakes during the war operations in western Slavonia. To crown everything, the Italian L'AVVENIRE recently said that some Croatian officers had launched an investigation to determine Decak's responsibility for the alleged breakdown of the Croatian Army in the fighting in western Slavonia, which, as the paper claims, was halted by the right-wing faction of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ], which favors Decak.

[Decak] The fact is that this campaign against me was supposed to culminate in the refugee discontent with the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] mandate, that is, their blockade of the UNPROFOR checkpoints, in connection with which people started to lay the blame for the Zagreb Agreement on me, all of which is disgusting, to say the least. I do not know at the moment whom this suits, and with what connotations, but I will admit quite openly that I do not know of any demands for an investigation regarding my responsibility for conducting the operations in western Slavonia. I will repeat again that, as far as technical equipment is concerned, we entered the fighting with the chetniks and the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] in western Slavonia with very slim chances of success, but we did not lose once. We managed to defeat the chetniks 11 times and to keep them relatively far away from the jugular vein—the Podravina Highway, which was one of the priorities in the action. It is quite certain that during this cruel fighting it was not possible to watch over each of the soldiers, so, ultimately, I can admit that it is possible that some minor mistakes occurred during this complex operation. However, we still defeated the chetniks there.

[Nuhanovic] Is it true that you aspire to General Bobetko's position?

[Decak] If this misinformation leaked from certain irresponsible officers, it only goes to prove that everyone still wants to show how important they are and to impress people with being supposedly well-informed. In accordance with this, Branimir Glavas [head of Osijek County] and I can laugh here on a local level about people saying he is going to take over my position. Some people would certainly like to see this happen, but, as a professional, I do not wish to get into that. General Bobetko is a top-level professional who will accept what the supreme commander assigns to him as a task, just as I will also carry out his orders without question. I am saying this in the context of various speculations on the personnel crosswords in the Croatian Army, as the same people who are supposedly creating it are forgetting that they are in fact dealing with the people whose basic characteristic is professionalism. We were assigned the primary task of creating an army. Now that we have completed that part of the job, we still have a huge task to deal with, which we will not manage to do if we start to act self-management-like. General Bobetko is the number one man, he joined us during critical times, and he did not give us a cock-and-bull story as the others did. He started issuing orders directly, he was successful in the south, he managed to connect the cut-off part of Dalmatia when the Lika road was in danger, and I am sure that, at present, we are also prepared to liberate this part of western Slavonia as soon as we are given the order to do so. I am sure that it will all be much easier if General Bobetko continues to hold the head position.

[Nuhanovic] Is it true that you presented President Tudjman with a plan for liberating the occupied Croatian territories within 24 hours?

[Decak] Even a layman understands that, like any other serious army, we certainly have many such plans, which are, for the time being, top military secrets. Regardless of the fact that the current Croatian politics is concentrated on the political solution for the UNPA's [UN Protected Areas], the Croatian Army is not lying idle. I talked to the president recently, and I can tell you that the reporters were not very wrong this time.

[Nuhanovic] So, if an attempt is made to maintain the status quo after September, will armed action be carried out?

[Decak] It primarily depends on what the international community offers us as the next resolution. The only thing that would be acceptable to us is the Security Council setting specific dates for the return of our refugees and the Serb refugees. I think that anything else would be unacceptable, and the Croatian Armed Forces would, in that case, be put into action. I hope it will not happen, but I can also claim with full responsibility that we are mature enough and capable of that.

[Nuhanovic] The Refugee Association has recently accused you, as the operative of the famous Zagreb Agreement, of a failure to actualize it.

[Decak] I only had the army withdraw to the distance to which I was ordered to.

[Nuhanovic] There has been talk that the lines of separation were drawn up in the offices, that is, on the maps, that the thickness of the markers that were used implied 200 to 500 meters on the ground, and that you did not manage to get that territory. It has turned out that Jarmina is now divided in two, and that we have lost a very important strategic elevation at Nustar.

[Decak] Firstly, the thickness of the marker was of no consequence, since we worked on the UNPROFOR maps, on which each plot of land was drawn in with a precision that included almost every meter. I did not surrender a meter wherever we had the right to be, but I did not take away a single meter wherever the seriousness of Croatian politics was in danger of being questioned. I will not permit any imputations against the Croatian Army regarding everything the refugees have experienced as the bad side of the Zagreb Agreement. I repeat, I was only the executor of what had been signed at the political level. I moved the army to the positions that had been agreed upon, and not to any that I had determined. Secondly, it is true that, with the implementation of the Zagreb Agreement, we lost about 1,000 meters of free territory that we had bled for not so long ago. Among the lost territories the most important one is the so-called Zidina near Nustar, which provided certain strategic advantages, but we should also not forget that UNPROFOR and the Croatian police are there, and the intervention units are close enough to be able to reach all these positions in a very short time. Therefore, these territories should in no way be considered lost, although we in the army view them in a different light, for obvious reasons.

[Nuhanovic] It seems that the army is this time bearing the brunt of politics.

[Decak] The audacity of the malicious statements aimed at having others bear someone else's brunt have upset me very much, to say the least. For instance, shortly after the signing of the Zagreb Agreement, someone from the presidency of the Association of Refugees, I think, said casually to the refugees who had gathered there in Karlovac that they could start packing to leave for home. Incredible! There is not a word about the return of the refugees in the Zagreb Agreement. I do not know what the negotiations and arrangements that followed contain, but those who had signed the agreement have to tell the refugees that there is not a word about their return in it. In the deployment of the army, I was personally in the position to try to save something, but when the Serbs felt that we could perhaps try something like that, they set the demands before us against which we were simply not able to do anything.

[Nuhanovic] You mean you tried to have the army stay at certain positions?

[Decak] Something like that, but that is not important now. I believe that the people who remained within the separation line are guaranteed maximum safety. However, people have gotten used to the army, and they have to understand the people of Jarmina, for instance, who protest against the line crossing their village.

[Nuhanovic] The public considers you to be a person who is not very open to various political options.

[Decak] I have heard much about this, but I believe that it is quite the contrary—I do not find politics completely unfamiliar, and I understand it quite well, as opposed to those who keep accusing me in accordance with their well-mastered Committee discourse.

[Nuhanovic] Do any such accusations perhaps come from the HDZ presidency, of which you are a member?

[Decak] Not from there, but I do not think this is the time for displaying dirty laundry.

[Nuhanovic] There have been many speculations about a conflict within the Croatian command cadre between the so-called graduates of the academies of the former JNA and the officers who acquired their ranks during the Homeland War. You have been said to hold the leading position among the latter.

[Decak] This is another premeditated, and, I must admit, very subtle attempt to create bad blood among the officers. I am not the leader of any of these groups—they do not exist to begin with. I cannot speak about the whole of Croatia, but in the command of the Osijek Regional Corps only we have 17 officers who graduated from the academies of the former JNA. These people all joined in the defense of the homeland, most of them even before the president appealed to all JNA officers to join up in 1991. One cannot even consider them as officers who have not contributed to the Homeland War just as much as the others did. On the contrary, I have a very high opinion of them. Since we have such a command cadre, we also have a somewhat different organization and training, because we want to put their great experience to use, especially the precious military experience of Brigadier Kokeza, who had spent many years in Libya and the Sinai, and who is certainly the soul of our regional corps. If this antagonism does exist, I assure you there is no such antagonism here. At present there are 11 brigade commanders in this command office, which is a very valuable reserve—something no other regional corps could boast.

[Nuhanovic] Could a specific war doctrine be discussed in relation to the Croatian Army?

[Decak] The doctrine of our army is in fact the essence of all the positive doctrines of many world's armies. This was our intention ever since the organization of the Croatian Army started. It should be said that, in the doctrinary sense, the knowledge from the academies of the former JNA does not in any way fit into our visions, since we really do not want an army that will sooner or later be defeated by mechanics, farmers, intellectuals, or shoemakers. I do not think that would be the army of the modern state we would like to be.

[Nuhanovic] One of your positions is that of a member of the HDZ presidency. To what extent do your political and military paths coincide?

[Decak] You probably think that the banality of one of these two functions bothers me. In the Osijek Regional Corps, I am primarily a soldier, which is what I ask all my subordinates to be. I am not in the least interested if one of my associates is a member of the HDZ or of any other party, because the time of idealogical armies is behind us. There will be no campaigning or party meetings here, because this is completely different from the petty politics that were conducted in the former JNA. At the same time, there are no rules forbidding the officers or non-commissioned officers of the Croatian Army to be involved in politics in their spare time. I must give an explanation here. According to some interpretations, I was supposed to freeze my mandate in the parliament because I am a general. According to another interpretation, although I am a general, I am not a professional, and I am not paid according to the A-category system, but this enters the area of understatement. At any rate, I do not see anything wrong with Croatian Army officers being involved in political activity.

[Nuhanovic] How true is the information that the Serbian information services have easy access to the military secrets of the Croatian Army due to the carelessness of the Croatian side?

[Decak] I think that the actions of the Croatian Army at Maslenica and the Medak pocket deny this best. We surprised them there; they almost did not have enough weapons, and they were completely unprepared. Their so-called information service will function no better when we are ordered to liberate western Slavonia or Baranja and eastern Slavonia. However, the claim that the Croatian Army barracks are too open to the often malevolent visitors does hold some water, and stricter measures will soon be taken to prevent this. On the other hand, I recently had a benevolent visit—Colonel

Richard C. Herrick, U.S. military attache came to the Command Office. He was impressed by what he saw, although he did have several objections: He said the soldiers enjoyed too much comfort and too much food, after which they must be slow.

[Nuhanovic] I must say you were not completely clear in answering the question of whether we can soon expect to see you in General Bobetko's position.

[Decak] As the saying goes, cemeteries house many of the irreplaceable. I have no knowledge of a change at the top of the officers' pyramid. If you want me to be clearer, I will not be replacing General Bobetko.

[Nuhanovic] Is the rumor that your name is on The Hague list of war criminals true?

[Decak] VECERNJI LIST transferred this nonsense from VECERNJE NOVOSTI, in which Bora Mikelic published his list of war criminals and sent it to the International Court in The Hague. Mikelic's list also contains the names of President Tudjman, Mesic [president of the Croatian Independent Democrats], Seks [deputy prime minister], Glavas, and Mercep [president of the Association of the Croatian Volunteers in the Homeland War].

Role of Southern Divulje Air Base Described

94BA0389A Zagreb HRVATSKI VOJNIK in Serbo-Croatian 20 May 94 pp 77-79

[Article by Gordan Lausic: "Croatian Airman: The Divulje Air Base"]

[Text] The landing of the Hercules transport plane in the presence of a great number of white UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] vehicles told us that we were close to the central air base of the HRZ [Croatian Air Force] in the south of Croatia—the Divulje Air Base. Starting out from Split, we went through the Kastels and past the Split Airport, and a left turn brought us right in front of the entrance. Stop, checkpoint! The guard at the entrance examined our papers. "Fine, Colonel Ticinovic is expecting you," he said as he raised the barrier to let us through. The airspace is crowded with numerous helicopters of the Croatian Army [HV] and the UNPROFOR, and the roads on the base are also crowded. The welcome given us on our arrival by Col. Gorki Ticinovic, commander of this unit, began our one-day stay among the aircraft of this base, which is well-known everywhere in the south of Our Beautiful Land. What we wanted was to learn as much as possible about the life and work of the pilots, the on-board mechanics, and the specialists of the avio service and other services in this unit.

During our stay at the Divulje Air Base, we heard numerous stories that testified to the work and life of its members—from combat missions (many of which were extremely strenuous and dangerous) and numerous sleepless nights to the day when the base was rebuilt after devastation by the JA [Yugoslav Army] during its withdrawal, to the education and training of the unit's new members, and also to the flights of transport helicopters, which have meant salvation to many of the wounded and sick.

This unit's career is similar to that of many that sprang up just before the war or in the whirlwind of conflict. The Divulje Air Base was created from two units—the Independent Air Platoon, which was established in late 1990 at the Sinj Airport under the command of Matko Raos, now a colonel in the HV, from members of the Flying Club of Sinj and Split, and the Joint Air Squadron under command of Col. Mladen Katavic, consisting of members of the Aviation Group of the 6th Operational Zone in Split, established by order of the chief of the HV General Staff on 6 November 1991.

When units of the Croatian Army entered the Divulje Garrison on 22 December 1991, they were accompanied by members of the Joint Air Squadron, who immediately began to clean up the base's devastated housing and work facilities. At the same time, from the Joint Air Squadron's inception some of its personnel were involved in the southern and Lika theaters, where the airmen held the defense lines superbly.

Preconditions were created for receiving Air Force helicopters: And preparations were made for combat action. During the entire time of the operation to liberate the Dubrovnik coast, the constant combat operations of MiG's from the Divulje Air Base and smaller planes which took off from the Air Force base in Opuzen helped considerably the progress of units of the Ground Forces of the Croatian Army. In late 1992 and early 1993, two MI-8-MTV helicopters, given the names St. Duje and St. Ivan, joined the squadron. The two aircraft very quickly had an occasion to show what they could do in Operation Maslenica. The Split Joint Air Squadron went into action at the very outset, making military and humanitarian flights. From February 1993 to the present day, helicopter crews have always been present on all the battlefields in southern Croatia, and at the same time they have also been transporting the sick from the Adriatic islands and helping the island population, and humanitarian flights into Bosnia and Herzegovina have also been organized in agreement with UNPROFOR forces. Since 21 April of last year, a total of several hundred flights have been made to carry more than 1,200 wounded and sick and dozens and dozens of tons of humanitarian cargo.

The public has already been informed about the work and exploits of Col. Matko Raos' pilots and mechanics, who before they became part of the air base were in the Independent Air Platoon. However, we must also mention the exploits of his pilots, who in ultralight aircraft and small planes, armed with suspended missiles they made themselves, instilled fear in enemy ranks, but they also carried wounded and passengers in their transport planes, and even today with a Dornier plane they are maintaining regular air service between Split and Zagreb three times a week. Since 13 April 1993, preparations have been made to organize today's air base, which is being formed officially on 6 August with appointment of Col. Ticinovic the base's commander. It began to operate on the second anniversary of the existence of the Split Joint Air Squadron, on 6 November of last year, so that that day is also the first day of the air base's existence.

The Divulje Air Base is not just the main air base of the HRZ in the south of Croatia, but units of the UNPROFOR are also stationed there. Members of the UNPROFOR first came to the Divulje Air Base in late 1992. "Cooperation with members of units of the UNPROFOR has been better than excellent because we have seen to it that it was. They are well-aware that they are our guests here and they obey the rules of the Croatian Army. This especially applies to flying and coordination of flights," says Col. Ticinovic, as he led us on a tour of the base. "First, we will go to the operations center, the 'brain' of the entire base, the executive arm of the command, which is responsible for receiving and processing the news and coordinating the operation of the units." Peace and quiet in a well-insulated room. The duty officer of the base command is following the air activity on a screen. We did not disturb him, but went on by the paths arranged between the hangars and the command of the aircraft technical company. Its commander, First Lieutenant Luka Supa, was not there on our arrival, he was at the heliport. "Let's go on further to the flight, and when we come back, you will immediately see how the members of the air technical company operate." We went to the heliport, passing through areas of the base where vehicles carrying cargo and people were passing every moment. Rush! Alongside the garage of the base's transportation company, the lads were preparing and inspecting vehicles, which must always be in tip-top condition. Just as much bustle at the heliport as elsewhere. The parking area is filled with British Sea Kings on which they are hurriedly installing heavy machine guns. It seems that their mission in Bosnia is not really "easy." As we took pictures of them, a French naval helicopter flew over us, carrying officers, and our hosts today—the MI-8-MTV helicopter with Col. Mladen Katavic, instructor, Captain Zeljko Pavic, the experienced airplane pilot who is his "student," and Sergeant Elvis Misic, on-board mechanic, came from the direction of Split at precisely the appointed time. They landed, we boarded, the rotation of the rotors speeded up, and we took off: The base remained below us. We looked carefully at the cabin, which has now become an office, a "flight school." We fly over the sea, Trogir is behind us, Solta up ahead. Sgt. Misic explains to us the flight plan and objective of the flight. "The objective of the flight is to explain and demonstrate the specific features of flight over the sea, because sometimes, depending on the weather conditions, you cannot distinguish sky and sea, but have to fly strictly according to the data obtained from the instruments. At the moment, we are flying at an altitude of 300 meters and a speed of 40 km/hr.

"Because of the specific flight conditions, our squadron is conceived as a squadron for operating at sea." Solta! We arrived at our first destination. While Capt. Pavic, under the vigilant eye of Col. Katalic, lands the helicopter, we collect our impressions, preparing to shower them with questions after the flight. We go up, and the "mosquito" with 24 seats takes us in a moment to the outside edge of the island of Hvar, where we slowly make a half-circle, turning toward the interior. The next objective of the flight is the Hvar Airport, destroyed during the war, struck by missiles from aircraft of the Yugoslav Army on 15 September 1991. Col. Ticinovic shows us the destroyed buildings. Suddenly, we rise abruptly, make a circle, and come down again, almost hedgehopping, and then we slowly hover rightward. A few moments later, we are again in the air, we are going to Brac, ahead of us is Bol, and Zlatni Rat.... Several more takeoffs from almost impossible terrains and the return, Omis, Split, Marjan, and Divulje. When we touched down, we got out, and the helicopter was taken over by members of the aircraft technical company. While they inspect the helicopter, and fill it with fuel, they explain to us their job and how they operate. In addition to regular inspections, they are able to replace and repair all the helicopter's parts, from the engine to the smallest part. "There cannot be any improvisation here, no flight takes place without our highly trained personnel. Our service, maintenance, and weapons crews must all be top-flight professionals. The most important things are flight safety, teamwork, and mutual trust," we were told by the boys as we examined their work and the medical team, which is always on duty from outside. We exchanged greetings, and along with the pilots and Col. Ticinovic we went off to the buildings of the command. It was time for the questions. Col. Katalic anticipated us by explaining in detail today's flight as well as the "flight school." "Having realized the need for constant additional education of personnel, we organized retraining of airplane pilots to be copilots on the MI-8-MTV helicopter.

"We are creating our own personnel, we have become a little school. You have to realize that the personnel starting the retraining are already experienced flight personnel. These are old pilots who know their job exceedingly well. Their retraining begins with the first phase, the theoretical education, in which we prepare the student for his first flight and familiarize him with the helicopter. The second phase is flight with an instructor and an information flight in which the specific nature of helicopter flight is demonstrated, the differences between airplanes and helicopters, and everything the helicopter can do. The biggest problem that arises is for the pilot to master landing, takeoff, and hovering. In takeoff and landing, the speed of the helicopter is equal to zero, while for an airplane it is never less than 80 km/hr. After hovering drills have been mastered—this is a precondition for the next phase of training—there are drills in various flight conditions, drills in the so-called 'school circles,' and then comes what we did today. A small trip with landings and takeoffs away from the airfield. Then the pilot must become independent, he must get a feel so that he can determine his own 'airport,' because in a helicopter he is the flight controller and mechanic," Col. Katavic explains briefly. "Everything you see here was created from nothing, we ourselves have prepared the facilities for operation, with the selfless aid of numerous donors from Croatia and the diaspora, who are still helping us today. We are the southernmost air base in Croatia, and for that reason we have the task of providing full support to units of the HV in defense of the borders, because we can do that, as we have shown with the MiG's and with the small airplanes and helicopters. Our pilots recently opened the Dubrovnik Airport with the Dornier 28 airplane, which was a donation to our base from the diaspora, and the Zemunik Airport. Because of the lengthy national border on both land and sea, in the immediate future we will have missions of supporting the Coast Guard of the HRM [Croatian Navy], the antiterrorist and special units of the HV, organizing squadrons of antisubmarine helicopters, and constant education, and, in addition to all the tasks enumerated, there will also be continuation of humanitarian and fire-fighting flights, aid to the island population, and aid to the economy by carrying various cargoes. We have high-quality personnel to perform all those tasks, people with war experience and tradition, and in the future there will also be better and more modern equipment," Col. Ticinovic concluded the conversation. As we were leaving and passing near the base, we watched an UNPROFOR Sea King go up, and after it Col. Katavic's MI-8-MTV, heading out on another "school class." We greeted him with a wave of the hand, we had a long road ahead of us, we needed to organize our impressions, but that is nothing compared to the job which has been done and the tasks which await members of the Divulje Air Base.

Training of Pilots at Pula Air Base

94BA0390B Zagreb HRVATSKI VOJNIK in Serbo-Croatian 12 Aug 94 pp 77-79

[Article by Gordan Radosevic: "Croatian Air Force: Training of Croatian Pilots"]

[Text] The Pula Air Base has been operating as a successful and worthy segment of the Croatian Air Force [HRZ] since the very beginning of organized air resistance in our homeland war. Back in 1991, when the enemy departed from the Pula region, pilots and aviation officials began a devoted effort to create and promote the defensive capability of our newly created air forces. The pilots, technical personnel, and other specialized personnel, who at that time were members of the Aviation Group in the 119th Brigade of the National Guard Corps [ZNG], placed themselves at the disposition of the Croatian Army [HV]. Today, some of the training of HRZ pilots is done at the Pula Air Base and has been continuous since the arrival of the first MiG's, that became part of the HRZ i PZO [Croatian Air Force and Air Defense] back in 1992, along with the training of conscripts for the numerous tasks needed by the HRZ. This is the first of our bases training fighter pilots, but in the quality of training, that is, the instructors, the simulators, and the aircraft, as well as other necessary conditions, they say at the base, they are at the level of the customary standards for such tasks.

In order to round out our impressions concerning the quality and dedication with which the Pula Air Base is assembling the mosaic of improvements of the Croatian Air Defense forces, we will dwell once again for a moment on the beginnings of the organized activity of the Croatian Air Force, that fateful year 1991, when in Pula, as throughout the homeland, a force, which is today strong and respectable, was born from the ashes and would defend the Croatian sky and defend it effectively. Colonel Vladimir Mikac, commander of the Pula Air Base, and Major Zeljko Jelenic, commander of the fighter squadron, recalled those first days. Soon after the war in Slovenia, the Croatian pilots in the former "JRV [Yugoslav Air Force]" passed over in great numbers to the ZNG and, along with other trained personnel, began to rebuild the damaged facilities and also immediately began training. Thus, in Pula, under the command of Brigadier Cerovac, they began to clear the mines and restore the air base to its original purpose, and the pilots, together with all the other technical and support personnel, played an important role in addition to their regular assignments. When conditions came about for operations to begin at the Pula Air Base, and pursuant to an order of Corps General Anton Tus, who at the time was the chief of staff of the Croatian Army, the air squadron was established. They also began to organize the base by recruiting personnel and putting the entire physical plant in order. In addition to the initial conditioning activities, the pilots and officials of the Pula Air Base also contributed their knowledge and experience in helping air defense activities in the regions of Zagreb and Split, and we should emphasize that personnel from the base also took part in combat missions conducted by the Croatian Army. At that time, everyone was doing everything, Maj. Jelenic said, and he emphasized again and again the indisputable and firm patriotic consciousness of these pilots. Among the anecdotes remembered from those difficult days in the twilight of the Yugoarmy on the soil of Croatia and the beginnings of the HRZ, the pilots like to recall the method they figured out to sabotage the activity of enemy aircraft while they were still in the former JA [Yugoslav Army]. That is, during flight they consumed more than the average amount of fuel so that the Yugoslav airplanes would have less for reconnaissance flights in Slovenia.

In short, the Pula Air Base has valuable principles in the wickerwork of the HRZ, three years of dedicated work with emphasis on rounding out their personal and professional attributes, a time in which it grew to become a representative unit of our Army.

Today, the Pula ZB [Air Base] is one of the centers for training, supplemental training, and retraining of fighter pilots, but in addition to that valuable task, which is necessary to our Air Force, the base commander, Col. Mikac, mentioned, the base can also be proud of its emphasis on the quality of technical personnel and all other personnel. The selection of people employed in Pula is based above all on a well-organized screening of candidates and on their meeting very strict psychophysical criteria, in addition, of course, to their professionalism and seriousness in a job in which, as the pilots like to interject, they are not allowed a second mistake. At the moment, there are enough potential fighter pilots in training to satisfy all the missions facing the homeland, in concert with the experienced air wolves, their instructors. Today, the number of aircraft available to the HRZ is also sufficient for devising even the most exacting combinations of missions. It should be emphasized that the Pula Air Base is very suitable for quality pilot training, because it is one of the safest with its clear approaches and favorable weather patterns and its many sunny days in the year. In addition, then, to the highly professional and experienced instructors, good auxiliary potential, and exemplary organization, sound conditions have been created for a stable and pivotal center for the training of pilots for our Air Force.

When we speak about the auxiliary potential of the Pula Air Base, it is essential to stress that the base has all the necessary auxiliary units, from logistics, services, and command, to air defense. They are especially proud here of their air defense system, which makes the Pula Air Base very safe.

As for the organization of work and activity at the Pula ZB, Col. Mikac emphasizes the exemplary discipline and interlinking of all the base's structures, both professional and general. It is quite noticeable that cooperation is excellent between the base and the field, that is, with the people of Pula and Istria in general, where the prevailing attitude is one of full respect and undivided understanding. The city and the region know that there can be no safe Croatian sky without training and exercises, and they are offering all available assistance to the execution of the work missions of the air base, and likewise the people at the Pula Air Base respect the efforts of Istria and the Republic of Croatia to have a successful tourist season, and accordingly they try to show discretion in conducting their daily exercises.

A working day at the air base, a day in the training and drilling of pilots, can be seen from the maxim—a great many conscientiously performed missions, combined with full optimization of all material and technical potential. The pilots' day always begins with the previous day, when they analyze what has been achieved and plan the next working day. In addition to the regular morning briefing, the preparations made, the analysis of weather information, and the mandatory inspection of the aircraft, performance is only the crowning touch of a complicated cycle that is superbly organized here.

Col. Mikac, air base commander, represents future plans in terms of four points: maintaining the quality level of instructors, training young "Croatian wings," creating preconditions for the transition to new models of aircraft with an orientation toward Western military equipment, and continuation of execution of all missions devotedly and with maximum optimization of resources, as has been the case up to now.

The pilots like to say that they have their hardest time on the ground, everything is more beautiful and easier in the air. We want to wish them many other things, we hope that they have peaceful flights, and that they are performed at that level of expertness, seriousness, and patriotism that are nurtured here in Pula.

FRY 'Intentionally Provoking' Border Tension

AU2408211594 Skopje MIC in English 24 Aug 94

[Unattributed report: "NOVA MAKEDONIJA: Does Anyone Need a Conflict?"]

[Text] As the military tension in Bosnia-Herzegovina is easing, at the same time the tension on the border between Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] and Serbia, that is, FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], is increasing, today's NOVA MAKEDONIJA writes. The number of border incidents in the last six months of this year have almost doubled in comparison with the entire previous year. At the same time, the crescendo of the dramatic element and the bitterness in the reactions of high military officers in the Yugoslav Army after every incident is growing. Starting from the statements that the border between Macedonia and FRY is administrative, through that that half the border line is administrative, out of a total of a 231 km long border, 140 km are being disputed (all the way to the latest symptomatic assertions that "Yugoslavia has the biggest problems and disputed over the determination of the border with Macedonia").

All of those are indications, the Skopje paper underlines, that point to the conclusion that the regime in Belgrade is intentionally provoking high tension on the border with Macedonia. Whether because of some more distant and dangerous targets or in order to balance the overall political situations on the Balkans in which an important role is also played by Greece and its embargo on Macedonia, can only be guessed.

The border between Macedonia and Serbia, within the framework of the former Yugoslavia, was determined on several occasions and there was never any more serious controversy. Particularly in the period 1952 to 1954, a full cadastre was drawn up on the basis of which the delimitation of the two republics was completely defined. The remeasuring that took place afterward determined the factual situation several times, and almost without any remarks. After gaining its independence, the Republic of Macedonia accepted this territorial division as a factual situation and suggested to the government of the newly formed FRY to form an interstate commission to define the factual situation and the state border and which would solve the eventual controversial points. The Macedonian side asked for a more precise definition of the border points on the junction between Macedonia, Albania, and FRY, or more specifically, the pasture on Sar Planina and the terrain surrounding the monastery Prohor Pcinski. This proposal has been addressed several times, however, always without a response.

Recently, a separate state commission for determination of the border with the new neighbors was formed in FRY of which the colonel in the Yugoslav Army Tihomir Stojanovic is also a member, who made the symptomatic statement that Yugoslavia had the most border disputes with Macedonia. Just as a reminder NOVA MAKEDONIJA concludes that similar statements were also made by high political and military figures in the wake of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is quite odd how the border with Macedonia could be the most disputable border of FRY, when the border with Croatia and Bosnia is not defined at all, when part of these two countries are under control and occupation of the Serbian Army and when a big question still remains whether and how much of the territories of these two states will belong to Serbia, that is, its sections and self-proclaimed Serbian republics in Bosnia and Croatia. How come suddenly the border with Macedonia turned out to be the most controversial, when the information above clearly shows that there are not reasons for disputing or dramatizing the situation on the border between these two states?! Except, if some political or military reasons are behind all of this, or military reasons known only to the regime in Belgrade.

The border provocations and extreme statements, foremost, by high Serbian military officials, as well as the constant disputes and provocations by high officials of the Serbian Orthodox Church, are only a part of the mosaic of constant pressure put on Macedonia by the Serbian official authorities in agreement with Greece. Their aim is destabilization of Macedonia and its elimination from the political map of Europe. Serbia did not manage to accomplish that at the time of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, as then, the campaigns to the west and the first penetration west of Drina was more important. Macedonia was left for later, however, now the situation is completely changed. That would be a classical occupation, in which case the world would not sit with folded hands. Moreso, seeing that a number of states have come out as guarantors of the territorial integrity of Macedonia, among which the United States has also shown interest.

However, the border incidents, the pressure and the increasing tension on the border, NOVA MAKEDONIJA writes, will always be there when a specific motive arises with which Serbia will want to "warn" Macedonia to be careful how it behaves and to stress that its status is still not fully defined, that the "Macedonian question" is not fully settled. In this context, we can particularly expect them before the forthcoming elections in Macedonia, like it was before the census, with the stationing of the Serbian Army on Macedonian territory on Cupino Brdo. Serbia can use the border pressure on Macedonia also for solving the Bosnian questions, particularly for putting pressure on the international community to get a bigger slice from the Bosnian cake. And this is yet to come. However, we can expect even bigger border trouble when the "Kosovo question" comes next in line. The pressure on Macedonia, whose fate is often linked with the Kosovo problem, by the military analysts ("a war on Kosovo would mean a definite war in Macedonia") could be cleverly used by the Milosevic regime to settle the prospects in this province.

All border pressures and provocations by the Serbian side, together and in excellent correlation with the closing of the border and pressure by our southern neighbor, are also aimed at examining the political, security, and economic endurance of Macedonia and its capability for independent life. That is a highly frequent game of nerves in which the final bill is paid by the people, NOVA MAKEDONIJA writes.

Commerce Chairman on Trade With Slovenia

94BA0371A Ljubljana GOSPODARSKI VESTNIK in Slovene 14 Jul 94 pp 17-18

[Interview with Dusan Petreski, chairman of the Macedonian Chamber of Commerce, by Janez Korosec; place and date not given: "We Are Currently Working Just to Survive"]

[Excerpts] *Dusan Petreski, chairman of the Macedonian Chamber of Commerce: "Because of the blockade, FYROM [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] is almost hermetically sealed, and it is costing us $3 billion."*

The Macedonian Government was in session long into the night when it decided on the temporary freeze on implementing the Slovene-Macedonian free trade agreement advised by the World Bank. Just before that measure, we spoke with Dusan Petreski, chairman of the Macedonian Chamber of Commerce, about these and other issues faced by Macedonia, which is otherwise in eighth place in Slovene exports.

[Korosec] Mr. Chairman, you were in this position during the so-called Age of Lead of the party dictatorship, and you are still there today.

[Petreski] I am now, obviously, but how long I don't know. I consider myself an operative in the area of the economy and I can get some other job. My basic principle has always been that one has to listen to people, and the door to my office is always open to everyone, especially directors. That is also the case in your country, as I have been told in Slovenia. A Chamber of Commerce can only be a service, which is something that the whole developed world has known for a long time. It cannot and must not be a political institution, much an institution of the parties currently in power. It is financed by the economy and no one else.

[Korosec] Its reputation therefore lies only in professionalism.

[Petreski] Only that, as I learned in my visits throughout Europe. In our country, for many decades the Chamber has only been a sort of appendage to party policy. That is why even during those times I firmly said that no official of any party should be in a management position at the Chamber. As soon as I took over this job, I therefore demanded that the basic-level League of Communists organization be disbanded. Now we are nongovernmental and nonparty. What would happen if we had 10 basic organizations of the most diverse parties at the Chamber today?

[Korosec] What do the politicians think about that?

[Petreski] Now, in our difficult situation, everyone is fleeing from "the devil," our economic problems. Of course, they smile pleasantly at some good enterprises, because they are aware that they have the capital to support individual parties. That is the basic problem. Even in developed countries, politics is extremely interested in economic measures and in earning profits that the state urgently needs. It has to do with a mutual and fair relationship between the economy and measures in the areas of domestic and foreign policy. [passage omitted]

[Korosec] You previously mentioned that you have trade difficulties with Slovenia.

[Petreski] I have been in your country many times, and visited many of your cities and enterprises, and I have a lot of friends. My principle is that only deals that are mutually beneficial are honest ones.

That is why I venture to assert that Slovenia is not considering Macedonia's interests enough. We talk at meetings about the possibilities of free trade. Unfortunately, in that regard it is still difficult for us to coordinate the less developed countries, such as Macedonia, and the more developed, which Slovenia certainly is. Because of the structure of production, we are necessarily in an inferior position. We should open the door to each other, however, along with possibilities for cooperation. Bilateral cooperation is like a highway that can be profitable only if vehicles from both sides drive on it.

The $100 million trade deficit—let me repeat that figure—really is not a small one for us. Furthermore, your merchants sell us foreign goods with Slovene markings, but you frequently reject our goods, saying that they are of Serbian origin, which is not true at all. Why don't you ask our ambassador or the Chamber about that? Your businessmen are also complaining about it. Let's give personal encouragement to entrepreneurs, and not adopt administrative measures, especially if no facts are involved.

If that continues, then, as we have already discussed with representatives of your Chamber, then our trade will soon reach zero.

[Korosec] Can you compete with offers from abroad?

[Petreski] You are importing some products and crops from other countries that you could get from us. But are you taking into account the costs of transportation, the cost of the visits by the businessmen and ministers who reach agreement on this, which is a direct burden on enterprises and the state? It is often cheaper if you just dial a telephone number and ask about an offer and price and a delivery date.

I am convinced that you could sell our products much more cheaply to Austria, Italy, Germany, and Eastern markets, and we could certainly sell yours to Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and Turkey. You have your contacts, and we have ours. We are aware, however, that these are relations between two states, and no longer relations between two republics of the former Yugoslavia.

[Korosec] You are probably thinking about wine, fruits, and vegetables as well. The Consumers' Alliance in Slovenia claims that your crops are healthier than those imported from other European countries.

[Petreski] With respect to wine, we could quickly reach an agreement in accordance with European principles. I recently proposed to Prime Minister Drnovsek that we establish a joint commission that could also take steps in regard to possible antidumping cases. If it is necessary to punish someone for that or for poor quality, then let's punish the individuals or enterprises, and not the state. No one can say that our wines are of too low quality, if they are buying them in Europe. It is true that for decades we had ties with Slovenia and that you blended the wines in your country, and then sold them under your own trademarks.

Some of our enterprises have lost the ability to sell in the Slovene market, because your firms have failed. Some of them also invested in equipment—1.5 million German marks is involved—in Slovene enterprises, and have not yet been repaid. I venture to assert that lawsuits in favor of Slovene enterprises are quickly settled in your country, but those in which Macedonian enterprises hold the trump cards go much more slowly. That is why, during my visits to Slovenia, I primarily try to have us continue to negotiate honestly as we have for years and years.

[Korosec] Are you pessimistic, then, about future relations?

[Petreski] Anything but that. Each of us has his own difficulties, and that is why coordination of interests is especially necessary. The main thing is for businessmen to get to know each other and trust each other when making deals. We would want tension over trade least of all, although you have to understand us, especially because of our large deficit, if we demand a more consistent and clearer agreement.

[Box, p 18]

Why Don't We Have "Rules of the Game" for Wine?

[Petreski] A few days ago I said that our wine seemed to be cursed for Slovenia. Why are those restrictions necessary, if we are all swearing by a market economy and we have cooperated extremely well together for years and years? We have respected all the agreements, we have sold Slovenia as many as 5 million bottles, to Emona, Mercator, Pomurka, Zivila... Then your wine lobby obviously became involved. Perhaps there really are new drinking habits, since our wines are too heavy, as some people claim; perhaps the reason is our somewhat higher prices, even though you are criticizing us for dumping. We have never received the real answer for the blockade, however. Unfortunately, it is obvious that we have never been able to agree on the "rules of the game," even though they are quite clear from international custom.

The Slovene blockade has affected Macedonian vintners, but the question is whether the Slovene economy is not losing from this as well. The agricultural ministries, in fact, agreed on importing our wine (1,200 railcars in the first half of this year), but your representatives are avoiding further agreements. We only hear that we do not know how to store wine in wine cellars, which is something that others in the world are not criticizing us for. And something else: Tikves has not even sold a liter of wine directly to Slovenia for three years now. A lot of Slovene importers in Macedonia, however, take our wine in exchange for your products. Think about that.

Opposition Parties on Negotiations With Italy

94BA0377C Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 30 Jul 94 p 30

["Statement by Slovene People's Party and Slovene Social Democratic Party"]

[Text] The statement by Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek that "we would not want... the somewhat changed relationships to affect the position of the Slovene minority in Italy" gives little hope for any sort of substantial improvement in the position of that minority in the future as well.

That statement, in fact, very clearly indicates that Prime Minister Drnovsek, at his meeting on Saturday with Italian leader Berlusconi, primarily avoided any risk that could have led to a deterioration in Slovene-Italian bilateral relations. That avoidance of any risk may be paid for in one way or another by the Slovenes in Italy, and indirectly by the Slovene state as well. It is characteristic that Prime Minister Drnovsek, after meeting with the Slovenes in Italy, could not find words about any sort of improvement in their position, or any effort by his government along those lines. He expressed only the firm intention of not doing anything that might make that minority's position worse.

The Italian side is well aware of everything that it owes to the Slovenes in its own state, since so far it has not fulfilled—and from all appearances does not have any intention of fulfilling—the fundamental obligations that the Italians assumed through the Osimo accord: A law on the comprehensive protection of the Slovenes in Italy is not anywhere in sight. Through the above-mentioned statement, Prime Minister Drnovsek has shown his understanding of the state of Slovene-Italian bilateral relations, namely that any firm position on our side with respect to our western neighbor would necessarily weaken the position of our compatriots there. Through that understanding, he has agreed in advance to the Italian negotiating position—which is nothing more than extortion—namely that the Slovene minority in Italy will feel the consequences of any resolutely expressed demand by the Slovene side.

With that sort of thinking, Prime Minister Drnovsek is already in an inferior, weaker position with respect to his interlocutor. From that psychological position, one can only talk to the Italians about a larger or smaller share in the right to the property that Italian citizens can gain in Istria. Of course, from that kind of position it is not possible to talk with the Italians about the historical Italian moral and material debt to the Slovene people and their state. That debt, in its general outlines, is derived from the following indisputable facts:

1. After the annexation of the Slovene coast, the fascist terror completely destroyed and plundered the cultural and economic institutions that the coastal Slovenes had established through great effort and sacrifice, and which promoted their national survival in those areas. The Italian state has not paid for that damage.

2. About 70,000 nationally conscious Slovenes, in fear of retaliation, fled from their homes in the face of fascist denationalizing violence, and had to seek refuge in the Yugoslav part of Slovenia. They were not voluntary exiles like the Italian exiles in Istria, but rather absolute refugees, without any sort of intergovernmental agreement.

3. The Italian occupation and annexation of the so-called Ljubljana province between 1941 and 1943 brought fascist savagery to an additional part of Slovene territory. That occupation left behind it thousands of burnt Slovene homes, hundreds of hostages shot, and tens of thousands of displaced persons. If the previous state on our territory (the second Yugoslavia) did not claim any compensation for the damage, that did not eliminate the debt to Slovenes. The material damage that took place must be repaid to the population of that country, only most of the harm done—the loss of life—constitutes permanent and irreplaceable damage.

4. The above-mentioned unfulfilled obligations of the Italian state to Slovenes on the basis of bilateral and international agreements.

It is only with those cards on the table that the Slovene side can be an equal partner in negotiations with the Italian side, especially when the latter is presenting demands for prior rights to real estate on the territory of the Republic of Slovenia. When the Italian side presents a precise list of its demands, why does the Slovene side get involved in negotiating on those demands, without having prepared its own exhaustive data on demands for compensation from Italy? This is the latest and also most serious case of an a priori inferior Slovene negotiating position with respect to Italy. The present government, through its characteristic conciliatory attitude and the legacy of socialist internationalism, has irreparably neglected the undoubted moral superiority of the Slovene side.

When the present regime continues Kardelj's practice by rejecting the principle of reciprocity in bilateral relations even when that principle brings us advantages—and that is precisely the case with Italy—it thus pushes us into a position that leads to new territorial losses, as happened at the end of World War I and World War II. Our position, which we also intend to implement, is as follows:

Our state not only has to withstand the pressure of Italian extortion, but in the event that Italy continues to ignore the obligations that it has assumed toward the Slovenes, will also have to bring a complaint before the UN, just as Austria did over Southern Tyrolia, as a result of which Italy was forced to legalize the ethnic rights of the Tyrolian Germans as a package. We are convinced that only internationalization of the Slovene question can lead to a more favorable solution for us.

Marjan Podobnik, president of the Slovene People's Party

Janez Jansa, president of the Slovene Social Democratic Party

Antiaircraft Units Conduct Tactical Exercise

AU2408190994 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] Several of our listeners called our station today and asked what the significance of frequent low overflights of aircraft and helicopters in Ljubljana and Kranj regions is.

The Defense Ministry reported that a tactical exercise of the antiaircraft defense units in the Ljubljana and Upper Carniola provinces and in the vicinity of Postojna has been underway since yesterday.

The drill will last until Thursday, 25 August. There will be several overflights in the region of Grosuplje, Ljubljana, and Kranj today.

Law Changed To Protect Financial Assets

94BA0377B Maribor VECER in Slovene 29 Jul 94 p 4

[Article by Irena Ferluga: "When Will the Nightmare of Solidarity Be Over?"]

[Text] *The door remains open to negotiations; $60 million already in a fiduciary account in a bank in Luxembourg; creditors specified too high a price; two new banks.*

The negotiations on succession to the former Yugoslavia in Geneva, in which the new states on the territory of the former joint state are to agree on how they will divide up the property and debts, are already dragging on for the third year, and there are still no results. The Slovene economy's favorable performance and above all the already more than $2.2 billion in state foreign exchange reserves have recently encouraged foreign creditors to put stronger pressure on our negotiating group. The solidarity clause in the new financial agreement from 1988 is binding upon Ljubljanska Banka and the Maribor Credit Bank, among the other Yugoslav banks listed at that time, to repay the accepted joint debts if the others are unable. In order for Slovenia to protect its national interests, the day before yesterday the State Assembly, at a session closed to the public, adopted by a large majority, at the government's proposal, amendments to the constitutional law on implementing the fundamental constitutional document on the autonomy and independence of the Republic of Slovenia.

Two New Banks

The adopted amendments represent a further step in the process of Slovenia's financial and economic independence; two new banks were already established the day before yesterday, Nova Ljubljanska Banka and the New Maribor Credit Bank. That is supposed to ensure additional legal security for these two banks and the Republic of Slovenia in relations with foreign creditors at a time when negotiations are still in progress on how much of a share of the joint (unallocated) Yugoslav debt Slovenia is to assume. At the same time, negotiations on succession are still going on.

The reasons for that step were explained at yesterday's news conference by Finance Minister Mitja Gaspari; Dr. France Arhar, governor of the Bank of Slovenia; Janko Dezelak, director of the Agency for Rehabilitation of Banks and Savings Banks; and the administrative directors of both Nova Ljubljanska Banka and the New Maribor Credit Bank.

"The main intention is to protect the vital interests of the Republic of Slovenia with respect to three types of creditors: commercial banks abroad and the creditor states of the so-called Paris Club, next to the creditors that obtained claims through later trade, and other creditors from the states of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with which we are resolving the open issues, for example with Croatia. There are no indications that the negotiations on succession will end soon, and it is not clear whether the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro will be lifted. That new state has acquired a great many claims and could thus be able to exploit all the legal possibilities for confiscating Slovene property. The implementation of the solidarity clause would mean the collapse of both our banks," Minister Gaspari said.

The steps that should therefore be taken are: establishing two new banks that have only reregistered themselves, while everything else remains the same as before, while the old banks (the cover banks) have been left with certain obligations, the potential obligations and potential solidarity obligation from the new financial agreement of 1988 (all the obligations of the former Yugoslavia, which applies primarily to Ljubljanska Banka, since the Maribor Credit Bank does not have such obligations). The headquarters of the new banks, which are in rehabilitation proceedings, are headed by the directors that headed them before; they have assumed the obligations that they had before; they remain at the addresses where the banks did business before, and nothing has changed for the depositors (with respect to both current operations and the security of their savings). The headquarters of the old cover banks are at the headquarters of the Agency for Rehabilitation of Banks and Savings Banks, at 3 Republic Square in Ljubljana, and they are administered by the Agency's management.

Being Left Out of the Agreement

Yesterday the Finance Ministry, in a letter also signed by the governor of the Bank of Slovenia, informed foreign countries about the changes that had occurred, which are actually already a well-known international practice with respect to protecting the interests of the national economy of states that are in a debt crisis.

"Slovenia is not asking the ICC-9 consortium of commercial banks for rescheduling, but is rather negotiating for being left out of the agreement. It is negotiating on the price for that decision. For the time being, too high a price has been specified," Minister Gaspari said.

Among other things, the Bank of Slovenia governor said that requiring that Slovenia repay $4.2 billion of the former Yugoslavia's debt was an unacceptable step, especially at a time when the rehabilitation of three banks was under way and when there were already applicants for buying shares in them. "We will not get a buyer this way, however," he said. In that case establishing a cover bank is a well-known practice, since the disputed obligations are left there and disaster is prevented.

"In spite of everything, Slovenia's conduct still gives prospects that it is prepared to repay its part of the known debt: We are regularly forwarding money to a fiduciary account, and on 30 June there was $60.1 million there; some banks are watching that with envy and wondering how to get that money. Our obligation is clear: those accepted by the Slovene banks, and nothing else. We are negotiating about the rest," the governor said. He added that this act by Slovenia was not to the detriment of the creditors, but rather an attempt to protect national interests, and that these actions did not have anything to do with the exchange rate of the tolar at home, where the central bank was using appropriate instruments to maintain the exchange rate.

The total obligation of the former Yugoslavia to the Consortium of Commercial Banks is $4.2 billion, and of this amount, it is known who spent approximately $3 billion. The final user of $1.2 billion is unknown, and Slovenia is prepared to repay this in the proportion recognized by the International Monetary Fund (somewhat more than 16 percent), and to assume somewhat less than $500 million. To be sure, the government presented these ratios to the State Assembly deputies in more detail at its March session (which was also closed to the public) on Slovene public debt and foreign obligations. The fact that the cover banks are being transferred to the Agency for Rehabilitation of Banks does not mean, the finance minister clarified, that the Agency is a black sheep. Together with the other institutions, it will resolve such open issues as the one regarding Ljubljanska Banka's depositors in Zagreb, which has to be resolved at the intergovernmental level. Such contacts should be more intensive as early as next week. For the Agency, taking over the cover banks means several additional personnel solutions, Janko Dezelak added. Some Croatian depositors have also tried to collect their deposits through lawsuits: Ljubljanska Banka has already paid 1.2 million German marks of them, and is still waiting for implementation for 2 million German marks, Marko Voljc said.

Federal

Marjanovic: Russia To 'Demand' Lifting Sanctions

AU2408211994 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Report by Katarina Andric on news conference by Serbian Prime Minister Marjanovic and FRY Deputy Prime Minister Sainovic in Belgrade on 24 August following their return from Russia—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Marjanovic] I believe that the results of this visit have contributed toward this being a new major step forward in the furthering of political and economic relations between Russia and Yugoslavia. Second, in the economic sphere we have actually initiated a process by which the trade between Yugoslavia and Russia would be brought to the level of 1990 and earlier, which means trade amounting to $3 or $3.5 billion at the least. Third, regarding the resolution of the political crisis in the former Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the positions of Russia and Yugoslavia are nearly identical. Four, we encountered a beautiful and traditionally warm reception, not merely from the Russian leadership, but also from the Russian businessmen and people everywhere we went.

I must emphasize that we signed two agreements. The first is a trade agreement between Russia and Yugoslavia, which is the first of its kind since the introduction of sanctions. This agreement does not contain a clause that it will be implemented after the lifting of sanctions. It contains a clause that it will be implemented after its ratification by both governments on the basis of their legislations.

The second agreement concerns the creation of a joint committee for cultural and technical cooperation between the two countries. The third thing were concrete (?barter) deals that we agreed and about which we can talk more later, in the next few days.

The prime minister of the Russian Federation, Mr. Chernomyrdin, has accepted an invitation to visit Yugoslavia soon and very quickly, by literally saying that not only is he accepting the invitation, but that he will certainly come. As you know, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev will also arrive in Belgrade soon.

Mr. Chernomyrdin has told me clearly that Russia will consistently implement the policy that was agreed jointly by Serbian President Milosevic and Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev and that there will be no deviations here regardless of the pressures that have been or might be exerted on their representatives in the Contact Group. Practically, we have accomplished what we departed with and what we wanted to accomplish, and more, I believe. The traditional links have again been brought to the level that befits our countries. That is what I wanted to say. FRY Deputy Prime Minister Sainovic signed this agreement in the name of the FRY Government, while for the Soviet Government [as heard] this trade agreement and the second agreement about the committee for scientific and technical cooperation, and for the Russian side Minister [name indistinct], that is Russian Foreign Relations Minister Oleg Davydov. I must also emphasize that, after the visit by Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, Prime Minister Kontic will visit Russia in return. Therefore, a period of more frequent contacts between our leaderships is on the horizon.

At the same time, I would like to thank Russian Ambassador Shykin for his contribution not merely to the [word indistinct] but also the results.

[Andric] When asked by a reporter whether Russia is ready to initiate the process of lifting, that is to say, alleviating the sanctions, Prime Minister Marjanovic said:

[Marjanovic] We did not discuss specific spheres. Mr. Chernomyrdin emphasized that Russia will demand the lifting of sanctions, which means at least their abatement. He also assured us that there is no reason to maintain these sanctions because they are aimed against the people and because Yugoslavia has done everything it could do and is working toward peace. Everything that our side does is done to benefit peace. Therefore, we were clearly told that Russia will demand the lifting of the sanctions and not merely their alleviation. When this will happen he could not tell, however, it is very important that this process begins.

We know about the pressures on the Russians, we know everything that other members of the Contact Group are trying to do. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Marjanovic Criticizes Bosnian Serb Leaders

AU2508105394 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 0824 GMT 25 Aug 94

[Speech by Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic to the Serbian Assembly in Belgrade—live; broadcast in progress]

[Text] ...(?syringes) for children. One year later they were tightened. Yugoslavia and Serbia have been bearing them stoically, aware that they did not have any other choice if they wanted to help the Serbs outside Serbia, who were at war, and convinced that the international community would after all come to its senses regarding the unjust brutality to which it had subjected the 12 million innocent citizens of Yugoslavia.

As we all in Serbia and Yugoslavia know, and as we believe the international community must have known, these sanctions have hurt most those who have nothing to do with war, those who are not involved in politics, those who cannot influence events in society in any way: children, the elderly, the sick, the disabled, and the poor. They have paid the highest price for the decision of the international community to punish the policy of help from one country to its people outside their mother country, people who are at war. However, even that, the most suffering party in Yugoslavia and Serbia [words indistinct].

On the contrary. In the meantime, the Serbs in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina made military advances. They managed to establish control over a large part of the former republic, in which they lived together with the Croats and Muslims.

The many efforts by the international community to stop the war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, to end bloodshed unprecedented in Europe at the of the 20th century, have resulted in a proposal that the so-called contact group for Bosnia-Herzegovina presented to the world public at the end July. This proposal envisages that the Serbs in Bosnia get one half of the total territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They would have the right to form their recognized state and were offered the opportunity to have confederal links with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

That is what you think. [Marjanovic replying to someone in the hall]. I don't care what you think.

[The assembly chairman calls on deputies to be quiet]

In this way their demands, which they had when they entered into war against the Muslims and the Croats, had been fully met. Their reasons for the struggle that they waged have also been acknowledged. Peace could therefore start in the interest of the Serbs in Bosnia and in the interests of the citizens of Serbia and the FRY, who have indirectly been suffering. And finally this is in the interest of all people who have been waging war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of their nationality. All this enjoys the support and has the guarantees of the international community. The international community also promised that possible omissions, grievances, and additional demands concerning the borders and mutual relations could subsequently be resolved by the three warring peoples in Bosnia in a diplomatic way, gradually [words indistinct] by the international community.

This solution puts an end to the greatest agony in the contemporary world. It removes the possibility of the war spreading through the Balkan peninsula and further afield, ends the physical suffering of thousands of people, above all in Bosnia, as well as in this neighborhood.

However, to the surprise of the entire world, Yugoslavia, Serbia, and every normal person, the leadership of the Serbs in Bosnia rejected the international community's proposal. Allegedly dissatisfied with the proposal from the point of view of the interests of the Serbs whom they represent, or claim to represent, they want to continue the war. They take the view that they have the right to a more of the territory of the former Bosnia- Herzegovina than one half. They are prepared to continue with the bloodshed of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina for a territory larger by only a few percent, and to lead the people into even greater suffering.

They have also not taken into account that by rejecting the peace proposed by the international community [words indistinct] sanctions for the FRY. Even if the leadership from Pale enjoyed the real support of the Serbian people in Bosnia for continuing the war, and if the continuation of the war were in their interest, there is the great moral question of whether they should continue the war if this war endangers the interests of the 11 million people of the FRY who are under the brutal sanctions of the international community for the help that they have been extending to the Serbian people in Bosnia over the last two years.

Because of this situation, even if this were the view of all of them in Bosnia, of whom there are only about 700,000-800,000 at present, should the mother country [words indistinct] because of few kilometers, a few villages, or a few so-called strategic points overlooking its territory, which, according to the representatives of these people living outside their mother country, are of vital importance to the people. However, it could easily happen that the nation, which has already been radically reduced through loss of life or emigration, ceases to exist.

Everything indicates that the leadership of the Serbian people in Bosnia, consciously or unconsciously, does not represent the interests of the Serbian people there and is completely endangering the interests of the Serbian people in Serbia and the interests of all citizens of Serbia and Yugoslavia. Such a policy of theirs cannot have the support of Serbia and Yugoslavia.

On the contrary, if they pursue such a policy they must count on our resistance. The opposition of the FRY and Serbia to the policy of the Pale leadership is not only in the interest of the citizens of the FRY and Serbia, but also in the interest of the Serbian people in Bosnia.

The reasons for entering the war no longer exist. The demands that the Serbian people had have been met. Peace could, peace must begin. Opposed to peace are only those who are benefiting from the war, those who have profited in the war in various ways, and those who want to protect their (?profits), those who can protect their profits only in the conditions under which they made that profit, that is, in war conditions.

Those who are afraid of peace may also want to continue the war and reject peace. It is possible that peace could open the question of responsibility in the war, even on the side of, in the circles of, and among individuals whom the public thought were innocent, (?clean), and honorable.

This happens in all wars. There are always those who fight honestly and honorably and those who use some else's struggle to serve personal and often dishonorable interests. The fear of disclosing such motives and such truths is one the major obstacles to establishing peace in Bosnia.

The (words indistinct] message of the leadership of Serbia and Yugoslavia to the Serbian people in Bosnia is that peace is in our common interest, their interest there and our interest here. They must put a stop to the loss of life, they must work for the return of their refugees so that they can start to work, rebuild towns, villages, factories, and [word indistinct], to start to live again, free of the fear that led them to war in the first place.

We in Serbia and Yugoslavia need to rid ourselves of the sanctions, the enormous costs to the Serbian people who have been at war for the last two years, and enormous obligations to the refugees here. We need to recover economically and socially, to join the international community, and to plan development in the fields ranging from economy and science to culture.

Serbia cannot allow itself to be undeveloped and [word indistinct], especially when there are no reasons for it. On the contrary, it is obliged to turn to its progress and establish links with the international community. It is obliged to do so for the sake of its own citizens, its youth, and future generations.

Presenting such a stand of the Serbian Government I expect support for this stance, that is, this policy from the Serbian Assembly.

I warmly greet you on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Serbia.

Jovanovic Rejects UN Report on War Crimes

LD2408161094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1541 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Belgrade, Aug. 24 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic on Wednesday dismissed as groundless a United Nations report on war crimes committed in former Yugoslavia.

In a protest letter to the U.N. secretary general, a copy of which was sent to TANJUG on Wednesday, Jovanovic said the team of U.N. experts without any evidence blamed Belgrade and the former Yugoslav army For armed conflicts in former Yugoslavia.

Jovanovic described the report as a one-sided indictment against the Serbs rather than an objective finding by experts appointed by the U.N. to perform a highly responsible task.

The report says that the Croats and the Muslims did not commit crimes in an organized manner and that they had publicly expressed regret about the sporadic crimes which were not the result of their official policies.

On the other hand, the chief blame for the crimes against humanity has been placed on the Serbs, in an evident attempt to accuse them of pursuing a well-planned and organized policy of ethnic cleansing of the Muslims and Croats, said Jovanovic.

The U.N. experts did not mention the fact that Yugoslavia, the Bosnian Serb republic and the republic of Serb Krajina had repeatedly condemned war crimes, said Jovanovic.

He also said that the report was issued without the annex which should contain evidence on all accusations made in the report, although the experts had been instructed by the U.N. secretary general to include the annex as an integral part of the report.

Jovanovic said that could only be described as withholding evidence.

He also said that Cherif Bassiouni, who chairs the U.N. war crimes commission, had shown an unexcusable degree of biasness and impartiality to some of the parties to the conflict (in former Yugoslavia).

This could seriously compromise the role of the U.N. and its agencies in efforts to resolve the crisis as put into question the validity of the report itself, said Jovanovic [sentence as received].

He said it was even more strange that William Stuebner from the international tribunal on war crimes committed in former Yugoslavia would say at a recent meeting in the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry that the tribunal received no reports from the Yugoslav government.

Copies of letters accompanying the material sent to Bassiouni from the Yugoslav U.N. mission in Geneva by secretary of the Yugoslav government commission on war crimes testify to the contrary, said Jovanovic.

Serbia

'Stormy' Serbian Assembly Session Expected

AU2508092094 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 25 Aug 94

[Text] The Serbian Assembly will hold its 4th Extraordinary Session today. Our reporter Dusica Jovanovic reports from the Assembly:

[Jovanovic] We have unofficially heard that the session is expected to start in about 10-15 minutes. A large number of deputies are already in the main hall. Others are in front of it, waiting to be called in to take their places. Members of the Serbian Government are also arriving.

This Fourth Extraordinary Session was called by Assembly Chairman Dragan Tomic at the request of 84 deputies from the Serbian Renewal Movement, the Serbian Radical Party, and the Democratic Party of Serbia, but deputies from all the other parties also agreed to participate in the session.

In brief, the topic is the Yugoslav and Serbian authorities' reaction to the stand taken by the leadership of the Serbian republic on the contact group's peace plan for the settlement of the crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A stormy debate is expected here and this is probably why the Information Service of the Serbian Assembly has announced that the session will last several days. The deputies will vote on this in a special motion.

We have no other details at present.

Socialist Leader Jovic Condemns Bosnian Serbs

AU2408170294 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 19 Aug 94 p 2

[Interview with Borisav Jovic, deputy chairman of the Serbian Socialist Party, by Milomir Maric; place and date not given: "On a Dangerous Path"]

[Text] [Maric] Is peace in Bosnia closer than ever?

[Jovic] I am not sure that it is too close, in view of everything that is happening. The situation in the field is very difficult and complicated, and it would be so even if the maximum willpower were shown by all three sides, there were utter impartiality on the part of the great powers, certain sacrifices were made by all sides, and there was a strong desire by them to settle things. Yet, there is neither enough impartiality nor elementary readiness to make compromises.

It Is Lasting a Long Time

[Maric] Whoever would have thought that the war would end up with a sort of inter-Serbian conflict?

[Jovic] Well, in the physical sense, there is no inter-Serbian conflict. There are only different views of the moment we are in, and of the choice of finding a way out. History will subsequently assess it as a natural occurrence taking place in very difficult circumstances, when any decision made by a part of the Serbian people determines the destiny of the entire Serbian people. However, the Serbian people does not yet have a forum that can legitimately make decisions on its behalf, although all the time the world is punishing the entire Serbian people.

We happen to be in a situation in which our fate depends exclusively upon a decision of the leadership of a smaller part of the Serbian people, that is, the leadership of the Srpska republic. Our assessment is that the continuation of the war would only claim even more victims, it would only further exhaust the Serbian people and cause more material destruction, and seriously endanger Serbia and the FRY, given the prospect of additional, extremely severe sanctions. On the other hand, in view of the inevitable military strengthening of the opposing side, the Serbian people in Bosnia- Herzegovina might find themselves in a situation in which they will start losing what they now hold, while the international community would never recognize those territories as Serbian again. There is a great danger that Serbia and the FRY might become involved in the war, and that it might lose the war with catastrophic consequences and a devastated country, because neither Serbia and the FRY nor anyone else is able to fight against the entire international community.

We are confronted with a choice: either to accept a peace plan that is not satisfactory in any case or to lose everything, which would be catastrophic for both this entire generation and many future generations. Political, strategic and military estimates tell us quite convincingly that we have no choice but to accept the peace plan, no matter how unjust we might think it is for us.

[Maric] The Bosnian Serb leadership went to Pale to discuss the issue at the Assembly after the talks with the Yugoslav and Serbian leadership, where it had agreed categorically to endorse the contact group maps provided certain conditions were fulfilled.

[Jovic] Their behavior totally disregards the agreement. It has been going on like this for a long time, and now it has gone too far. Not because somebody finds it annoying but rather because our country cannot stand it and put up with it any longer.

Because of our responsibility to the citizens of Serbia and the FRY and the entire Serbian people, we had no choice in this situation but to dissociate ourselves from the wrong policy, which is not based on any objective estimate, interests that can be really accomplished, and which could lead the entire Serbian people to destruction, with many casualties and huge material losses.

[Maric] This is not the first time the Srpska republic leadership has defied agreements. The same situation happened with the Vance-Owen plan.

[Jovic] Well, Karadzic signed the plan in Athens and said he would recommend the Serbian Republic Assembly to endorse it, and then he said the plan should not be endorsed and, of course, it was rejected. Such a way of pursuing policy does not inspire confidence.

[Maric] Does the Serb leadership in Bosnia perhaps have other international contacts, apart from the leadership of Serbia, on the basis of which it holds certain attitudes or takes certain steps?

[Jovic] There is some speculation about that but we have never really had any evidence of such connections.

Some of Them Even Cried

[Maric] How do you compare this situation with the difficulties that arose when the Vance plan was supposed to be accepted in the republic of Serbian Krajina?

[Jovic] A certain combination of war and peace is necessary in politics, and it sometimes happens that politicians and soldiers are not capable of assessing a situation realistically, that they lose control and cannot desist from pursuing a war option.

When almost all the Serbian regions in Croatia were under Serbian control, except for a part of central Slavonia, which was of no significance, the Serbian people had neither the need nor the ambition to conquer Croatian territories, but rather to wisely preserve its own territories. It was quite logical that such a military situation should be politically sanctioned at the right moment, ensuring that the territories would be preserved without further clashes. Since there was no chance of reaching such a political agreement with the Croats it was necessary to look for a chance in a different way, through the protection of those territories by the United Nations, in order to end the armed conflict and protect the Serbian people from mass persecution, because in Slavonia columns and columns of people were leaving the region, fleeing before continuing Croatian onslaughts. The Serbian Krajina leadership was, however, quite distrustful of the idea at the time, and it considered that we want to surrender them to the United Nations and eventually, with the help of United Nations, to Croatia.

Milan Babic, who was the president at the time, made a public statement alleging that we wanted to occupy Krajina and establish our military regime there. Such distrust was something really unbelievable. Now, our role there has saved Krajina, because they are entitled to aid dispensed from the federal budget, supporting their administration, judiciary, until the issue of Krajina is finally settled. Krajina is relatively underdeveloped to be able to support its state and army itself. As you know, the talks we held with its officials were really difficult. Some of them even cried, cursed, threatened....

[Maric] Were there really moments when guns were drawn at the meeting of the all-Serbian leadership?

[Jovic] Nobody drew any guns but there were provocations and threats. General Blagoje Adzic set on one of their officials to strangle him but we managed to stop him in time. Babic was three or four hours late for the meeting. He did not oversleep, as was reported. Rather he did it deliberately because he wanted to avoid making a decision, even though 50 or 60 people were waiting for him in the hall, the entire leadership of Yugoslavia, Krajina, Bosnia, Montenegro, and the military top brass. When Babic finally appeared Adzic said it was sheer impudence that he had let them all wait for several hours. To this remark Babic's minister for religions retorted that Babic would continue to behave as he liked because he was the prime minister. Whoever wanted to wait for him should wait and whoever did not should leave.

Adzic was really incensed and told him to shut up, otherwise he would throttle him with his own hands. That is, he should shut up so Adzic would not have to strangle him. However, the minister kept on provoking him: "Come on, strangle me if you dare!" And Adzic jumped up and set on him so we had to stop him, otherwise there might have been real trouble.

It was the generals who then said: "Gentlemen, we have finished our war, and now you are the ones who have to accomplish political settlements! We cannot keep on sitting on the front and protecting the territory!" We insisted that nobody could leave the meeting until a positive decision was made, that is, until the Vance plan was accepted, because it was unreasonable constantly to send in troops and keep on fighting, because the territory had already been liberated and it had to be preserved by political means.

Babic did not want to hear about it. During a break, I told him in private, quite straightforwardly, that he had to understand that the interest and survival of the Serbian people was in question, and the issue had to be positively resolved, with him or without him. He looked at me and said: "How do you mean without me?" I told him: "Quite simply, you will be suspended, and we shall appoint other people who will accept it. This has nothing to do with the will of one or the other man, this is a turning point for the Serbian people." He only smiled and said: "I am not quite sure that your plan will work."

[Maric] Could something similar happen with Karadzic?

[Jovic] I do not know, I cannot say. It all depends on the further course of events, and on internal movements in the Srpska republic. I am not familiar enough with the situation. It would be easier if the leadership saw its mistake and changed its attitude rather than further heat up the conflict because it is a very dangerous and difficult path they are treading. Still, I do not exclude any possibility.

[Box, p 2]

[Maric] How much understanding do you have for the Bosnian Serbs' rejection of the plan?

[Jovic] We can have understanding only for the part of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina that will remain outside the proposed borders, or for the part of the people who are not familiar enough with the strategic and political circumstances that are limiting us and compelling us to take such a course.

For their leadership, however, I do not have much understanding. It has embarked on a hazardous game of life or death, gambling with the lives and interests of the Serbian people, not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also in Yugoslavia and the republic of Serbian Krajina.

SK-PJ Accuses Pale Leaders of 'Profiteering'

AU2408132394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1039 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Belgrade, 24 Aug (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Council of the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia [SK-PJ] in today's statement stressed the conviction that "the decision to continue the war is not motivated by the interests of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but by the interest of its representatives in Pale."

The SK-PJ believes that "it is logical that the authorities in Pale are against peace," because their "extremism has contributed to the war in the same way as Muslim and Croatian extremism."

The statement goes on to state that the authorities in Pale also oppose peace "for personal reasons," because "it is possible that peace would raise the issue of the responsibility—which the war has obscured—for profiteering, immorality, crimes...."

Peace is in the interest of the citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and all the people living in and around the areas where the war is being waged, reads the statement, in which the SK-PJ appeals to "all those who make decisions regarding the war to opt for peace."

SPO Spokesman: Unification Idea 'Ill-Timed'

AU2308151694 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] The Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO] held its regular news conference today. Executive Committee Chairman Milan Komnenic addressed journalists. Here is a report by Svetlana Zivkovic:

[Begin Zivkovic recording] At the coming session of the Serbian Assembly, Komnenic said, the SPO will discuss most seriously the things that the party considers to be of primary state and national significance. Komnenic (?pointed out) that SPO deputies will not have a strict party approach and will not go into interparty bickering and (?quarrels).

Speaking about referendum that will be held in the Srpska republic next weekend, Komnenic pointed out that the already dubious legal character and legality of the referendum is made even worse by the fact that all citizens born in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina will be able to take part in it. Komnenic is of the opinion that with this move of increasing an already unknown number of voters, Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, wants to appear more convincing.

Regarding the declaration on the unification of (?all) Serbian lands, the SPO is of the opinion that it is most ill-timed and has been started by people who possess neither political or (?moral) legitimacy to bring such a great and noble idea on the political market [words indistinct] chances for it to (?come true). [end recording]

Opposition Party Seeks 'Better Solution' for B-H

AU2408145794 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] The Democratic Party of Serbia today held a regular news conference. Party President Vojislav Kostunica presented the party's stands on the situation in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and the extraordinary session of the Serbian Assembly scheduled for tomorrow [25 August]. Svetlana Zivkovic reports:

[Zivkovic] Kostunica repeated that the Democratic Party of Serbia strives for a better peace solution than the one that has been offered by the Contact Group, because, as he said, poor peace solutions could lead to an even deeper war. The main shortcoming of this plan, Kostunica said, is the absence of guarantees for the Serbian side regarding the status of the Srpska republic and the lifting of the sanctions against the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia].

The Democratic Party of Serbia will promote these stands at the extraordinary session of the Serbian Assembly tomorrow. As Kostunica stressed, the session was called by three opposition parties whose views on the national policy are different, but who all agreed that such an important issue of the national and state policy should be discussed in the republican parliament.

Views Contact Group Plan

LD2408144994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1253 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Belgrade, 24 Aug (TANJUG)—Vojislav Kostunica, president of the Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS] said today that all that the Contact Group's draft plan for Bosnia does is to confirm that the Serb side has not been offered any guarantees regarding the constitutional status of the Srpska republic and the lifting of the sanctions.

"The nonexistence of guarantees merits an extraordinary session of the Serbian parliament," Kostunica said at a news conference adding that the fact that the parliament was convened is an obvious success for the opposition.

The DSS leader stressed that the draft plan, which he described as bizarre, will mean nothing unless it becomes a document. According to Kostunica, it is a vague proposal according to which Bosnia is both a bipartite state and a tripartite union, representing a conglomerate of federal and confederal elements with the federal elements dominant.

Kostunica said that the draft plan no longer refers to the union of the Bosnia-Herzegovina republics but only to the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The term "entity" is also being used in order to distort the situation and to prevent the Bosnian Serbs from linking up with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kostunica said.

He thinks that the plan is infeasible and that "the war in Bosnia cannot be expected to end soon on the basis of this peace proposal."

Commenting on the extraordinary session of the Serbian assembly, Kostunica said that its outcome "is predictable". However, the DSS believes that the discussion preceding it is more important, he said.

According to Kostunica, the discussion will show that "every normal person is for peace but it must be clear that there is a better peace than the one on offer and that this proposal could be the introduction to a new war."

Kostunica criticized some of the Socialist Party leaders for their prediction that the speaker's platform of the parliament will be abused. According to Kostunica it has already been abused by the fact that such an important issue of foreign, national, and state policy has not yet appeared on the parliament's agenda.

Chief Editor Tijanic Resigns From RTV Politika

AU2508085494 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Aug 94 p 26

[Unattributed report: "Tijanic Resigns"]

[Text] At today's session the board of RTV Politika accepted the resignation of Aleksandar Tijanic, editor in chief of RTV Politika. Tijanic's resignation note—which does not give any explanation—reads: "Since RTV Politika has been proclaimed the best and most professional station in all the public opinion polls this year, I have been forced to tender my resignation. [sentence as received] I can, and will not act differently."

Rada Visic, former editor of Radio Politika, was appointed acting editor in chief of RTV Politika at the same session.

Tijanic Appointed Deputy Director

AU2508110294 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Aug 94 p 28

[A.Dj.-attributed report: "Tijanic Deputy Director of RTV Politika"]

[Text] Belgrade (BNA TIKER)—TIKER has found out from Hadzi Dragan Antic, general director of the Politika house, that Aleksandar Tijanic, editor in chief of RTV Politika, has been appointed deputy director of RTV Politika. "I have three months to find a successor for him," Antic also said. This puts an end to speculation that Tijanic is to be appointed ambassador to Athens.

Tijanic Responds

AU2508085794 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Aug 94 p 28

[Unattributed report: "I Will Not Participate in Sale of House"]

[Text] The news that Aleksandar Tijanic, director of RTV Politika, "the Robin Hood of journalism"—as he calls himself—has resigned represents a rerun of an event from last year for those in the know. When he returned from his holiday in Greece last summer, Momcilo Pantelic, the then chief editor of POLITIKA, resigned. Aleksandar Sasa Tijanic, too, resigned on his first day back from a holiday in Greece (which he apparently spent with Zoran Djindjic [Democratic Party leader]). The chances are that the trouble with the Serbs across the Drina was giving Tijanic a headache, too, as his editorial policy—one hears—"did not fit in with the policy of Hadzi Dragan Antic, top man in the Politika house." Tijanic's statement to BORBA yesterday could be explained in that light.

"I have ascertained that there are people within the house that are ready to sell the house itself having already sold journalism. I will not participate in that," he said.

Police Involvement in Organized Crime Viewed

94BA0392A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 5 Aug 94 pp 10-12

[Article by Branka Andjelkovic and Srboljub Bogdanovic: "Police and the Mafia: The Sticky Nightstick"]

[Text] Aside from the other costs of maintaining the police, the citizens of Serbia make appropriations for the salaries of about 80,000 employees in law enforcement agencies. These funds are an important item in the republic budget, but by no means is this the final figure, because it is the prevailing conviction of the citizenry that police take for themselves as much as they need.

The favorite summer sensation of most of the media is the testimony of Inspector Dragan Mladenovic, who raised the issue of whether or not we have organized crime. From what Mladenovic says, an organized underground is a luxury we can do without in our still modest environment. We do not need a Mafia, it turns out, because we have police already performing that function.

Vice-Ridden Milieu

"If we have organized crime, it must be in collusion with the state, regardless of the party in power, the type of regime, or the social system," says Dobrivoje Radovanovic, director of the Institute for Criminological and Sociological Research, emphasizing at the same time that he is not basing his conclusions on the assertions of Inspector Mladenovic, because, he says, "that inspector is in a special situation."

"Because we do nevertheless have organized crime, admittedly in the development stage, it has its connections in the bodies and agencies of the state, and here the police, the judiciary, and the bodies of government are the most important targets."

In discussion of the criminalization of the police, it should be said that what we mean by that here is the activity of individuals or quite small groups that have entered into "private business," using for that purpose the positions they hold in law enforcement agencies, and especially their acquaintances and connections established in the underground. From what the police themselves say, every policeman, if he is a real one, spends a major portion of his working life in constant contact with "collaborators from vice-ridden milieux," which is the professional term given for members of the underground.

Today, the "vice-ridden milieux" in the underground and the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] are linked up to such an extent that this is no longer just a criminological phenomenon. According to Professor Radovanovic, simultaneous phenomena have favored the advance of organized crime: the economic crisis, the sanctions, the disintegration of the state, and uncontrolled privatization. Organized crime, assisted by government agencies, including the police, has been used in order to break the blockade, and the benefit has gone not only to the state (if it had any at all), but also to the underground channels which have been doing business and their collaborators in the system of government. Once you rush into that kind of network, there is no running back out of it, because in time, according to Radovanovic, the government structures become hostages to these dangerous liaisons, and the "vice-ridden" collaborators derive much greater benefit from this than the government institutions.

Mandatory Instruction

The Yugoslav police have had a long tradition of collaboration with "vice-ridden" groupings. The best example that brought to the light of day the way in which these things are done was the case of the murder of Andrija Lakonic in 1990 in the nightclub "Nana," following which it was established in the trial itself that the police had been permissive toward the persons involved in these events because of certain services which they had rendered the police, or, more precisely, state security. It was never learned what kind of services they had been, but it was obvious that there were many such services, and as a consequence the accused had for all practical purposes enjoyed the constant protection of the police. "In Belgrade, a category of criminals emerged who were operating under protection of the police," the lawyer of one of the defendants said in the trial.

Contacts of this kind, however, are the usual method in which any police department operates, and they were even foreseen by the so-called "Mandatory Instructions on Operational Work," which were top secret, but their existence was irrefutably established in the court. Contacts with collaborators from the underground were mainly made through the state security service, because most of those recruited for this type of collaboration were in the group of collaborators "for patriotic reasons," who readily agreed to offer help to the police even when they perceived this as an "interest of the state." They showed much greater firmness, our police sources say, when conventional "informing" was involved.

The essential mistake was made when police informers and collaborators were allowed to engage in crime with impunity because of their "past service to the state." The policemen who maintained "contact" with these people offered them unlimited protection, although the "Operational Instructions" referred to did not envisage this, and as the "vice-ridden collaborators" rose in the criminal hierarchy, so did the rank of the policemen who collaborated with them. They would come a long way in a few years.

Too Many Police Agencies

"There are several police agencies operating in Belgrade. Aside from fighting crime, they also wage war with one another," said Bozidar Spasic, state security operative known as "Black Pearl" on the program of TV Politika, that same year, 1991. It was the affair of the "Nana" and certain names mentioned in connection with it that revealed that a group had been organized in Zagreb which later "found" stolen motor vehicles, and did so legally, through the form of an agency, which it did in direct collusion with those who had stolen those vehicles in the first place. Our police informants also call attention to the particularly symptomatic circumstance that recently a terribly small percentage of motor vehicle thefts have been discovered.

Much the same is true of the series of executions that have occurred in the last two or three years. The victims of the gangland murders have been associated in one way or another with the underground, political, or business elite. Police ineffectiveness is always one of the principal indirect indicators that something is not as it should be. It is incomprehensible, our informants say, that declared criminals should strut about the city and even give interviews, while the police know exactly what they are doing and do nothing about it. We might also say that certain prestigious members of the underground drive cars with four-digit license plates, which was always an unofficial sign of recognition of members of law enforcement agencies.

The usual services which the police perform for those they protect in the underground are issuing passports and gun permits, but in time this grew into toleration of serious criminal acts, such as smuggling drugs or arms. It is clear that in this situation a policeman who is not conscientious does not have to travel far from being a passive observer to being an active participant.

Sumptuous Gifts

With this prehistory in mind, one gets a clearer idea of the kind of ties today's police have with people on the other side of the law and why certain inspectors consider the police to be the principal mafioso organization or the organization within which there are several competing criminal organizations. It is, of course, difficult to prove all these speculations, and so in the police itself there are not many people who have any reliable knowledge of this. That is the main objection which serious policemen make to the allegations of Dragan Mladenovic, because it is unusual for a junior inspector to have access to such information (except, of course, if he obtained it from someone who is better-informed).

"Once organized crime is developing, it cannot be got rid of, but it can be kept under control if the following conditions are met: public scrutiny of the operation of the police, an internal department to see that the police operate properly, a board or committee in the parliament including people whose identity would be protected for the sake of security and whose recommendations would be binding on state agencies. At the same time, there must be a card file on the standard of living of all those who hold power at all levels," says Dobrivoje Radovanovic. The well-informed say about this last requirement that the standard of living of certain officials is usually a solid indicator of whether law enforcement personnel have certain "extraordinary" sources of income or are living on their modest salaries. If it is true that Assistant Minister Stojicic is driving a Porsche, as Dragan Mladenovic says, then it is certain that he did not buy it out of his pay.

Legal Thievery

If, then, there are suggestions that the police are criminalized to a great extent, it is logical to ask why political structures, which one way or another do have an influence on the work of the police, are tolerating all this?

"Crime still has not established ties with those who hold political power, which is organized crime's strategic objective. However, this does not justify neglect of this problem by political structures," says Radovanovic. And Vladan Batic, deputy of the DSS [Democratic Party of Serbia] and a lawyer by profession, believes that a link-up has been made between the crime lords and the upper levels of capital, by which he means the chief executives of state-owned firms, who are more and more frequently turning up as political officeholders as well. The main stealing being done in this state, in Batic's opinion, is not done through the police, but rather there are forms of legal thievery through primary note issue or the extension of loans in the millions which are paid off with small change under the conditions of hyperinflation.

It is widely believed by the public that political structures tolerate large-scale criminal activities which are conducted with knowledge of the police or with their help because they themselves are involved and are taking a cut. That is the opinion of Vladan Batic, who points out that in our country war profiteers have not only not been prosecuted, they have even been glorified in the public media. Need we recall here that those advertised as war profiteers are people who earlier were described more or less openly as "collaborators of law enforcement agencies," specifically those from "vice-ridden milieux"? We should also cite as other reasons for the favoring of particular personnel in the MUP personal acquaintance, family ties, and other Balkan combinations that affect the shaping of personnel policy.

Instant Training

Wartime conditions have also produced a corresponding selection of people for the MUP. Those who qualified through past service mainly at the front have been emerging more and more as the key people, while the real professional police have often been given a back seat. According to Vladan Batic, a large number of people recruited for the police are not from Serbia and in their own communities were actually deserters, because they evaded the military obligation, but here they have been in a situation to demonstrate their strength, power, and might.

"The police school in Sremska Kamenica cannot turn out as many personnel as the MUP is constantly demanding, especially because a large number of these people quit because of the difficult working conditions and the low pay. Those who stay, precisely because of the poor pay, are more subject to the temptations of corruption. Those are the conditions under which our police are operating," says Dobrivoje Radovanovic.

The usual way of obtaining a blue uniform today is to take the three-month course, and this lack of selectiveness has been determining the behavior of the police over the last three or four years.

It should be said, however, that the charges being lodged against the police (they always talk about individuals or groups, never about the entire department) far exceed what could be considered a fight for mere survival. The reference is to organized abuses of those who are using this sensitive service for conventional crime.

Radmilo Bogdanovic, former police minister, has said in an interview published in EKSPRES, that all the charges and suspicions related to the operation of the police should be checked out. It is difficult to figure out who could be the one to examine those charges, especially because Radmilo Bogdanovic gives no indication of this, although he is chairman of the federal security committee and a member of the republic security committee.

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